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Executive Summary 
This report was commissioned by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs and has been undertaken by the ESRC Centre for Business Relationships, 
Accountability, Sustainability and Society of Cardiff University.  It aims to provide a 
clearer understanding of the role which corporate social responsibility (CSR) currently 
plays in influencing the activities of companies involved in the nanotechnologies industry 
in the UK, and how CSR may contribute to protecting society from any health and 
environmental risks which may emerge from nanotechnology applications in the future.  
 
Structure of the Research 
Findings are based on three phases of research, which comprised: 
 
Phase 1: A review of the literature on risks associated with nanotechnology and the role 
of CSR.   Two key elements of the literature review were to amalgamate all current 
transnational and national standards and codes of conduct relevant to nanotechnology 
sectors and the identification of general CSR criteria to be utilised in Phase 2. 
 
Phase 2: an online survey of global nanotechnology companies and products either 
currently on the market or in development led to a sample of 78 companies based in the 
UK, or with substantial Research & Development (R&D) and/or manufacturing capacity 
in the UK, being selected for an online survey of CSR reporting. This study employed 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis of these documents to examine the breadth 
and depth of CSR reporting across six areas of material concern. 
 
Phase 3: a programme of 22 interviews (7 public and 15 private sector) to examine 
attitudes towards and assumptions about CSR activities relevant to the aims and 
objectives of the research.  If Phase 2 of the research concerned primarily what companies 
reported publicly about their CSR activities, Phase 3 aimed to assess as far as possible 
how companies and public sector actors understood the extent and depth of industrial 
activities in relation to CSR. It also included a roundtable event to allow interview 
participants and other stakeholders to offer feedback on preliminary findings, and to 
reflect further on the potential regulatory role of CSR. 
 
Findings 
Assessing these data in the light of the conceptual frameworks it utilises, the report finds 
that the UK nanotechnologies industry remains in an early stage of development, with 
progress very uneven across different sectors. Some commercialisation of products is 
evident in fields like medical diagnostics and electronics, but most production of novel 
materials is still concentrated within industrial R&D.  
One key finding from the research is that the scope of individual companies’ current CSR 
activities is significantly affected by their size and the degree of commercialisation in 
their sector. Two key areas where size and sector make a particularly significant 
difference are: 
· Stakeholder engagement: wide engagement is not generally undertaken by 
smaller companies. Further, companies also have mixed opinions about its 
value: some see wide engagement as a valuable pedagogical device for 
ensuring public acceptance of nanotechnological products. Others see it as an 
expensive and in the last instance unnecessary activity.  
· CSR reporting: levels are very low among smaller companies and those 
engaged in B2B activities and nanotechnology R&D (for example, 86% of 
micro-companies and 73% of SMEs failed to report online on their CSR-
relevant activities at all). 
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Nonetheless, the majority of the 15 companies we interviewed are engaged with 
precautionary approaches to risk in the workplace, driven by existing regulations. 
Elsewhere, some gaps in current practices are evident : 
· Assessment of risks at other stages in the product lifecycle is highly variable in 
scope and depth, and its extent is dependent on several factors:  
§ company size; 
§ data gaps; 
§ difficulties with risk assessment methodologies; 
§ costs; 
§ availability of specialist expertise; and 
§ the extent of business collaboration in producing and collating data.  
· Lifecycle risk management faces serious obstacles, the problem of orphan 
products is perhaps not being widely addressed, and the role of stakeholder 
engagement is currently limited  
 
The report also identifies a number of drivers and inhibitors whose interaction is held to 
affect how far and how widely CSR uptake has occurred, and which might continue to 
exert a strong influence in the future. As well as company size and sector, these concern:  
· The extent to which CSR values are embedded within a company from senior 
management on down;  
· The extent to which the market is seen as an arbiter of public acceptance of 
new technological applications; 
· The perceptions within the company of costs of voluntary regulation; 
· The extent to which both CSR and some forms of technical expertise are 
available to the company; 
· Intellectual property issues; and 
· The extent to which industry codes of conduct are seen as being of value.  
 
Recommendations  
The report makes several recommendations in Section 8.2, relating to what tools may be 
needed in order to promote voluntary regulation as a response to the regulatory 
uncertainty surrounding nanotechnologies. Regulators should: 
· Promote an effective industry code of conduct; 
· Facilitate access for all companies to CSR and wider technical expertise; 
· Encourage collaborations between companies to develop CSR practices to 
“crystallise” industry code of conduct, with the aim or promoting sectoral 
differentiation of practices and principles where appropriate;  
· Encourage sharing of CSR expertise within existing supply chains.  
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Needs 
This report aims to provide a clearer understanding of the role which corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) currently plays in influencing the activities of companies involved in 
the nanotechnologies industry in the UK, and how CSR may contribute to protecting 
society from any health and environmental risks which may emerge from 
nanotechnological applications in the future.  
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It has been suggested that regulators face considerable difficulties in regulating 
nanotechnologies effectively, due to the wide variety of applications that employ 
nanoscale science and to gaps in toxicological and other data relevant to potential human 
health and environmental impacts. The benefits of voluntary regulation are seen as lying 
chiefly in the contribution it may make to anticipatory and proactive management of 
emerging risks, and in integrating different areas of concern. An example of such a view 
is the EU’s “Nanotechnology Action Plan” (EC 2005), where respecting ethical principles 
and integrating societal considerations into the development of nanotechnologies is seen 
as important at every stage of development.  
 
This report provides below a comprehensive analysis of how CSR is currently viewed by 
nanotechnology companies and public agencies involved in governance. Building on data 
obtained via range of investigative methods, the report concludes with some  
recommendations to policymakers regarding the potential future regulatory contribution 
of CSR and how this may be promoted and developed. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The primary aim of this research is to assess the current penetration of CSR approaches 
into the nanotechnologies industry, together with what drivers and inhibitors may 
influence the future development of voluntary approaches to regulation. Specific 
objectives were as follows: 
 
1. To conduct a comprehensive review of the role of CSR policies, statements and 
strategies within the nanotechnologies industry. This is intended to provide the 
basis for: 
o Identifying current practices and adequacy of modes of CSR within the 
industry; 
o Identifying, where relevant, any existing gaps within practices; 
o Providing an analysis of current measures from legal to self-regulatory and 
their effectiveness; 
o Mapping current products and key industry players. 
 
2. To interview a range of key companies  on matters relating to risk management and 
risk assessment and to identify drivers, inhibitors and motivational pressures 
influencing the practices of companies within this industry and whether there are 
distinct drivers across the industry as a whole or whether there are sectoral 
differences.   
o To follow the interview phase with a ‘round table’ event of key stakeholders, 
held at DEFRA in London, in order to provide feedback on desk based and 
interview findings and provided the industry, researchers and policy makers to 
respond to findings to date, as well as to contribute further to the research via a 
scenarios exercise and subsequent discussion. 
 
3. To conduct final analysis and to synthesis the gathered data to provide: 
o A set or drivers and inhibitors that influence the practices of industry including 
factors which motivate the marketplace activity, modes of governance, the role 
of media and public perceptions, legal liability and the role of scientific 
protocols; 
o A life-cycle assessment of the role of CSR and assessment procedures from 
pre-market, manufacture, use to disposal, it will also consider the priority of 
factors involved in decision making and how where practicable companies 
undertake assessment of risks without the full knowledge of potential risks; 
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o An assessment of the temporal assessment of the future uses of nanoproducts 
after commercialisation; 
o A range of targeted recommendations to identify the most effective means to 
manage potential environmental and human health risks associated with 
nanotechnologies and to provide, where applicable, exemplar models of 
practice. 
 
1.3 Scope of Report 
The report is divided into 7 sections. Section 2 outlines the methodological background to 
the project, including its basic conceptual framework. In Sections 3 and 4, we present an 
analysis of the results of the research, relating findings to key technical aims related to the 
project’s main aims and objectives. There we examine, inter alia: 
 
· The extent to which companies report on their compliance and beyond 
compliance activities; 
· At what level of specificity this reporting operates; 
· What mechanisms of external assurance and oversight are in place;  
· How far companies consider CSR to be capable of making a valuable 
contribution to protecting society from health and environmental risks; and 
· What assumptions are made by actors from the private and public sectors 
about the opportunities and obstacles which surround CSR.  
 
Sections 5 through 7 draw on these results in giving an overview of drivers and inhibitors 
which may affect future uptake of CSR, and gaps in current practice. Finally, section 8 
draws a number of conclusions from the foregoing results and provides a number of 
recommendations which are intended to address some of the issues raised in sections 5 
through 7. 
The report also includes eight annexes, which contain in detail the evidence to support our  
analysis.  In particular, Annex 3 deals with the on- line review of CSR documents 
published by identified companies, whilst Annex 6 contains a breakdown of data from 
both the public and private sector interviews.  Finally, Annexes 7 and 8 provide details of 
the scenarios created for the round table event, together with an analysis of discussions 
and feedback from the event.  
 
2 Methodological Background 
2.1 Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual background which informed our analysis of the results from these two 
phases identifies a baseline understanding of CSR, which conceptualises companies  as 
social entities, not just private ones, whose responsibility to comply with certain norms of 
behaviour extends beyond the expectation that it should make profits for its shareholders. 
A company can have a range of impacts on society through its profit-seeking activities, 
and therefore it has certain obligations to contribute to the management of these impacts.  
 
One might isolate three steps to continuous improvement in the business practices by 
which these impacts are looked after:   
 
(a) Ensure compliance with legislation to the fullest extent ;  
(b) To proactively manage impacts beyond the level of compliance with existing 
regulation; and  
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(c) Ensuring that reporting on these activities takes place (with a preference for 
external audits). 
 
One way of thinking normatively about how this might operate (which informs phases 2 
and 3 of the research, and our conclusions and recommendations) is to see a need to 
develop a dynamic ongoing relationship between high level values, concrete policies and 
regular reporting on key performance indicators. 
 
This ideal of continuous improvement has to be qualified, however. What actually 
becomes the subject of improvement is, some scholars have argued, one of two models of 
CSR performance. In other words, there are two contrasting directions in which CSR 
values, policies and reporting can move. 
 
The recent EU-funded RESPONSE study (RESPONSE 2007) of firms’ attitudes to CSR 
has identified two main orientations of CSR – towards minimisation of risks both to the 
business and to society across the spectrum of a company’s activities on the one hand – 
“do no harm” – and towards adding added positive dimensions of social value to the 
company’s business activities - the company as “positive social force” (see Figure 1 
below).   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Corporate Social Responsibilities as a continuum (Pedersen 2009) 
 
 
The research is structured into three distinct but interrelated phases. 
 
 
2.2 Phase 1: Literature Review 
Initial work on this project was directed at producing an exhaustive literature review of 
academic, policy, and ‘grey’ literature relating to the role of CSR as a self regulatory tool 
for the nanotechnologies industry. This was crucial not only to shape the main work on 
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identifying current scope of CSR within the industry but also to identify general CSR 
Criteria for application in Phase 2.  This literature review is appended to this report (see 
Annex 1) and that part of the review touching upon the framework of CSR is to some 
degree replicated in the main body of this report. 
 
The literature review examined research on: (a) NST risk and uncertainty; (b) regulatory 
developments in the UK, EU and USA; (c) CSR thinking on areas of direct relevance to 
the NST industry;  and (d) current international and national CSR standards and 
guidelines (see Annex 2).  From this, six material CSR criteria (see Table 1 below) were 
identified which were postulated as areas of concern which companies and regulators 
should address to develop a comprehensive and integrated approach to “responsible 
innovation”.  
 
 
Table 1: Material CSR Criteria 
 
Environmental Impacts Including statements around specific environmental impacts of 
current activities, but also definitions and programmes of 
sustainable development  
Health and Safety  What measures are undertaken to safeguard the safety of workers 
and the safety of consumers? 
Access Is IP shared with developing countries? To what extent are 
upstream commitments made to sharing other benefits and 
promoting development (NB this excludes corporate 
philanthropy, defined as sharing of profits) 
Social acceptance and 
understanding  
To what extent are a range of internal and external stakeholders 
included consulted and/or informed about the company’s 
activities and future plans? 
Legal compliance and 
liability 
What declarations are made about compliance with legal statutes, 
regulatory regimes (including statements about judgements of 
liability made against the company) 
Risk management Is information provided about general approaches to risk 
management and responsible innovation within the company 
(such as LCA, product stewardship, precautionary approaches)? 
This is in addition to specific statements about safeguarding 
consumers and employees, or the environment – it concerns 
whether systems of risk analysis are explicitly discussed. 
 
 
2.3 Phase 2: Online CSR Survey 
Phase 1 was followed by an online survey of global nanotechnology companies and 
products either currently on the market or in development.  The purpose of Phase 2 of the 
research was to examine how companies involved in the nanotechnology industry in the 
UK reported online on their CSR activities. From this survey, 78 companies based in the 
UK, or with substantial R&D and/or manufacturing capacity in the UK, were selected as 
the basis for an online survey of CSR reporting (producing a sample of 68 documents 
during the period September – November 2008). This study employed quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis of these documents to examine the breadth and depth of CSR 
reporting across six areas of material concern that were identified in Phase 1 (see Table 
1). 
 
Online statements from 78 companies, all of whom advertise their interest in 
nanotechnology either through membership of industry associations or through broader 
research programmes, formed the basis of this study. Because of the jurisdictional remit 
  
11 
of the DEFRA project, all these companies are ones either based within, or with 
substantial research and development capacity based within, the UK. As the focus of the 
project concerns a broad-based concept of what constitutes CSR, these documents were 
not limited to annual reports, but also included policy statements and published codes of 
conduct. Companies tend to incorporate more than one form of commitment in reporting 
their CSR activities. These can range from general guiding values, through specific policy 
guidelines, to quantitative performance targets designed to aid continuous improvement.  
 
Companies were categorised as either: 
· Micros (typically making use of university-originated IP, with <10 staff); 
· SMEs (>10 and <250 employees); 
· Large (over 250 employees but based in one country) ; or 
· Multinational/MNC (with substantial production, research or distribution 
operations in more than two countries).  
 
They were further categorised according to their positioning in the supply chain. 
 
The unit of analysis for the study was explicitly taken to be individual sentences within 
documents, as sentences typically form the unit of analysis for studies of CSR statements 
even when this is not explicitly stated (Tilt 2001, 196). Declarative statements containing 
information either about general commitments, specific policies or quantifiable goals and 
measures of progress were counted across 7 individual thematic categories (see Table 1 
and Table 2).  The classification of these statements was further broken down to indicate 
whether they applied specifically and explicitly to NST-related activities or were more 
general in scope, and whether they applied mainly to the company on whose behalf the 
statement was made, or whether the information provided concerned the supply chain 
with which the company does business.  
 
Table 2: Examples of Declarative CSR Statements 
 
Examples of general declarative CSR 
statements  
“We support efforts to improve access to 
medicines around the world, in both developing 
and developed countries.” (Access) 
“We are committed to reducing our impact on 
climate change.” (Environmental Impacts) 
 
Examples of specific declarative CSR 
statements  
“To help us better understand patient needs we 
have set up advisory boards in the US and Europe 
with representatives from a wide range of patient 
groups.” (Social Acceptance and Understanding) 
 
Examples of quantified declarative 
CSR statements  
“We set new targets to reduce our climate change 
impact (CO2 equivalent emissions) and energy 
use in operations, and transport from 2006 levels 
by 20 per cent per unit of sales (based on a 
constant exchange rate) by 2010 and by 45 per 
cent by 2015.” (Environmental Impacts) 
 
 
Statements were coded as “general”, “specific” or “quantified”, and frequency statistics 
for these three categories of statement were used to provide “profiles” for different 
categories of company across the various material CSR concerns, with the aim of 
mapping the kinds of normative commitment upon which different categories of company 
report. Only statements which related directly to the material concerns outlined above 
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were recorded. These material concerns were taken to reflect the different dimensions 
which would have to be included in order to build a comprehensive and integrated 
approach to “responsible innovation”.  No account was taken of philanthropic initiatives, 
or community initiatives which did not relate specifically to stakeholder engagement or 
access considerations as outlined above.  
 
In addition, a qualitative analysis was undertaken to identify examples where companies 
have begun to develop (either individually or in concert with others) systems of 
stakeholder, risk and responsible innovation management. These may potentially be 
useful both in responding to potential NST hazards, should any emerge, and in shaping 
the future direction of NST development in ways which reflect material CSR concerns 
about access, social acceptance, environmental protection and product stewardship 
through a product’s lifecycle. This analysis also considered, by way of comparison with 
examples from the main sample, the NanoRisk Framework (NRF) developed by DuPont 
and Environmental Defense, and the CENARIOS “nano-risk assessment tool” developed 
by Innovationgesellschaft GmbH in Switzerland, and AssuredNano’s certification 
standard of the same name (at the time of writing, full documentation was not yet 
commercially or publicly available). For the purposes of this study, DuPont’s CSR 
contribution was considered as an extreme outlier, given the unique nature of the NRF, 
and was not included within the main survey.  
 
A complete analysis of on- line statements is located at Annex 3. 
 
 
2.4 Phase 3: Public & Private Sector Interviews  
This phase consisted of a programme of 22 interviews (7 public sector and  15 private 
sector) to examine attitudes towards and assumptions about CSR activities relevant to the 
aims and objectives of the research. 
 
If Phase 2 of the research concerned primarily what companies reported publicly about 
their CSR activities, Phase 3 aimed to assess as far as possible how companies understood 
the extent and depth of their own activities in relation to CSR, and to relate these 
understandings to those of government and public agencies.  
 
Seven interviewees from public agencies and government departments were identified 
with the assistance of DEFRA.  50 private companies were initially contacted, with 
contactees being identified through the foregoing online CSR study, through previous 
research on current products, via personal contacts, and via further online research (see 
Annex 5). A series of 15 semi-structured interviews with representatives of companies of 
different categories, sectors and positions in supply chain was undertaken as a result. In 
both the public and private sector interviews, a set of interview questions were used as a 
loose script for each interview (see Annex 4).  Some difficulties were encountered. 13 
companies (26%) declined to participate, with business confidentiality being widely cited 
as reason for not participating, along with time and costs for SMEs of participating 
(several companies have been contacted by a number of researchers recently, as the 
industry does not comprise a large number of companies). Four companies (8%) 
responded by stating that they were not, technically speaking, involved in 
nanotechnology. 15 (30%) companies did not respond despite various attempts to contact 
them,, with a majority of these being companies involved in manufacturing consumer 
products containing nanomaterials, some of whom did not have accurate contact details 
on their websites. 
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Interview data for the public and private sector interviews was coded and analysed 
according to different but complementary analytical foci (see Table 3 and Table 4 below), 
which reflected the general stated aims and objectives of the research (see p. 7 above, and 
Annex 6 for a complete breakdown of interview data according to these foci). 
 
Table 3: Analytical foci for public sector interviews  
 
Public  Sector 
1. Government role in 
promoting responsibility in 
nanotechnologies industry.  
 
2. Contribution of different 
regulatory approaches. 
3. Extent of 
evidential gaps and 
application of 
precaution 
4. Drivers within the 
industry that might 
encourage the uptake of 
CSR 
 
5. Companies’ concerns 
regarding present and 
future markets for their 
products 
6. Views on role of 
codes of conduct 
 7. Examples of CSR in 
industry/gaps in practices 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Analytical foci for private sector interviews  
 
Private Sector 
1. Role of foresight/ 
anticipatory risk 
management 
2. Nature and extent of 
pre-market 
research/isolation of 
employee risk factors 
3. Sources of influence 
on company practices 
from within the industry 
4. External sources of 
pressure which influence 
5. Technical questions 
about manufacture, use 
6. Temporal extent of 
risk assessment and 
Limitations of Data 
 
The interview sample, whilst including companies from a broad cross-section of the 
UK nanotechnologies industry, does not necessarily enable a comprehensive 
comparison between companies from similar sectors to be made. For example, while 
such comparisons are to some extent possible between companies engaged in 
producing specialty chemicals, the lower representation of e.g. the food, cosmetics and 
pharmaceutical sectors make comparison difficult.  
 
However, given that information from consumer-facing large and MNC companies in 
the cosmetics and pharmaceutical sectors is widely available online and has been 
documented under Phase 2, extrapolating from the available interview data to a 
broader picture of practices in these sectors is arguably justifiable, with caveats. 
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practices  and disposal  which 
influence product 
development 
research and actions 
resulting from these 
assessments 
7. Extent and nature of 
stakeholder engagement 
practices 
8. Extent to which 
monitoring procedures 
for products containing 
nanomaterials differ 
from those not 
containing nanomaterials 
9. Influence of modes of 
governance on attitudes 
to CSR 
 
 
 
2.5 Roundtable Event 
Following the phases 2 and 3 of the research, a roundtable event, hosted by DEFRA in 
London, was held to which were invited public and private sector stakeholders who had 
participated in Phase 3. The main part of the event consisted of a scenarios exercise (see 
Annexes 7 and 8). This involved participants discussing and reflecting on three potential 
scenarios for the next decade of nanotechnological development (“Low consensus, high 
cost”, “High consensus, slow growth”, “High disruption, high growth”), and on the role 
that voluntary regulation might play in changing the shape of these futures. These 
scenarios were developed by the research team, based on work done on the EU-funded 
Nanologue project, to reflect the initial conclusions of this project regarding current 
strengths and weaknesses in CSR practice in the industry, and what factors might play a 
role in driving or inhibiting CSR take-up. 
 
3 Profiling Current Modes of CSR 
3.1 Regulatory context 
Based on Phase 1, it is evident that various national and regional jurisdictions are, at the 
present time, pursuing modes of “soft” regulation which make a place for voluntary 
action. These have included, for example, the voluntary reporting schemes to collect 
information from industry on existing uses of nanomaterials in the UK (UK Government 
2008b) and the USA (Environmental Protection Agency 2008). In the UK, the Royal 
Society, Insight Investment and the Nanotechnology KTN have set up a working group 
called Responsible NanoCode, which has produced a principles-based code of conduct for 
the industry that stresses the need for effective and comprehensive risk assessment, wide 
stakeholder engagement, and transparency, and which aims to be promoted on the basis of 
a benchmarking model (Responsible NanoCode 2008). The German Chemical Industries 
Association (VCI) has published a set of guidelines to help companies understand the 
responsibilities pertaining to nanomaterials under the EU’s new REACh regulations (VCI 
2008). For its part, the EU’s “Nanotechnology Action Plan” (EC 2005) promotes the 
integration of CSR concerns with private sector activities both at a high level and 
throughout business practices.  
 
However, some have argued that the promotion of voluntary approaches faces difficulties: 
some suggest that voluntary initiatives do not produce high-quality data unless they 
include effective incentives, are properly transparent, and are made mandatory after an 
introductory period of some years (Hansen and Tickner 2007). Whether there is currently 
any great appetite across the nanotechnologies industry for collaboratively developing 
frameworks of best practice is difficult to determine on the basis of existing research.  
Drawing specifically on Phases 2 and 3, a number of key findings were observed in this 
regard. One of the key findings of the study was that most companies who engage in CSR 
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see it as a tool to reduce risks and operational cost; only companies with very high 
social performance rankings – a subset for the most part of the set of all large and 
multinational companies - think about CSR as a means to drive product innovation and to 
contribute to social values beyond those with a financial dimension. 
 
3.2 Levels of reporting 
From analysis of on- line statements, 86% of micro-companies and 73% of SMEs failed to 
provide either a code of conduct, policy statement or annual report that addressed one or 
more areas of material general CSR concern identified in the survey (see Figure 2 below).   
Moreover, there were very few documents that made explicit reference to a company’s 
nanotechnology activities, only 12% (8 out of 68 submissions across 43 submitting 
companies) overall. There was in general no explicit and detailed discussion in any of the 
documents examined of nanotech-related activities across any of the materia l CSR criteria 
on which the survey focused. In general, it was assessed that micro-companies and SMEs 
who make submissions do not tend to refer to external CSR reporting standards or codes 
of conduct.  In contrast, submissions by MNCs regularly referred to external standards 
(see Table 14, Annex 3) with ISO 14001 with the highest recorded number of references 
with 13 of the 68 submissions. 
 
 
Figure 2: CSR Statements Available Online by Company Type 
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The sectoral profile (by SIC 2003 division) of the reporting sample shows that the lowest 
level of reporting was among companies engaged primarily in R&D, including research 
on nanomaterials and nanostructures. This sector sees a heavy representation of micro 
companies (see Figure 3 below). 
Use of third-party auditing for CSR reporting is widely recognised as essential to build 
trust and credibility (see e.g. GRI 2006). However, those micro-companies and SMEs 
who make submissions do not tend to refer to external CSR reporting standards or codes 
of conduct. Some degree of auditing is more common among MNCs, but even here is far 
from universal (6 out of 22, 27%). 
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Figure 3: Provision of CSR documents by industry sector (n=71) 
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3.3 Extent to which NM-specific monitoring procedures are used  
In the workplace, NMs are treated largely in accordance with existing risk management 
protocols developed in response to existing regulation, although in some cases NMs are 
treated according to additional protocols and with extra toxicology and risk assessment 
being done. Products incorporating nanomaterials are made to meet the same standards as 
apply to other comparable products, although in consumer-facing sectors, regulations are 
seen as stringent enough to ensure that adequate pre-market research is done. 
 
3.4 Influence of modes of governance on attitudes to CSR 
Our Phase 3 interviews showed that companies were more or less unanimous in seeing the 
impacts of taking mandatory regulation beyond what exists at present as potentially very 
destructive. Nonetheless, regulatory uncertainty was also seen as destructive – although 
uncertainty was not itself widely seen as a strong incentive for companies to self-regulate. 
Further, to place measures, which are currently beyond compliance, into part of a 
mandatory regime (e.g. LCA for new NMs), or extending REACh to all new NMs, were 
seen as particularly disproportionate.  
Companies were keen for better and more formal modes of engagement with regulators to 
be in place, allowing more information to be exchanged, but also saw codes of conduct, 
perhaps endorsed by government, as a big step forward. Companies tended to be 
confident that the current regulatory situation would not change too much in ways which 
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might have a negative impact on their business, although consumer-facing companies 
saw it as holding some potential threats, notably through EU-based labelling legislation, 
which was seen as a blunt instrument. The cosmetics company we interviewed in 
particular has acted in anticipation of this by demanding more public communication 
from the EU on the balance of risks and benefits on e.g. sunscreens. Their argument for 
taking this action was that labels would be interpreted by consumers primarily as 
warnings. 
3.5 Extent and nature of stakeholder engagement practices 
Results from Phase 2 suggest that wider stakeholder engagement activities are very 
uncommon among smaller companies. In addition, Phase 2 results show that even among 
larger companies there is limited evidence of systematic approaches or of the setting of 
specific performance targets in this area (see  
 
Figure 4 below). Further, little evidence was found to indicate that access to technologies 
in the developing world is an issue much addressed in general CSR documents, although 
one pharmaceutical company we interviewed in Phase 3 indicated that public perceptions 
of inequalities in access to products have been a major factor in their revision of their 
stakeholder engagement practices. This was borne out by evidence from Phase 2, where 
companies involved in the medical/pharmaceutical sectors tended to be most interested in 
more upstream, systematic and consultative modes of engagement. Within the 
submissions from these companies, it was evident that in many cases these approaches 
reflected responses to previous negative publicity. 
From our Phase 3 interviews, it is evident that B2B companies, small and large, tend to 
view stakeholder engagement as difficult, costly, and being best undertaken through 
intermediaries (media, government, industry bodies). Across all sectors represented in the 
interviews a frequent assumption appears to be that the rapid commercialisation of 
beneficial products is seen as a key route to positive public perceptions, irrespective of the 
impacts of stakeholder engagement activities. Along with this view tends to come the 
assumption that it is individual products that are the subject of acceptance and rejection, 
rather than whole technologies, unless these technologies are created as an object of 
specific concern through e.g. the advocacy action of CSOs. 
 
Figure 4: Stakeholder Engagement Profile by Company Type (n=68) 
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4 Extent of LCA Approach 
4.1 Foresight 
Little evidence of systematic proactive management of product risks/product stewardship 
approaches is available from the online CSR submissions of smaller companies. Even 
larger and multinational companies tend not to frequently set themselves quantifiable 
reporting targets in this area. 
Nonetheless, there is strong evidence from Phase 3 that activities which fall under 
different analytical foci (see Table 4 above) and which reflect, to varying degrees, a “do 
no harm” interpretation of CSR (see Figure 1 above) are engaged in by all the companies 
we interviewed. This is despite there being notable differences in levels of reporting on 
CSR among different categories of company and sectors (see section 3 above). Notable 
exceptions were the three pharmaceutical and medical diagnostics companies we 
interviewed, whose responses contained marked elements of a “positive social value” 
approach, to varying degrees (with the strongest indicators provided by larger companies). 
The orientation towards risk minimisation extended from strategic foresight activities, 
through occupational health measures, to the employment of risk assessment protocols for 
products. 
There is, therefore, some evidence of anticipatory approaches to risk being employed 
across different dimensions of companies’ activities. Some examples of areas into which 
companies’ current foresight activities and thinking extend include: 
 
· The extent to which different approaches to product stewardship might be feasible 
for NST-engaged companies of different sizes and sectors. 
· Some evidence among SMEs that a lack of regulation and a need to anticipate risk 
can drive innovation. 
· Views that anticipating specific risks and uncertainties associated with products can 
sensitize companies to potent ial areas of regulatory change. 
· A general sense that the role of industry or sectoral codes of conduct in making this 
kind of risk management more systematic may be valuable. 
 
The majority of companies we interviewed, across different sectors, claimed to employ 
precautionary occupational health risk protocols, focused on minimisation and monitoring 
of exposure within the workplace. Five of the smaller companies we interviewed (and two 
of the multinationals) attributed their precautionary 
commitments in part to values and attitudes held by directors or 
senior management which reflect their experience in larger 
technology companies or university research centres, which 
have become embedded within the working practices (the 
“DNA”) of the company. Larger companies tend more to 
describe well-established systems, e.g.  “risk banding”, that have 
evolved across the full range of their operations in response to 
existing regulations. 
Smaller companies, working at the cutting edge of technologies 
in many cases, are perhaps closer to emerging risks, and 
potent ially highly sensitized to them. Examples exist of specific 
and extensive pre-market human and environmental toxicology 
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Lifecycle 
costs: 
“And if there's 
legislation to say 
you must deal 
with end of life., 
you will stop 
companies such 
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manufacturing our 
product, because 
being developed by individual companies, with some companies suggesting as a result 
of their experiences that existing toxicology protocols tend to be unsuitable for NST 
purposes, and better ones would encourage more pre-market research. 
 
4.2 Technical questions 
Although smaller companies tend to represent CSR as relatively inaccessible to 
companies like them due to high costs, they undertake anticipatory assessments of the 
risks and uncertainties which surround potential product development options in a way 
similar to that taken by larger companies. Most companies we interviewed tend to 
distinguish between: 
  
i) Products with established benefits which are expected to be accepted by 
consumers or business customers;  
ii) Products surrounded with known uncertainties which can be dealt with by 
established precautionary protocols; and  
iii)  Products where persistent and difficult to resolve scientific uncertainties make 
them unacceptable business risks. 
 
4.3 Temporal extent of risk assessment and research  
One area where costs undoubtedly may impose considerable limitations on what measures 
are possible for smaller companies is temporally extended risk assessment and 
management – through LCA, product stewardship and so on. 
With respect to LCA, it is true that, given the early stage of 
development of most sectors, many gaps affect the feasibility of 
LCA, particularly in relation to data and modelling, even for 
larger companies. However, costs of performing LCA for 
products and, often, a lack of access to relevant expertise are 
anticipated to make implementation difficult for smaller 
companies. 
Although they may not currently report on their activities in this 
regard, our interviews show that approaches to product 
stewardship are being explored by smaller companies, especially 
those who have experience of industry codes such as Responsible 
Care. For larger, consumer-facing companies, temporally-
extended risk management is typically seen as essential to the 
company’s business. LCA is seen as extremely important, and 
bespoke analytical tools are available for the assessment of 
products, often developed by industry associations. Nonetheless, 
gaps in toxicological data, together with the early stage of product development in many 
cases, are seen as major – if not insuperable – obstacles for the use of LCA in 
nanotechnological contexts. 
Liability for orphan products has not been widely considered by smaller companies, but 
where it has, the problem is seen as related to IP ownership passed up or down the supply 
chain. 
 
 
5. Drivers 
5.1 External Pressures 
If small and large companies show capacity for foresight and precautionary practices to 
avoid and/or mitigate business risk, there are clear differences between their attitudes to 
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external pressures to adopt CSR measures, which appear to reflect their different 
positions in the supply chain. 
Many companies we interviewed see business risks from negative public perceptions, and 
relate these to inadequate communication by industry, government and media, with some 
also citing the distorting effects of CSO activities. This is reflected in views of wider 
engagement as being essentially about educating the public – not in terms of enabling 
people to understand the science, but to appreciate the benefits of particular products. 
But outside larger consumer-facing companies, there is little evidence (with some 
exceptions) that perceived external pressures are driving changes in practice, particularly 
where communication with stakeholders beyond peer companies, business customers and 
employees are concerned (out of 13 non-consumer facing companies of all sizes 
interviewed, only four showed signs of extending 
engagement beyond this circle).  
 
5.2 Size and sector 
It is undoubtedly true that both the degree to which 
companies are involved in activities which address 
material CSR criteria, and the extent to which they report 
on them, are heavily influenced by their size and sector of 
operation. Profiles for all CSR criteria analysed in Phase 
2 demonstrate that much higher levels of general, specific 
and quantifiable statements are produced by large 
companies and MNCs, and that overall there is more 
integration of codes of conduct, specific policies and 
performance targets in the reports produced by larger 
businesses. The need to survive in the short term may 
trump longer term views (cf. Baker 2003): “one of the 
real challenges for CSR is specifically for small 
companies where a long term - a long timeframe is six 
months” (Company G). Without extra capacity (such as 
might be provided by a department dedicated to dealing 
with CSR practice, for example), smaller companies face 
major difficulties developing comprehensive and integrated approaches to CSR. Further, 
B2B companies, of all sizes, and those involved primarily in R&D activities, are less 
likely to report or engage in CSR. 
 
5.3 Supply chain pressure 
A common concern for smaller companies is that, compared with larger companies, they 
face cost pressures and an associated shortening of their temporal frame of reference 
which may reduce their capacity for developing “beyond compliance” approaches. A 
major concern for many of these companies is, first and foremost, “getting the technology 
to work” in ways which are functionally useful and add value to products. Determining 
what technologies may add value to products is, for example, a significant concern for 
smaller (and indeed, for larger) companies. Navigating markets and finding likely 
customers is also a source of time and financial costs for small companies, an effect in 
many cases of the sheer number of potential uses for novel materials.  
Nonetheless, some of these pressures may themselves be important sources in motivating 
CSR. For example, small manufacturers of NMs typically seek collaborations and 
investment from larger companies, often beyond the EU. The CSR requirements of 
operating within these supply chains may often be significant, forcing companies to treat 
the costs of going beyond compliance pragmatically as business costs. Seeking ways of 
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adapting to the requirements of the supply chain is a crucial way in which smaller 
companies can reduce their business risk. 
The majority of CSR documents from larger companies analysed in Phase 2 make clear 
that commitments from suppliers to follow certain EHS standards or practices are 
required by their larger customers. As Figure 5 below indicates, our data suggests that 
multinational companies in particular (who naturally tend to source materials from a wide 
range of suppliers) often have a marked focus on specific supply chain policies. This was 
borne out by the interviews we conducted: the need for smaller companies, particularly in 
the speciality chemicals sector, to develop collaborations with larger companies to 
develop products creates expectations among smaller companies that certain best practice 
standards as well as regulatory compliance will be required of them. In some cases, this 
led to changes in business models and manufacturing processes:  
 
[…] we basically have a range of material that doesn't use any cadmium and 
that really is a big deciding factor for Japanese companies to work with us 
because they just don't like any heavy metal in their products. […]So that's 
going to be again another, another key issue for us to work with that in terms 
of lifetime and performance and everything else that they outperform I guess 
the cadmium based materials. (Company M) 
 
Figure 5: Statements on Supply Chain requirements by Company Type (n=68) 
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5.4  Embedded Values 
A range of companies small and large pointed to the influence that direction from senior 
management can have on CSR activities. For MNC 
companies, a change of CEO was seen as an event 
which could have an enormous influence on 
perceptions within the company. Smaller companies 
traced the influence of experienced directors or other 
members of senior management within working 
practices in the company. This was particularly 
apparent in relation to the implementation of 
precautionary measures in the workplace, where 
attitudes were also buttressed by the natural orientation 
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of “overcautious” scientists (Company M). It was also apparent, however, in general 
attitudes towards long-term liabilities. As one SME noted,  
 
it's no use trying to hype up the technology, make a quick exit, get those 
original shareholders, make those original shareholders money and then 
leave the, if you like, the next generation of shareholders or owners with a 
long-term liability.(Company G) 
 
The importance of such values as a way of expressing a fundamental connection 
between the normative assumptions of companies and those of the society in which 
they operate was also stressed by several interviewees. As one remarked: “no 
responsible company should be in a position that says we want to take more risks than 
the societies in which our customers are based are willing to actually tolerate” 
(Company G).  
 
5.5  Freedom to operate 
Public sector interviewees tended to assume that reputation and publicity are two key 
drivers in causing companies to adopt CSR measures, due to their effect on company’s 
position in the market. Companies tended to concur, interpreting these factors as 
necessary components of their “licence to operate”, which required them to anticipate 
future shifts in regulation and to satisfy themselves that their products and practices 
complied with current regulations. Proactive attitudes to environmental and health 
implications were seen as bringing key benefits to the industry, by helping to head off the 
threat of costs being imposed through future legislation, and other business risks: “being 
ahead of the game and understanding what the issues area in terms of both our customers 
and our staff, that's far better than being told later” (Company K). This was also one of 
the main drivers behind companies’ feelings about wider public engagement, which they 
expressed in terms of the need to help the public understand the actual benefits of 
nanomaterials and nano-enabled products. A connection between market advantage and 
CSR was made by most companies interviewed. 
 
5.6  Coordinated guidance and assistance 
Where companies reported having access to guidance, information, expertise and 
financial assistance for developing CSR policies through contacts they happened to have 
within and outside industry, this was seen as having been a major incentive to adopt a 
more CSR-based approach. To make it more likely that CSR measures would be adopted 
across the board, several companies suggested that it was necessary for government (and 
in some instances, industry bodies) to take a more coordinated approach to providing 
information, guidance, and in some cases funding for the support of CSR activities. These 
measures could include the following:  
 
i) Providing a research framework which helps companies focus EHS research 
on specific areas where data and modelling gaps exist;  
ii) Setting firm guidelines (on the model operated by the EPA) regarding “risk 
banding” for the production of NMs and NSPs, so that a transition from 
precautionary mode to full toxicological assessment is triggered by scaling up 
production;  
iii)  Code-of-conduct based guidance formulated in concert with CSOs and 
government to help companies (particularly in the food sector)  deal with 
uncertainty; 
iv) Well-publicised provision of coordinated advice and support to early stage 
companies to understand risk issues; and 
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v) Seed money to help smaller and larger companies in the same and in 
different sectors to collaborate on toxicological research. 
 
6.  Inhibitors 
6.1  Lack of access to CSR expertise 
This is a problem noted by several smaller companies (from different sectors), and seen as 
a serious stumbling block. Going beyond compliance – whether this concerns individual 
material concerns like stakeholder engagement, anticipatory risk management, EHS 
issues, or integrating these issues in a framework which can drive subsequent reporting – 
is seen as extremely difficult due to a lack of coordinated support, in terms of information, 
guidance and extra capacity.  
 
6.2  Cost perceptions 
Although much of the R&D necessary to drive NST development was being done by 
smaller companies, these companies are perhaps least able to bear the costs of 
implement ing proactive CSR measures, particularly where long-term risk management, 
e.g. through LCA and product stewardship, might be a matter of concern. This point was 
made emphatically by two companies we interviewed closely involved in industrial R&D. 
In relation to cost problems, one interviewee noted that cost may deter companies from 
even trying to find out about CSR, as it appears not to be something companies like them 
can engage in: “they don't want to hear” (Company G).  
  
High degrees of safety testing, LCA research and monitoring were all seen by one of 
these companies as much more feasible for sectors where there are large mark-ups on 
products: such an approach, it was suggested, “does not work at all on anything else bar 
the pharma industry; never has, never will” (Company K). In general, at least some 
perception of CSR beyond basic compliance as having high costs was almost unanimous 
among smaller companies interviewed, with some seeing in particular the pressures that 
would derive from future regulatory costs (particularly with REACh now exerting 
additional pressure) as potentially crippling for the whole European NST industry if the 
future development of regulation was not undertaken with particular sensitivity to the 
needs of smaller companies. 
 
6.3  Lack of effective regulatory engagement 
Smaller companies we interviewed noted that making sure compliance is possible for 
companies is a major contribution of itself, which means ensuring that they are aware that 
they should comply with existing regulations. Noting that there may be around 4.5 million 
small companies in the UK, one interviewee wondered  
 
how many of those companies actually have a comprehension or understanding 
of what the regulations really mean and how they affect their business.  There's 
not enough education done I think on engaging people to actually help them 
understand what their obligations really are. (Company N). 
  
If such awareness exists, then it may itself be a driver of further CSR activities. Without 
such awareness, however, further steps may be very difficult.  
 
6.4  Intellectual Property Right Issues 
Although business confidentiality issues were not widely discussed by interviewees, some 
interesting comments were made about the specific role played by intellectual property in 
stimulating growth in emerging technologies and the pressures that this could exert on 
companies to avoid e.g. opportunities for public engagement and other voluntary 
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measures in case commercial commerciality was compromised. Labelling was 
mentioned as one area in which IP issues of this kind could act as a barrier, and two 
companies in particular (K, L) noted that data gathering exercises such as voluntary 
reporting schemes, together with public engagement exercises, would face difficulties:  
 
[…] this is still very much an experimental type technology because you can 
make massive changes in functionality very easily. Then you know, you have to 
hold the IP close and I think that's what the NGOs find somewhat difficult to get 
their heads round (Company K). 
 
6.5  Competing standards 
As was evident from Phase 2 of the research, a number of codes of best practice and 
codes of conduct are becoming available. There was significant concern among both 
private and public sector interviewees that perceived or actual competition among these 
frameworks might slow down the take-up and implementation of CSR. A collective action 
problem might result, with companies waiting to see which of the available standards 
would become “the only game in town” (Public 7). It was widely thought that the industry 
and public profile of any standard or code would be the key to its success. Participants in 
the Scenarios Exercise and some companies interviewed in Phase 3 suggested that 
government backing, provided perhaps via a set of well-publicised criteria thought 
necessary for any standard to be effective might be a way forward.  
 
6.6  Effectiveness of standards 
Some interviewees noted that for any voluntary standard to be effective and to attain a 
high profile, it has to include strong oversight mechanisms. The problem of oversight is 
frequently mentioned in literature on CSR initiatives as a cause of perceived 
ineffectiveness (e.g. Gunningham 1995). Without such oversight, it was thought that any 
voluntary standards would be ineffective. Overcoming this problem was seen as very 
difficult: one company suggested that a full and thorough implementation of independent 
and professional oversight via review committees which did not include stakeholders 
would be one way forward: “you almost want professionals who have no axe to grind” 
(Company G).  
 
6.7  “The market will decide” 
As noted in section 3 above, one of the key assumptions evident behind the responses of 
several smaller B2B companies (six in total) we interviewed was that the primary 
criterion for increased penetration of nanotechnologies would be the commercialisation of 
products that consumers would buy (rather than the acceptance of whole technologies). 
Two companies alluded to the public acceptance of mobile phones as an example of how 
this market–led dynamic might operate. If such a dynamic is widely accepted as the 
primary mode through which societal concerns become alleviated, or at least neutralised, 
then there is less incentive for smaller companies to extend their CSR activities beyond 
risk minimisation in the workplace and compliance with standards in the supply chain. 
 
7.  Gaps 
7.1 Inadequacies of data  
There was widespread recognition among companies interviewed that persistent data gaps 
continue to provide cause for concern. With respect to human health, these include the 
nature of potential hazards and characterisation of reference materials, but also include 
uncertainties about the best approaches to acute and chronic exposure modelling, 
toxicological methods more widely, and testing protocols. These gaps also extend to 
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environmental exposure, where fates of NMs, complex interactions with the 
environment and latent effects continue to be of concern. 
 
7.2 Life cycle analysis 
These data gaps present a particular problem for wider adoption of lifecycle approached 
to risk management. Here, in particular, the lack of modelling capability for complex 
interactions between NMs and the environment or human body is felt particularly keenly 
by smaller companies, particularly in the food sector. Another issue is that many products 
or materials remain at a very early stage of development, and so filling data and 
methodological gaps remains attendant on further development. It was evident from our 
interviews that larger consumer-facing companies had more capacity, as well as access to 
more data, but here the problem was seen as one of fostering further 
industry/academic/government collaboration, given that “nobody has been able to put all 
of the pieces together” (Company C).  
 
7.3 Orphan products 
Discussions of orphan products and successor liability in interviews were marked by little 
evidence that smaller companies had considered this issue in depth. Two SMEs and 
micros dealing with innovations in electronic components or spun out from universities 
interpreted this issue in relation to IP arrangements. In the event of the company’s 
dissolution, one company saw IP and liabilities returning to the university, with the other 
interpreting them as being taken on by larger customers who had incorporated N’s 
proprietary technology in their mobile devices, textiles etc. 
 
7.4 Stakeholder engagement 
Generally and for the most part, both private and public sector interviewees (with some 
exceptions, mainly in the public sphere) saw the role of CSR in terms of risk 
minimisation, “do no harm”. It is here that the problem of ELSI, the economic, legal and 
social impacts, of emerging technologies and the proper place of these considerations in 
the activities of companies becomes relevant. As one interviewee noted, 
 
the question is: what is the purpose of regulation? And I think […] that, in the 
debate, that fundamental question is often lost and my view of regulation is it's 
[…] effectively society's willingness to accept risk (Company G). 
 
As recent studies (e.g. Gavelin, Wilson et al., 2007) of the various upstream public 
engagement exercises undertaken in response to the Government’s Outline Programme 
for Public Engagement on Nanotechnologies suggest, one dimension of public concern, 
which may have a significant affect on acceptance of technologies (as it arguably did with 
GM: see Kearnes, Grove-White et al. 2006), is the extent to which uncertainty is openly 
discussed in relation to both the risks and benefits of emerging technologies.  If regulation 
reflects societal acceptance of risk, then it may also be thought of as representing 
society’s acceptance of persistent uncertainty also. These persistent uncertainties may, 
over time, crystallise around technologies and not just individual products, due to various 
factors which may include but are not necessarily reducible to CSO advocacy activities 
(see e.g. Kearnes and Wynne 2007).  
 
In this light, there is perhaps a significant disconnect between the observation made by 
several participants in the roundtable Scenarios Exercise, that latent health and 
environmental impacts of new technologies (not products) may, in any event, be 
unforeseeable, and the views of stakeholder engagement held by the majority of public 
and private sector interviewees, as summarised in Section 3 above. These views can be 
seen as a reflection of the drivers and inhibitors discussed previously, in so far as they 
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represent wider stakeholder engagement as difficult and costly, but also often as a 
necessary means of communicating benefits of specific products (as opposed to 
technologies) to consumers. Treating stakeholder engagement as, primarily, a means of 
communicating certainties may reflect assumptions about how best to minimise business 
risk and societal risk – by getting across “the facts” about products. But upstream 
engagement has, as one of its aims, transparent discussion about uncertainty and how it 
can be managed and responded to.  
 
 
8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions: Current Scope of CSR 
There are several key conclusions to be drawn regarding the current scope of CSR in the 
nanotechnologies industry, which indicate both strengths in the industry as well as 
significant gaps in practice: 
 
· The UK industry remains in an early stage of development, with progress very 
uneven across different sectors. Some commercialisation of products is evident in 
fields like medical diagnostics and electronics, but most production of novel 
materials is still for industrial R&D. The scope of individual companies’ CSR 
activities is therefore significantly affected by their size and the degree of 
commercialisation in their sector. 
· Two key areas where size and sector make a particularly significant difference are 
in stakeholder engagement and CSR reporting: 
o Wide stakeholder engagement is not widely undertaken by smaller 
companies. Further, companies also have mixed opinions about its value: 
some see wide engagement as a valuable means of ensuring public 
acceptance of nanotechnological products. Others see it as an expensive 
and in the last instance unnecessary activity, as the market is seen as being 
a more reliable mechanism for ensuring products with demonstrable 
benefits are successful. 
o Public documentation and reporting of activities is very low among smaller 
companies. 
· Most companies interviewed are highly engaged with precautionary approaches to 
risk in the workplace, driven by existing regulations. 
· Assessment of risks at other stages in the lifecycle is highly variable, and its extent 
is dependent on several factors: company size, data gaps, difficulties with risk 
assessment methodologies, costs, availability of specialist expertise, and the extent 
of business collaboration in producing and collating data.  
· A wider sample of companies would be necessary to fully assess how far these 
issues affect different sectors, but it is evident that outside large companies, 
lifecycle risk management faces serious obstacles, and that the problem of orphan 
products is perhaps not being widely addressed. 
 
 
8.2: Recommendations: Future Scope of CSR 
1) Promote an effective industry code of conduct: to assist in overcoming regulatory 
uncertainty, the promotion of an effective code of conduct (which provides both high-
level and concrete guidance on how to address areas of material CSR concern) is 
essential. This is necessary in order to avoid the potential for competition between 
different codes of conduct in the near future. Forms that such promotional activity might 
take might include: 
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Which model? 
Is it enough for 
emerging 
technologies 
companies to seek 
to “do no harm”?  
· Setting out requirements that any such code should include (both in procedural 
terms, e.g. being developed by multiple stakeholders, and substantive terms, e.g. 
to include reporting requirements, regular external auditing, adoption of proactive 
and systematic models of stakeholder engagement); 
· Promoting being benchmarked against the code as a condition which suppliers of 
goods and services to public organisations should meet; and 
· Focusing on encouraging adoption by larger companies in order to exploit their 
supply-chain influence on smaller companies. 
 
2) Facilitate access to CSR and wider technical expertise: it is essential that 
benchmarking against any such code should be adequately incentivised for smaller 
companies, with access to regulatory information, CSR consultancy expertise, 
toxicological/risk management expertise, and possibly financial assistance. Bodies such as 
NanoKTN could conceivably play a key role in encouraging the sharing of expertise. 
 
3) Encourage sectoral differentiation: the development of principles and guidelines to 
make a code of conduct a concrete source of guidance for different sectors should be 
pursued, which may require the setting-up of sector-specific working groups to allow 
guidance to “crystallise” in forms suited to the specific conditions which obtain in 
different sectors (a recommendation which was also made by participants in the 
Roundtable Exercise). Companies who have already developed, or are developing 
positive models of CSR and/or technical risk assessment and management expertise 
should be used to energise activity. 
  
4) Encourage sharing of CSR expertise within existing supply chains: it is not only 
pressure to be benchmarked against codes of conduct that should be exploited by 
regulators. Transfer of CSR knowledge and experience down the supply chain, with 
sharing of resources, should also be encouraged. Exemplar models of practice should be 
formulated. 
 
Beyond these recommendations, however, wider questions should perhaps still remain 
very much on the agenda for regulators. The degree of involvement in and reporting on 
CSR activity is highly variable, as suggested in this report, and dependent on interactions 
between a range of drivers and inhibitors. Does it 
therefore make sense to conceptualise a more responsible 
future as one in which more and more companies adopt 
CSR policies, gradually adopting high- level value 
commitments which are realised in specific policies and 
assessed against quantifiable performance targets?  
 
According to this view, more effective voluntary 
regulation requires incremental improvements in different 
areas of CSR concern to close CSR gaps. But even if 
these gaps are closed, it is possible that such a view would 
be seriously mistaken. We stated earlier (see p. 8 above) 
that business’ own understandings of CSR tend to fall 
somewhere on a continuum between “do no harm” and adding “positive social value”. To 
assess the future contribution which CSR may make to regulating nanotechnologies, it is 
also necessary to ask which kind of CSR we will get, if incremental improvements go on 
being made, and what kind emerging technologies might need. 
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This point is particularly pertinent with respect to how best to address public concerns 
(which may as yet be at a low level, based on recent research on public awareness of 
NST). If effective regulation of emerging technologies involves building consensus about 
what kinds of risks and uncertainties society is prepared to accept, then it may be asked 
whether enacting policies that reinforce the assumption that CSR is about “minimising 
risk” may be for the best. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
At this point in time, the assessment of the social, juridical and ethical consequences of 
nanotechnology relies more on hypothetical or even speculative assumptions than on rigorous 
scientific analysis. (Renn and Roco 2006, 154) 
 
Governments have responded to the rapid development of nanoscale science and technology 
(hereafter NST) by proposing a variety of regulatory approaches. The major difficulty they 
face is how to develop an adequate and proactive regulatory approach for highly uncertain 
risks, in situations where strong scientific evidence of risks is not available, although 
plausible risk scenarios may be (Hansson 2004). A proactive approach, which promotes ex 
ante responsibility for managing and mitigating uncertain risks, is arguably not built into 
either traditional risk regulation, or the precautionary approach that is currently built into EU 
law. The reactive nature of traditional risk regulation may trap regulators in a “vicious spiral” 
of being unable to regulate while waiting for evidence of risk to arrive (Dorbeck-Jung 2007, 
268-9). At the same time, the standard precautionary approach is itself dependent on 
scientific evidence, and cannot protect against risks of which we are ignorant (Marchant 
2003, 1800). Given that a proactive approach presents regulators with these difficulties, the 
promotion of voluntary regulation and corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR), based 
on measures such as codes of conduct, promulgation of best practice, and data-sharing, has 
come to form part of the approach advocated by the US, UK and German governments, along 
with the European Commission. The aim is to produce a system which is both flexible and 
efficient at gathering information, as well as fostering a “culture of responsibility” (European 
Commission 2008a, 7) 
 
In this review, we survey the areas of uncertainty with which any regulatory system will have 
to cope. These comprise both the potential risks of current applications of NST on human 
health and the environment, and the possible consequences of future applications which may 
become possible as the technology develops. Importantly, the uncertainties faced by 
regulators are not just a matter of “data gaps” which affect our understanding of e.g. the 
toxicological properties of current nanomaterials; they also arguably derive from “moral 
gaps” which are opened up by the potential economic and social consequences of NST 
research (Dorbeck-Jung 2007, 267). We then end with a brief survey of how the regulatory 
context in the European Union, United Kingdom and United States contains provisions for 
voluntary regulation, before going on to examine corporate social responsibility criteria 
which are germane to NST applications, and how current international and national CSR 
frameworks articulate some of these general criteria. 
 
Future Potential: Uncertain Benefits and Risks 
In deciding what regulatory approaches might be best suited to oversee the development of 
nanotechnologies, it is necessary to weigh visions of the potential benefits which may flow it 
against anticipations of the risks which may result (Wolfson 2003). However, the keyword 
here is “anticipation”. Manipulating matter at the nanoscale exploits the novel properties 
which particles and structures with at least one dimension of at most a few hundred 
  
30 
nanometres can have. But these novel properties, and how they might be exploited in the 
future, are by their very nature the source of much uncertainty and ignorance (Swiss Re 2004; 
Nel, Xia et al. 2006, 622-3). Many properties are thus ambivalent or ambiguous in terms of 
their potential for risk (Renn and Roco 2006, 163-4; Swierstra and Rip 2007, 17). At the 
moment, much of nanotechnological research concerns what has been called “passive” 
technology (Roco 2004), generally involving the engineering of particles in order to produce 
novel material structures and compounds, including for example carbon nanotubes, quantum 
dots, and nanoscale metal oxides, which can then be incorporated into other applications and 
products (Allianz 2007, 28-9). In the future, it is postulated that the skills and knowledge 
gained through the early development of nanotechnology will lead to radical innovations in 
the creation of complex nanostructures, which will in turn enable systems incorporating 
numerous individual nanoengineered components to be built (Renn and Roco 2006, 156-7). 
The potential of such developments for revolutionising materials science, computing, 
environmental management, medicine and other fields is seen as immense (Anton, Silberglitt 
et al. 2001). Nanotechnology is often represented as a technology that could enable other 
existing approaches to engineering (including information technology and biotechnology) to 
converge, with far-reaching results (Bainbridge 2007). 
 
Whether such expectations about future generations of nanotechnological evolution can be 
fulfilled is highly uncertain, and will depend upon scientific developments and wider social 
conditions which are entirely unpredictable from the standpoint of the present (Keiper 2007). 
Concerns about the potential negative economic, social and ethical consequences of future 
innovations have nevertheless been widely articulated in response to the continuing 
development of “first wave” nanotechnology, and have included the impact of advanced 
nanotechnology on the economies of developing countries (Correa 2005; ETC Group 2005; 
Hunt 2006), the possible impact of technological convergence on accepted definitions of 
human nature (de S. Cameron 2006), and the development of new generations of 
nanotechnological weaponry (Gatti and Montanari 2008), as well as the now-familiar (and 
widely discredited) apocalyptic scenarios of biospheric destruction (“grey/green goo”) (Joy 
2000; ETC Group 2003). 
 
Some suggestions about potential regulatory responses to the uncertain futures of 
nanotechnology have proposed dealing with such concerns directly as a necessary element of 
risk management (International Risk Governance Council 2006), and as a means of securing 
the social acceptability of NST research into an uncertain future (Siegrist, Keller et al. 2007). 
The possibility of “concern assessment” (as opposed to traditional “risk assessment”)  in the 
face of novel technological development has emerged against a background of new interest 
from government, industry and commentators in the potential of stakeholder engagement for 
allowing social concerns and ethical debate to be publicly articulated (Renn and Roco 2006, 
177; Gavelin, Wilson et al. 2007).  
 
However, regulatory responses to the current uses of nanotechnology have themselves to deal 
with conditions which, over ten years since the founding of the US National Nanotechnology 
Initiative, are still characterised by widespread scientific uncertainty and ignorance about the 
potential risks of current nanotechnology applications (Bijker, de Beaufort et al. 2007). In 
toxicology, characterising the risk of a given substance generally requires a thorough 
description of its hazards and the potential for exposure of humans (and other organisms) to 
these hazards. Current uncertainty about risk is generated by a continuing lack of knowledge 
in both these areas. We now move to examine some of the areas of uncertainty and ignorance 
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which hamper the application of tradit ional risk assessment and management approaches to 
current NST developments. 
 
 
Nanotechnology hazards: the status quo of current knowledge 
Human health 
There is no way to establish in some general way what the hazards associated with 
nanoparticles of different elements are. When particles of familiar elements such as 
aluminium and carbon are engineered at the nanoscale, it is true that some characteristic 
changes in properties are shared by nanoparticles of different elements, such as larger surface 
to volume ratios and changes in surface conductivity. It is also true that physical properties 
like these (as opposed to chemical ones) are seen as crucial in determining whether or not a 
particular nanomaterial is hazardous (Chatterjee 2008, 342). However, the specific variations 
in such properties across different nanomaterials, and in the ways in which these materials 
may interact with the environments in which they are employed, may be such that 
characterisation of hazards is not possible until a nanomaterial is made and used in a 
particular context (Uskokovic 2007, 46) or deployed in a particular environment (Klaine, 
Alvarez et al. 2008), as it is often interactions between ambient properties (such as the 
biological properties of the pulmonary or digestive system) with those of the nanomaterials in 
question that produce unforeseen outcomes. Further, any harmful effects produced by these 
complex interactions may only emerge over a long period of time. Finally, the properties 
which may cause problems tend to be ones which are not usually considered in toxicological 
testing regimes (Oberdorster, Maynard et al. 2005) and the amounts of nanomaterials which 
are ingested may be so small as to make measurement difficult (Englert 2007). 
 
This means that describing the health hazards associated with even a single material is 
difficult. Take single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWNTs) as an example. SWNTs are widely 
used in a variety of applications, notably in sports goods such as tennis rackets for their high 
tensile strength and in electronics applications for their high conductivity. They are expected 
to become one of the most widely used products of the first wave of nanotechnology (Besley, 
Kramer et al. 2008). However, a growing number of studies have indicated that introduction 
of SWNTs into the body (particularly the lungs) can cause damage like that produced by 
asbestos fibres. Some have also suggested, however, that this effect may only be produced by 
longer SWNTs, and not by shorter ones (Donaldson, Poland et al. 2008).  
 
Other notable hazards which have been indicated by animal studies have been the possibility 
of cell damage resulting from phenomena such as oxidative stress (Oberdorster 2004). 
However, there is as yet almost no dose-response data on such hazards (UK Government 
2006, 42), and data on long-term hazards will have to wait until currently ongoing in vitro 
and in vivo studies (Thomas and Sayre 2005; IRGC 2006, 22-3) are completed. The 
importance of understanding the parameters which govern how NSPs can interact with the 
human body over time is vitally important given the strong possibility that some 
nanomaterials will not be expunged by the body’s natural defences and may bioaccumulate 
over time (European Commission 2004, 18; SCENHIR 2006, 50). However, studies on 
bioaccumulation are still not far advanced (Allianz 2007, 4). 
 
Environmental 
Calls for greater priority to be accorded to ecotoxicological studies have repeatedly been 
made by commentators and government advisors over the last few years (NSTC 2006, 31-2; 
UK Government 2006, 88), in response to indications that the level of knowledge on the 
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potential environmental fates and ecological effects of nanomaterials has been even lower 
than on their possible effects on human health (Krug 2005). Questions have been raised about 
the levels of funding given to studies on ecological risks: for example, Service (2004, 1734) 
notes that the US National Nanotechnology Initiative claimed in 2004 that 11% of research 
funding was spent on environmental studies, but that in fact the majority of this money went 
on research into potential environmental applications of nanomaterials, not on toxicological 
studies of existing materials. Despite greater efforts being made in this area, knowledge 
remains piecemeal (Lubick 2008, 1821-2). 
 
The priority of improving ecotoxicological knowledge is underlined by the need to 
understand what environmental fates are possible for easily-transportable nanomaterials 
(Kuzma 2007, 1087), which requires that their behaviour both in solution and as colloids 
should be understood (Klaine, Alvarez et al. 2008). It is also vital because of the variety of 
potential hazards which are beginning to be indicated by research. Much of this research has 
concentrated on the dangers which maybe posed to key aqua tic species, such as daphnia and 
fish (Oberdorster 2004; Blaise, Gagne et al. 2008), although the significance of some earlier 
studies has been subject to debate (Stern and McNeil 2008, 15). However, numerous other 
lines of work have been opened up: some NSPs have been shown to inhibit root growth in 
plants (Hannah and Thompson 2008, 296), can bind pollutants in ways that alter their 
bioavailability, bioaccumulation and movement (Sutherland, Bailey et al. 2008, 823), and 
may be harmful to important soil microorganisms (Klaine, Alvarez et al. 2008, 1842-4).  
 
Nanotechnology exposure: an overview 
In characterising the potential risks posed by nanomaterials, the second key aspect after 
hazard is the degree to which human and environmental exposure may occur, and through 
what mechanisms of transport this exposure could happen.  Nanoparticles could gain entry 
into the human body via a number of routes, including ingestion, inhalation and absorption 
through the skin (Hoet, Bruske-Hohfeld et al. 2004; Nel, Xia et al. 2006, 624-5). Research is 
continuing on the various pathways that free nanomaterials may take through the atmosphere 
and through aquatic and terrestrial environments, if released through e.g. a research 
laboratory accident or through product disposal.  
 
As noted above, the properties of nanomaterials can vary depending on how they are 
produced and used. Exposure pathways can also vary throughout a nanoproduct’s lifecycle, 
from manufacturing through use to disposal (Donaldson, Stone et al. 2004). The likelihood of 
exposure can be assessed using tools such as life cycle analysis (LCA). However, no LCAs 
for nanomaterials conforming to the relevant ISO standards have so far been produced 
(Bauer, Buchgeister et al. 2008, 912), with one reason being that data gaps concerning the 
nature of specific hazards affect our understanding of what possible exposure routes may 
exist at the various stages of a product’s life (Aitken, Chaudhry et al. 2006, 305-6). 
 
Toxicological research therefore continues to investigate whether or not workers, consumers 
and the environment may become exposed to free nanomaterials during, respectively, the 
manufacturing, use and disposal of free nanomaterials. For example, the potential for workers 
being exposed through inhalation to e.g. carbon nanotubes during the manufacture of either 
the nanotubes themselves or products incorporating them has been of great concern (Stern 
and McNeil 2008, 6), and to date has constituted one of the main areas of NST health risk 
research (Donaldson, Aitken et al. 2006).  However, because of the knowledge gaps 
concerning hazards discussed in the previous section, to date, risk assessments on 
nanomaterial manufacturing processes have only been able to concentrate on the risks 
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attendant on the manufacturing processes themselves, not on the risks of exposure to specific 
nanomaterials themselves (Robichaud, Tanzil et al. 2005). 
 
Use and consumption of nanomaterials brings with it a different set of concerns. As more and 
more nano-enabled products enter the market across different sectors (Brumfiel 2006), 
research is beginning to focus on the more widely used materials that are being incorporated 
into consumer items, such as nanosilver (Chen and Schluesener 2008; Friends of the Earth 
2008, 27; Luoma 2008), as well as carbon nanotubes (Köhler, Som et al. 2008). As medical 
use of nanomaterials increases, questions surrounding the routes taken by nanoparticles 
through the body and their eventual fates will become more urgent. Research on these 
pathways and the kinetic properties of nanoparticles more generally remains scanty (Hagens, 
Oomen et al. 2007). Dermal exposure, through the use of e.g. TiO 2 in sunscreens, has also 
been investigated (Schulz, Hohenberg et al. 2002), with some studies showing that the typical 
size of metal oxide nanoparticles makes such a source of exposure unlikely (Nohynek, 
Dufour et al. 2008). As well as exposure to nanomaterials such as quantum dots through 
medical uses such as in drug delivery (Chan 2006), future research will need to examine the 
use of nanomaterials in food, which promises to become widespread (Chau, Wu et al. 2007; 
Chaudhry, Scotter et al. 2008; Friends of the Earth 2008). 
 
The potential for migration of nanomaterials during use or disposal makes the transport and 
fate of potentially persistent materials such as nanotubes and metal oxides being a particular 
focus. Among the key anticipated environmental applications of nanomaterials are water 
purification (Bellobono, Morazzoni et al. 2005; Savage and Diallo 2006), pollution abatement 
and environmental remediation using e.g. iron nanoparticles (Zhang 2003), sensing of 
pollutants, pH and chemical warfare agents, oil-water separation, and the destruction of 
bacteria (including anthrax) (Theodore and Kunz 2005). The potential of such applications 
for releasing free nanoparticles and nanostructures into the environment necessitates 
extensive research on their potential for transport particularly through aquatic and terrestrial 
media. As a result, the potential for exposure of key aquatic species to nanotubes, fullerenes 
and metal oxides has been the subject of a number of studies (e.g. Cheng and Cheng 2005; 
Lovern and Klaper 2006; Blaise, Gagne et al. 2008). The potential for exposure of key 
species is even less well researched in relation to the foundations of ecosystems. Studies on 
soil microbes (critical for the health of terrestrial ecosystems) have suggested that 
nanomaterials could have serious effects (Throback, Johansson et al. 2007), but are few and 
far between, while studies on microbes within marine sediments and on marine invertebrates 
are nearly entirely lacking (Klaine, Alvarez et al. 2008, 1841). 
 
Further, a key research need which threatens to hamper work into human and environmental 
exposure scenarios is for new instrumentation and testing methods which can detect 
nanoparticles distributed within real-world environments (Maynard, Aitken et al. 2006; 
Englert 2007). 
 
Regulatory Responses: Making Room for Voluntarism 
Being clear about the extent to which the current situation is characterised by uncertainty and 
ignorance, as well as clear risk, is vital to framing regulatory action. The International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC) has suggested in an influential white paper that four categories 
of risk can usefully be applied in understanding the potential hazards posed by NST: simple, 
complex, uncertain and ambiguous (IRGC 2006). A subsequent report stressed that the 
present generation of mainly passive nanomaterials may pose at most complex risks, with 
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future generations of NST development (leading e.g. to the manufacture of active 
nanostructures and their incorporation in living systems) may create situations where the 
effects of using nanomaterials are highly uncertain or ambiguous (Renn and Roco 2006), both 
in terms of their toxicological impacts and their broader social consequences (for example, in 
the sphere of human enhancement). The assurance that further risk research will lead in the 
near term to sufficient characterisation of nanomaterial hazards has been criticised, however, 
on the grounds that the limitations of knowledge in the present, especially regarding the 
toxicological effects of persistent nanomaterials in the long-term through mechanisms such as 
bioaccumulation, make some of the more serious potential risks very uncertain indeed 
(Bijker, de Beaufort et al. 2007, 1218-19).  
 
Calls for pre-emptive regulatory action have been widespread, and have varied enormously in 
the scope of action advocated. Some have called for moratoria on the production and release 
of nanomaterials (ETC Group 2003). Other commentators have called for voluntary 
precautionary measures on the part of researchers and industry to limit exposure, particularly 
of workers engaged in NST research and manufacturing, and particularly where nanotubes 
are produced (Mills and Fledderman 2005, 21; Köhler, Som et al. 2008). The Royal Society 
and Royal Academy of Engineering (RS/RAEng ) report on the risks of NST (RS/RAEng 
2004) proposed that nanomaterials should be regulated in a precautionary manner as novel 
chemicals, and that free nanoparticles should be removed from waste streams to limit 
environmental exposure. The question of whether nanomaterials are “substantially 
equivalent” to bulk forms of the same chemical remains a key question to which reviews of 
regulatory responses in different national jurisdictions have drawn attention (e.g. RS/RAEng 
2004, 86; Ludlow, Bowman et al. 2007). The pertinence of this issue is marked, as various 
reviews of the literature (e.g. Uskokovic 2007, 53) and studies of current regulatory 
approaches (e.g. Franco, Hansen et al. 2007, 176) stress that case-by-case assessment of 
nano- and bulk versions of chemically identical materials have often demonstrated substantial 
differences between the two types, and that these differences can often be shown to be vitally 
important in determining how to manage risks. It can be argued, therefore, that a key 
requirement of regulatory responses is how to mobilise data-gathering on nanomaterials 
toxicology across the industrial and academic sectors where NST is developing, and how to 
use this data to produce best practice guidelines with respect to risk assessment and risk 
management. Further, to maximise the public acceptability of NST research, wide 
stakeholder engagement has been promoted. To fulfil all these requirements, several 
governments are encouraging industry and academia to develop flagship voluntary initiatives. 
 
Governmental Responses 
We now provide a necessarily brief survey of responses at the government level from the UK, 
EU and USA to the risks and uncertainties surrounding NST. A common theme across 
jurisdictions has been an incremental, step-by-step approach to the regulation of 
nanomaterials, concentrating on already defined exposure scenarios (e.g. in the workplace), 
utilising current regulations as much as possible, and avoiding blanket regulation across what 
is largely felt to be a difficult to define technological sector. Linking these approaches with 
effective transnational regulatory models (Marchant and Sylvester 2006), backed by 
comprehensive international databases of nanomaterials (Put 2004, 120; Allianz 2007, 36) is 
crucially important, with international product standards offering one regulatory model which 
could facilitate further development (Lee and Jose 2008, 117). The role of industry in the 
interim as a partner in helping to promote voluntary forms of regulation and in taking 
proactive precautionary action where necessary has also been emphasised. We briefly survey 
in section 5.ii the prospects for the development of voluntary regulation, before going on in 
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section 6 to look at some general CSR criteria which voluntary frameworks should 
incorporate, and in section 7 at how some extant examples of such frameworks embody these 
critieria. 
 
European Union 
In the EU, an incremental testing and regulatory programme (EC 2004, 23-4) is currently 
favoured. Part of this approach is to encourage industry to pursue stakeholder dialogue, build 
in life cycle risk assessment, and to take into account the wider impacts of its activities in line 
with CSR criteria (EC 2005). In order for this approach to work, however, commentators 
have argued that a number of modifications to the existing regime should be made (Franco, 
Hansen et al. 2007, 180-2): occupational exposure be limited as far as possible, free NSPs 
should be treated as inherently hazardous until shown otherwise and possible treated as new 
substances under REACh even if not produced in sufficient quantities to trigger assessment. 
Franco et al. also point out that for an incremental approach to work, more LCA analysis 
must be done, which requires overcoming the tendency for manufacturers to avoid disclosing 
product data. Recognising that crucial knowledge gaps and resultant research needs exist in 
the key areas discussed above, a report for the European Commission (EC 2008b) has 
suggested that existing regulation should nevertheless be able to cope with NST development 
for the moment. 
 
United Kingdom 
The UK Government agreed with the RS/RAEng that nanoparticles should be removed from 
waste streams and that their novel properties mean that they should require special testing 
(UK Government 2005b, 5-7). They also agreed with the RS/RAEng’s conclusion (2004, 77) 
that a general moratorium on NST research would be inappropriate, and that a case-by-case, 
incremental approach would be required (UK Government 2005b; 2008a). In order to obtain 
more information on the scope of current nanomaterials production and to allow for the 
creation of lifecycle profiles, a voluntary reporting scheme was announced in 2006 by 
DEFRA (UK Government 2008b). The Government has also developed a framework for 
coordinating research funding to address outstanding research needs in metrology, hazard 
characterisation and exposure studies, as well as on the wider social and economic impacts of 
NST (UK Government 2007). Its commitment to extending public participation in addressing 
future NST development was initially articulated in 2005 (UK Government 2005a), with the 
initial result being a series of activities undertaken under the aegis of the Nanotechnology 
Engagement Group or NEG (Gavelin, Wilson et al. 2007).  
 
United States 
The EPA ruled in July 2008 that nanoparticles should be considered substantially equivalent 
to bulk forms of the same element, despite the continuing debate over whether it is the 
physical or the chemical properties of a given element that decide the risk potential of its 
nanoscale form (Chatterjee 2008, 342). The EPA’s voluntary reporting programme, inspired 
by the UK’s initiative, aims to fill existing data gaps on the potential hazards emerging within 
the life-cycle of individual nanomaterials, and is running alongside a programme of research 
aimed at addressing outstanding risk research needs (NSTC 2006). As with other 
jurisdictions, the USA has avoided a sector-specific set of new regulations. In this 
environment, it has been suggested that the regulatory approach in the USA may be pushed 
ahead by individual states taking responsibility for “end-of-pipe” regulatory measures in the 
absence of any proactive lead from the federal government (Powell, Griffin et al. 2008).   
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Voluntary Prospects 
The various national and regional jurisdictions are also pursuing the possibility of voluntary 
regulation as a way of responding to ongoing uncertainty. Ongoing initiatives include 
voluntary reporting schemes to collect information from industry on existing uses of 
nanomaterials in the UK (UK Government 2008b) and the USA (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2008), together with the collaborative framework for dealing with risk developed 
between the NGO Environmental Defence and DuPont (EDF - DuPont 2007), all which 
emphasis the need to collect data to form lifecycle profiles of the risks of specific 
nanomaterials. The Royal Society, Insight Investment and the Nanotechnology KTN have set 
up a working group called Responsible NanoCode, to produce a principles-based code of 
conduct for the industry that stresses the need for effective and comprehensive risk 
assessment, wide stakeholder engagement, and transparency (Responsible NanoCode 2008). 
The German Chemical Industries Association (VCI) has published a set of guidelines to help 
companies understand the responsibilities pertaining to nanomaterials under the EU’s new 
REACh regulations (VCI 2008). 
 
However, voluntary approaches will have to overcome difficulties, with some commentators 
arguing that they do not lead to high-quality data unless they include effective incentives, are 
properly transparent, and are made mandatory after an introductory period of some years 
(Hansen and Tickner 2007). Whether there is currently any great appetite across the 
nanotechnologies industry for collaboratively developing frameworks of best practice is 
difficult to determine on the basis of existing research.  
 
For example, a recent survey of 40 companies in Germany and Austria manufacturing 
nanomaterials and/or products containing nanomaterials originating with others indicated a 
near complete lack of any voluntary risk management framework for nanomaterials (Helland, 
Scheringer et al. 2008), with 30 of the 40 reporting that they did not actively investigate the 
possibility of human or environmental exposure of the materials they produced or used (ibid., 
642). Similarly, a brief survey of 11 large companies from the chemical and consumer goods 
sectors conducted as an adjunct to the EU-funded Nanologue project found that only 3 had 
specific NST-related corporate social responsibility policies, and that both stakeholder 
dialogue and transparency were broadly lacking (Turk 2007). 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility – General Criteria 
For any business CSR is about balancing the need to make a profit with the need to be 
socially and environmentally responsible. CSR is a means for a company to proactively 
manage its impact on society and can provide opportunities for risk reduction and innovation. 
In its “Nanotechnology Action Plan” (EC 2005) the European Union stresses the importance 
of respecting ethical principles and integrating societal considerations into the development 
of nanotechnologies at every stage. Businesses need to take appropriate action to make use of 
opportunities and limit risks while involving and informing stakeholders. “CSR management 
also fosters innovation and risk reduction as stakeholders evaluate their own business 
activities and strategies and map out current and future requirements and concerns” (Schaller 
2008). 
 
The knowledge gaps which NST opens up provide space within which voluntary regulation 
may serve as a valuable way of putting flesh on the bones of a general commitment to 
precautionary handling of nanomaterials in workplaces, in the supply chain, and in the 
marketplace and beyond. Corporate social responsibility provides conceptual and practical 
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models for developing such a framework, with a view to promoting a culture of pro-active 
ethical responsibility within industry (Carroll 1991). The idea that to promote future-
regarding corporate responsibility through a mixture of codes of conduct, best practice 
models and gradual acculturation is in line with arguments provided by some ethicists on the 
greater robustness of “virtue” or “care”-based theories of responsibility in the face of great 
technological uncertainty (e.g. Jamieson 1992; Keulartz, Schermer et al. 2004; Groves 2009).  
 
Materiality 
It is important for any industry to define and manage the most important CSR issues rather 
than take a general approach to identifying “material” issues. Given the complex and varied 
nature of the nanotechnology industry materiality will differ considerably from company to 
company. The industry has the opportunity to address material issues right at the beginning of 
developing CSR strategies. While the detail of which issues are material to each business will 
vary there are common concerns that the whole industry must address in any CSR strategy if 
it is to lead to any successful form of governance. Not all material CSR concerns are 
negative; a successful strategy should balance the potential gains from nanotechnology with 
careful assessment, mitigation and communication of risks. 
 
 
Table 5: Negative and Positive Impacts of Key Material Issues 
 
Material issue  Negative impacts Positive impacts 
Environmental 
Impacts 
· Release of manufactured 
nanoparticles into the 
environment. 
· Life-cycle impacts of technology. 
· Problems at recycling and 
disposal phase. 
· Manufacture of nanoparticles 
could be energy and resource 
intensive. 
· Efficiency gains in 
production due to cleaner 
manufacture and less 
resource use. 
· Nanotechnology-based 
environmental 
technology applications. 
Human health · Scientific uncertainty regarding 
the behaviour of nanoparticles in 
the human body. 
· Opportunity for disease 
prevention (e.g. 
improved food safety). 
Privacy/human 
rights 
· Collection of increasingly 
sensitive data likely to raise 
questions about information 
provenance and distribution. 
· Concern for civil liberties from 
increasingly advanced 
surveillance capabilities. 
 
Access · Fears that the developing world 
will not have good access to 
nanotechnology due to 
prohibitive costs. 
· Divide between the rich and the 
poor as only the rich can afford to 
take advantage of e.g. high-end 
medical applications. 
· Potential to tackle 
environmental and health 
issues in the developing 
world. 
· Poverty alleviation? 
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Acceptance/und
erstanding 
· Little understanding/awareness in 
general public about 
nanotechnology and its potential 
impacts. 
· Concerns expressed regarding 
governance structures and 
corporate transparency. 
· CSR can be used as a 
powerful communicative 
tool to improve 
understanding and 
acceptance. 
Liability · Difficult to establish a causal 
relationship between the actions 
of a company and the resulting 
impact. 
· Concern that liability frameworks 
are currently insufficient for the 
regulation of nanotechnologies. 
· Risk that nanotechnology may 
develop outside regulatory 
control. 
· CSR may be able to 
bridge some of the gaps 
in legislation. 
· CSR as an enabler of 
innovation.  
 
Stakeholder Engagement  
It has become widely recognised that businesses are deeply enmeshed within various social 
networks, members of which can indirectly or directly affect or be affected by a company’s 
operations. Voluntary strategies for proactively managing relationships with these 
“stakeholders” have been represented as advantageous to both business and society 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995), both in terms of increasing the social legitimacy of business 
and in accessing information which may be germane to a company’s operations. In particular, 
good stakeholder relationships are seen as crucial in anticipating and managing conflict 
through negotiated solutions, thus obviating the possibility that a conflict may have to be 
settled through external agencies, such as the courts or government agencies (Freeman 1984). 
It has been argued that the practicality and clarity of stakeholder management-based 
understandings of CSR are extremely useful for promoting CSR to managers (Jamali 2008).  
 
The need for businesses to pursue social engagement activities in the context of technological 
innovation (Wilsdon and Willis 2004) has been particularly stressed with regard to NST 
development (Kearnes, Macnaghten et al. 2006; Pidgeon and Rodgers-Hayden 2007), with 
the hope of learning lessons from the failures of public engagement surrounding GMOs and 
biotechnology in the 1990s (Barnett, Carr et al. 2006; Einsiedel and Goldenberg 2006). 
Munshi et al. (2007) identify 8 nodes of discussion or “stakeholder groups” that have been 
central to the development of dialogue around NST, but also note that “most discussions on 
this subject are not multidimensional, multidisciplinary, or fully open” (433). These key 
stakeholders are: 
 
1. Technoscientists 
2. Leaders of business and industry 
3. Official or quasi-official bodies 
4. Social science and humanities researchers 
5. Fiction writers 
6. Political activists 
7. Science journalists and popular science writers 
8. General public 
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Munshi et al. raise a number of key points that have a bearing on the development of CSR in 
the nanotechnology industry. Firstly, there is much definitional variation surrounding NST. 
Given that defining CSR is also a contentious issue the addition of another complicated layer 
of discourse to the CSR debate may prove problematic. There is a general lack of societal 
debate on the social implications of NST (Dunkley 2004), which leaves the social aspects 
underrepresented. This is compounded by the fact that discourse on the social, economic, 
legal and ethical implications of NST among social science and humanities researchers is in a 
very early stage of development. Munshi et al. (2007, 439) note that “[…] researchers have 
not produced literature yet, nor have they coalesced into functioning research communities”.  
 
Political activists and NGOs (so crucial to the endorsement or criticism of CSR) are wary of 
NST developments and have tended to take a negative stance. However, some activists have 
recognized that NST offers both potential benefits and risks and have called for the 
application of the precautionary principle as a way of managing nanotechnology (Montague 
2004).  
 
Like GM foods and bio-technology, NST has the potential to produce fear and confusion in 
the general public, particularly with regards to environmental and human health issues. There 
is a “lack of trust in business leaders to minimize nanotechnology risks to human health” 
(Cobb & Macoubrie 2004).  The main problem at the moment is that there is a lack of 
awareness in the general public of what NST is and what the future holds in this area “few 
individuals are aware of this new science as the entire field…is a well-kept secret” (Dunkley 
2004).  Munshi et al. (2007) contend that it is businesses that need to convince the public of 
the benefits of nanotechnology; one way to do this is through CSR. 
 
Munshi et al. (2007) raise two further points of interest. First, “[…]the power to define what 
is or is not nanotechnology rests with technoscientists […] It is this very power that 
privileges the technological aspects of a little-understood field over the social and cultural 
aspects” (p. 446). Crucially for CSR, “[i]t is in acknowledging social and cultural rationalities 
alongside technical and economic ones that policy makers can make the use of new 
technologies more equitable and socially and environmentally sustainable” (447). 
 
CSR and Risk Management 
The idea that CSR can be used as a means of reducing business risk is not a new one (see 
Wood 1991; Orlitzky & Benjamin 2001). Businesses with proactive CSR engage in 
managerial practices like environmental assessment and stakeholder management (Wood 
1991) that tend to anticipate and reduce potential sources of business risk, such as potential 
governmental regulation, labour unrest, or environmental damage (Orlitzky and Benjamin 
2001). 
 
Husted (2005) offers a “real options” concept of risk management that could potentially be of 
benefit to an industry where the risks are both significant and also frequently unknown, and 
where “strategic adaptation by skilful, rigorous, and continuous management of unsystematic 
(business) risk lies at the very heart of strategic management” (Bettis 1983).  Husted (2005: 
176) argues that “[a]s a real option, CSR projects provide a way of reducing the downside 
business risk of the firm and are thus an essential element in the risk management of the 
corporation”. CSR involves business decisions about the allocation of resources “careful 
analysis of the costs and benefits of CSR projects in terms of cash flows, using traditional 
techniques of valuation, often leads to the decision to forego such investments” (McWilliams 
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and Siegel 2001). However, in undertaking traditional cost-benefit analysis businesses often 
fail to take into account the value of strategic flexibility that certain CSR investments may 
create. 
 
Options quite simply confer “preferential access to future opportunities”. Real options include 
both the option to undertake activities or to acquire. They allow a person or a firm to defer a 
decision to commit resources until after the nature of an uncertain environment has revealed 
itself. If future conditions turn out to be poor, then decision makers can stop investment; if 
conditions turn out positively, investment may continue (Husted, 2005: 177).  
 
CSR may be used as an option to call upon the support and resources of stakeholders in times 
of crisis. A proactive CSR management system may provide a company with strategic 
flexibility that allows them not suffer too greatly when a risk is realized. Such strategic 
flexibility is crucial to the NST industry where so many of the risks are poorly understood; it 
could allow companies to take pre-emptive action. 
 
Husted (2005) notes that CSR ‘real options’ may be divided into at least two kinds: “[d]irect 
benefits are derived from the creation of new products and services, which generate rents that 
are captured by the firm. Indirect benefits include the development of firm-specific assets that 
are of value to the firm, but require further steps in order to capture the rent potential of these 
assets. In the case of real CSR options with direct benefits, CSR may act as a vehicle for 
innovation, which may provide a test of a product or service before launching that product or 
service to a wider public” (Kanter 1999). 
 
CSR and innovation 
To be successful and innovative today, companies must consider the social and 
environmental impact of their operational processes, stimulate employees to be creative, and 
collaborate with their customers, suppliers and other business partners in designing and 
developing new products and services. The view that equates innovation exclusively with 
high technology and new products is slowly being abandoned and innovation is coming to be 
understood as a broad, continuous, systematic activity that takes place throughout the 
enterprise (Sawhney et al., 2006; Hamel, 2006; Vila and MacGregor, 2007). 
 
"Innovation is the process through which productive resources are developed and utilized to 
generate higher quality and/or lower cost products than had been previously available. […] 
[Innovation] requires the visualization of a range of potentialities that were previously 
hidden and that are now believed to be accessible. Thus, innovation strategy is in its essence, 
interpretative and therefore subjective, rather than 'rational' and objective."  
(O'Sullivan, 2000: 393, 409) 
 
The term “corporate social innovation” was first introduced by Kanter (1999: 125) who 
argues that companies should use social issues as a learning laboratory for identifying unmet 
needs and for developing solutions that create new markets. The term corporate social 
innovation can be defined as a way of "finding new products and services that meet not only 
the functional needs of consumers for tasty food or clean clothes but also their wider 
aspirations as citizens."(Patrick Cescau CEO of Unilever cited in Webb, 2007). Little explicit 
attention has been paid to the space or fit between CSR and innovation i.e. very few 
published works explicitly discuss CSR in conjunction with innovation (e.g., Midttun, 2007). 
Implicitly, however, much work in each of the general domains of CSR and innovation has 
overlapped, as in the case of sustainable development (Carpenter and White, 2004). 
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There are two types of innovation that may be driven by CSR: 
 
1. Innovations aiming at social improvements (i.e. health, education, community 
development). Here the term social innovation can refer to product innovations with a 
social purpose.  
 
Nanotechnology is widely recognised as a great opportunity for disease prevention (e.g. 
improved food safety); early disease detection (e.g. sensors for cancer detection) or medical 
treatment (e.g. cont rolled drug delivery by nanocapsules). There has also been considerable 
discussion about the potential benefits of nanotechnology in tackling issues affecting 
developing countries (Turk, 2007). 
 
 
2. Environmental or eco- innovation at the heart of their work. 
 
Sustainability innovations (also called eco-innovations, eco-design, eco-preneurship, or clean 
technology venturing) have been proposed as a source for "environmentally benign growth" 
(Dyllick, 1994: 60). Cleantech denotes new technology and related business models (such as 
CSR) offering competitive returns for investors and customers while providing solutions to 
global challenges through breakthrough product innovation (Hockerts & Morsing, 2008). 
Cleantech venturing is thus driven by two main forces: technology and competitiveness 
which are both superimposed on certain environmental or social problems in order to 
generate new ideas (ibid.). At present there is a strong belief that there will be environmental 
benefits from the introduction of nanotechnology and improvements could be delivered in the 
overall environmental performance of products through: 
 
· efficiency gains in production due to miniaturization effects, e.g. cleaner manufacture 
with less emissions and less waste 
· efficiency gains in use from the ability to build devices from the bottom up and 
improve efficiency and operation, e.g. better solar cells from molecular manufacturing 
· nanotechnology-based environment technology applications, e.g. devices for waste 
water treatment (Turk, 2007). 
 
Socially Responsible Design (SRD) (Davey et al., 2005) builds on existing design areas that 
overlap with areas of responsibility and sustainability such as Design for Environment, SRD 
takes an integrative approach to several existing design initiatives. The link with CSR is 
described as being the part of CSR that has an external focus; alternatively, SRD is described 
as “CSR in action”. A key message is that an understanding and implementation of design is 
necessary in order for companies to include CSR in the production of the products, processes, 
environments and services that create their image in the marketplace. The authors state that 
SRD “focuses attention on the products, environments, services and systems that can alleviate 
real world problems and improve quality of life.” 
 
From the CSR point of view, interest has focused increasingly on certain corporate actions 
and processes where companies have no choice but to innovate on several levels, including 
products (where they have to satisfy the demand for socially responsible products) and 
processes (where they must pay attention to the implications of social responsibility across 
the whole supply chain) (MacGregor & Fontrodona, 2008). 
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However, as pointed out by Hockerts (2008), most companies remain focused on CSR as a 
tool to reduce risks and operational cost; only companies with very high social performance 
rankings think about CSR as a means to drive product innovation. Hockerts (ibid.) proposes 
that corporate social innovation requires the creation of knowledge structures that result from 
investments in corporate social performance. Blum-Kusterer and Hussain (2001) similarly 
find that regulation and technological progress are the two main drivers for sustainability 
innovations. 
 
Conclusion 
CSR is fundamentally about re-imagining the social contract between business and society. In 
order to understand and classify the pro-active activities of companies, it has been suggested 
that the CSR “imaginaries” (deeply embedded assumptions about the nature and limits of 
CSR) which underlie these activities should be mapped. Categorizing approaches to CSR, 
based on business’ own interpretation of how it should deal with material CSR issues, has 
become one influential way of understanding to what extent CSR has penetrated a given 
industry, and with what emphasis. The recent EU-funded RESPONSE study has suggested 
(RESPONSE 2007), we could usefully consider two ways of thinking about the general 
orientation of a company’s CSR activities. According to RESPONSE, companies can be 
placed somewhere on a continuum which has as its extremes contrasting CSR models: “Do 
No Harm” and “Positive Force”. The first of these concentrates CSR activity on minimizing 
health and environmental risks – and with them, business risks. The second strives towards 
adding positive social value to the company’s business activities in various ways. Examples 
of how these different approaches might play out across different material concerns are given 
below in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Social responsibilities as a continuum (Pedersen 2009) 
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Annex 2: CSR and Voluntary Initiatives: Current Transnational and National Frameworks Relevant to NST 
Development 
 
Table 6: CSR and Voluntary Initiati ves: Current Transnational and National Frameworks Relevant to NST Development 
 
Transnational  
 
Standard/Code of conduct Description Relevant principles 
AccountAbility 1000 
(http://www.accountability21.
net/) 
Launched in 1999, AA1000 is an 
accountability standard which specifies 
processes designed to improve accountability 
and performance through stakeholder 
engagement. It was developed to address the 
need for organisations to integrate their 
stakeholder engagement processes into daily 
activities.  
AA1000 sees effective stakeholder engagement as being based 
on three principles: materiality (knowing which stakeholder 
concerns are important), completeness (understanding the 
meaning of these concerns) and responsiveness (responding 
effectively to concerns) (AccountAbility 2005, 27).  
 
It provides a comprehensive framework for planning and 
evaluating engagement activities which draws on these 
principles to construct an iterative process of planning, design, 
implementation and review. Stakeholders themselves should be 
included in evaluation and review processes (ibid. 49) 
CENARIOS TÜV SÜD’s CENARIOS approach sets out 
general requirements for a company’s overall 
risk management system.  
 
 
Includes an adaptation of the typical risk matrix used in risk 
assessment (classifying risks according to seriousness of 
consequences and according to probability of risk event 
occurrence) which, given the lack of knowledge surrounding 
the probability of particular potential consequences of the 
introduction of an innovative technology, uses the seriousness 
of these consequences as the primary classificatory variable. 
 
Monitoring of information sources on product risk as the state 
of knowledge changes is included as a crucial ongoing part of 
the risk management system, recognising the extended temporal 
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aspects of the risk management process.  
 
Features annual auditing to support award of accreditation, and 
established responsibilities of risk (TÜV SÜD GmbH 2008, 23) 
and production managers (TÜV SÜD GmbH 2008, 24) to 
ensure that processes and systems are continuously improved 
DuPont and Environmental 
Defense Fund Nano Risk 
Framework 
(http://nanoriskframework.co
m/page.cfm?tagID=1095) 
Agreed between a major MNC and a 
prominent NGO, this framework offers 
guidance on the key questions an organization 
should consider in developing NST 
applications. It allows users to address areas 
of incomplete or uncertain information by 
using reasonable assumptions and appropriate 
risk management practices. Further, it offers 
guidelines on how to generate information 
and iteratively update information as it 
becomes available, as well as offering 
guidance on how to communicate with 
stakeholders. 
The framework offers a six-stage set of guidelines for risk 
assessment and management, designed for iterative use in the 
development of specific NST applications. 
 
The six stages cover the general description of the physic-
chemical properties of nanomaterials, through life cycle 
profiling of potential hazards, evaluation of risks, assessment of 
risk management measures, organisational action (including the 
setting up of a process management structure), and ongoing 
review of progress.  
European Commission Code 
of Conduct for Responsible 
Nanosciences and 
Nanotechnologies Research 
(http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechn
ology/pdf/nanocode-
rec_pe0894c_en.pdf) 
Published in 2008, this code of conduct is 
intended to provide EU member states and all 
stakeholders interested in NST with a set of 
guidelines that seek to promote responsible 
research. Member states are encouraged to 
use the code as the basis of concrete 
regulatory action, including encouraging 
voluntary regulatory measures within their 
jurisdictions. 
Action by member states should encourage precautionary 
activity, together with forward thinking about potential future 
impacts of products, with the aim being the creation of a 
“general culture of responsibility” (EC 2008a, 7-8). 
 
A key priority of concern for states should be initiatives 
regarding the communication of benefits, risks and 
uncertainties related to NST research, and also measures 
designed to encourage private and public sector laboratories to 
share best practice concerning risk (with due respect for the 
protection of intellectual property). 
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Ethical  Investment Research 
(EIRIS) 
(http://www.eiris.org/) 
A not-for-profit organisation, EIRIS does not 
investigate companies' financial status but 
looks at their social, environmental and 
ethical policies and practices. It carries out 
independent research covering over 40 
different areas including animal testing, 
military, environmental performance and 
human rights. Information from EIRIS is used 
in compiling the FTSE4Good Index Series 
(see below). 
A comprehensive series of performance indicators used by 
EIRIS are provided in the document, The State of Responsible 
Business (Gordon 2007). These cover, for example, supply 
chain labour standards, supply chain systems, and monitoring 
and reporting of labour practices in the supply chain. These are 
based on the ILO Conventions, with basic and advanced scores 
being achievable depending on companies’ degrees of 
commitment (ibid. 47-8.  
 
Environmental indicators are also provided, covering 
environmental policy, management systems, reporting and 
performance improvement (ibid. 55-6). The documentation also 
mentions NST as an emerging issues, noting that “[a] number 
of companies are involved in the research and marketing of 
nanotechnology products and, although some experts are 
warning of potential risks to health and the environment, 
confirmation of which could damage the reputation and value 
of such companies, it is clear that not all companies are 
reporting on how they manage such risks.” (79) 
 
FTSE4Good 
(http://www.ftse.com/ftse4goo
d/index.jsp) 
The FTSE4Good Index Series is a family of 
benchmark and tradable financial indices. 
FTSE4Good indices have been designed to 
measure the performance of companies that 
meet globally recognised corporate 
responsibility standards, and to facilitate 
investment in those companies. Uses the 
EIRIS framework. 
Based on research from EIRIS (see above). 
Global Reporting Initiative 
(http://www.globalreporting.o
rg/Home) 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a 
multi-stakeholder process and independent 
institution whose mission is to develop and 
disseminate globally applicable guidelines for 
The 2006 edition of GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
states that they provide a framework which an organisation can 
use to show how it “influences and is influenced by 
expectations about sustainable development” (GRI 2006, 37-8)  
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reporting by organisations on sustainability 
performance. 
 
The guidelines set out several relevant reporting principles. 
They recommend that organizations should cover all significant 
sustainable development impacts (environmental, economic and 
social), and that reports should be inclusive of all stakeholders 
and responsive to their concerns. Processes of stakeholder 
engagement should be documented. 
 
As well as overall principles, the guidelines also provide a 
number of performance indicators concerning environmental 
impact, labour standards, social performance and responsibility 
for products. These should be addressed directly in reporting. 
 
Environmental indicators 
EN12 Description of significant impacts of activities, products, 
and services on biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas. 
EN14 Strategies, current actions, and future plans for managing 
impacts on biodiversity. 
EN22 Total weight of waste produced by type and disposal 
method. 
EN23 Total number and volume of significant spills. 
EN24 Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated 
waste deemed hazardous under the terms of the Basel 
Convention Annex I, II, III, and VIII, and percentage of 
transported waste shipped internationally. 
 
Labour practice indicators 
LA8 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-
control programs should be in place to assist workforce 
members, their families, or community members regarding 
serious diseases. 
  
47 
LA9 Health and safety topics should be covered in formal 
agreements with trade unions. 
 
Social performance indicators 
SO1 Includes reporting on the nature, scope, and effectiveness 
of any programs and practices that assess and manage the 
impacts of operations on communities. 
 
Product responsibility indicators 
PR1 Concerns life cycle assessment of health and safety 
impacts of products and services. 
PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and safety 
impacts of products and services during their life cycle, by type 
of outcomes.   
 
Global Sullivan Principles 
(http://www.thesullivanfounda
tion.org/gsp/principles/gsp/def
ault.asp) 
The objectives of the Global Sullivan 
Principles are to support economic, social and 
political justice by companies where they do 
business, particularly with reference to the 
different dimensions of equality and 
tolerance. Organizations small and large are 
encouraged to endorse them. The GSP 
organization publicises case studies of best 
practice under the principles. 
Relevant here are commitments to provide a safe and healthy 
workplace, to protect human health and the environment, and to 
promote sustainable development. 
 
The principles also commit endorsers to work with 
communities in which they do business to improve quality of 
life (“their educational, cultural, economic and social well-
being”). Endorsers are also requested to encourage 
organizations with whom they do business to adopt and apply 
the principles. 
International Council of 
Chemical Associations (ICCA) 
Responsible Care 
(http://www.responsiblecare.o
rg/) 
A long-standing code of conduct initiative 
from the chemical industry which began in 
Canada in 1985. The basic mechanism of the 
code is the adoption by companies of codes of 
conduct. Adherence to these codes allows 
organizations to sit on their country’s 
The basis of the initiative is a commitment to improving all 
aspects of health, safety and environmental performance in a 
company’s activities, as well as establishing forms of open 
communication about its business with stakeholders.  A key 
part of the RC initiative is the management systems-based 
guidelines on Product Stewardship, adopted in December 2007 
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Responsible Care council. (ICCA 2007). 
 
Adherence to Responsible Care commits companies to 
developing indicators against which improvements in their 
performance can be measured. 
 
ILO Conventions 
(http://www.ilo.org/global/lan
g--en/index.htm) 
A system of conventions focusing on the 
fundamental rights of human beings at work, 
which have been maintained since 1919. As 
well as being supported by formal compliance 
procedures, they also form the basis for 
numerous transnational voluntary codes of 
conduct. 
Various conventions pertaining to health and safety contain 
stipulations which are relevant to the assessment and 
management of NST risks. Some examples follow. 
 
C187, Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and 
Health Convention, 2006a 
Article 5.2.b states that employers shall “contribute to the 
protection of workers by eliminating or minimizing, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, work-related hazards and risks, in 
accordance with national law and practice, in order to prevent 
occupational injuries, diseases and deaths and promote safety 
and health in the workplace” 
 
Convention C170 Chemicals Convention 1990  
Employers shall ensure that “all chemicals are evaluated to 
determine their hazards”. Article 6.1. states that employers shall 
maintain “[s]ystems and specific criteria appropriate for the 
classification of all chemicals according to the type and degree 
of their intrinsic health and physical hazards […]”. 
 
Article 12 states that employers should “ensure that workers are 
not exposed to chemicals to an extent which exceeds exposure 
limits or other exposure criteria for the evaluation and control 
of the working environment established by the competent 
authority, or by a body approved or recognised by the 
competent authority, in accordance with national or 
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international standards”. Further, that they should “assess the 
exposure of workers to hazardous chemicals”, and “monitor 
and record the exposure of workers to hazardous chemicals 
when this is necessary to safeguard their safety and health or as 
may be prescribed by the competent authority”. Finally, it 
stipulates that they should “ensure that the records of the 
monitoring of the working environment and of the exposure of 
workers using hazardous chemicals are kept for a period 
prescribed by the competent authority and are accessible to the 
workers and their representatives.” 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/eng
lish/employment/multi/downlo
ad/english.pdf) 
 
First adopted in 1977, the Declaration offers 
guidelines to governments, companies and 
employees’ organisations on employment, 
training, conditions of work, and industrial 
relations. It is reinforced by the ILO 
Conventions, and regular surveys are 
conducted to assess its impact.  
Multinational enterprises are enjoined to provide “adequate 
safety and health standards” for employees, “bearing in mind 
their relevant experience within the enterprise as a whole, 
including any knowledge of special hazards” (ILO 2001). 
Companies should share information with employees’ 
organisations across the range of their operations, and 
particularly should “make known to those concerned any 
special hazards and related protective measures associated with 
new products and processes” (ibid. 8). Further, they should 
“cooperate in the work of international organizations concerned 
with the preparation and adoption of international safety and 
health standards” (ibid.) 
ISO 14000 Series 
(http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14
000_essentials) 
ISO is the world's largest developer of 
standards. ISO 14000 details accreditation 
criteria for environmental management 
systems. 
In relation to environmental management systems, the key 
standard is ISO14001:2004, whose aim is to provide a 
framework for a holistic, strategic approach to setting out an 
organization's environmental policy, plans and actions.  
 
The standard provides generic requirements for an 
environmental management system (EMS). Its underlying 
rationale is that the requirements of an effective EMS are the 
same across organizations, regardless of the specific nature of 
their activities. The standard is based on an iterative approach 
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to management. 
OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 
(http://www.oecd.org/docume
nt/28/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2
397532_1_1_1_1,00.html) 
A set of guidelines and standards addressed 
by OECD governments to multinational 
businesses which are designed to stimulate 
and guide corporate social responsibility 
initiatives. Areas covered include 
employment and industrial relations, human 
rights, environment, information disclosure, 
consumer interests, and technology. 
On employment, the guidelines enjoin businesses to “take 
adequate steps to ensure occupational health and safety in their 
operations”.  
 
Environmental guidelines stipulate that businesses should 
“establish and maintain a system of environmental management 
appropriate to the enterprise”, including “[c]ollection and 
evaluation of adequate and timely information regarding the 
environmental, health, and safety impacts of their activities”. 
Further, taking into account cost and confidentiality issues, a 
business should “[p]rovide the public and employees with 
adequate and timely information on the potential environment, 
health and safety impacts of the activities of the enterprise, 
which could include reporting on progress in improving 
environmental performance”. 
 
A precautionary approach to risk management is commended, 
with businesses being enjoined to “not use the lack of full 
scientific certainty as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures” to prevent the possibility of harm. 
 
In relation to innovation, the guidelines propose that MNCs 
should “where practicable”, adopt “practices that permit the 
transfer and rapid diffusion of technologies and know-how, 
with due regard to the protection of intellectual property 
rights”. 
Social Accountability 8000 
(http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?&stopRedi
rect=1) 
The social accountability system, SA8000, 
promotes the adoption of human-rights-based 
principles by retailers, producers and other 
organizations. Their goal is to encourage just 
The primary relevant principles here concern health and safety 
practices in the workplace. The latest version of the SA8000 
standard states that companies should, “bearing in mind the 
prevailing knowledge of the industry and of any specific 
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and decent working conditions throughout 
supply chains. 
hazards, […] provide a safe and healthy working environment 
and shall take adequate steps to prevent accidents and injury to 
health arising out of, associated with or occurring in the course 
of work, by minimizing, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
causes of hazards inherent in the working environment” (Social 
Accountability International 2008, 6). Further, it stipulates that 
companies should “establish systems to detect, avoid or 
respond to potential threats to the health and safety of all 
personnel.” 
UN Global Compact 
(www.unglobalcompact.org/) 
The Compact emerged from the 1992 Rio 
Summit under the Agenda 21 programme, and 
reflects principles established by the Rio 
Declaration, ILO standards, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It seeks to 
advance responsible corporate citizenship in 
response to the challenges of globalisation. 
In relation to the environment, Principle Seven states that 
“business should support a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges”, Principle Eight, that it should 
“undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility”, and Principle Nine, that it should “encourage 
the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies”. 
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National 
  
Framework/Code of 
conduct 
National  
Jurisdiction 
Description Relevant principles 
Assured Nano UK (but 
potentially 
wider) 
An accreditation standard which 
aims to offer reassurance that 
companies are proactively taking 
steps to look after EHS concerns 
surrounding NST.  At the time of 
writing, this standard is still in the 
beta testing stage. 
It is hoped that the standard will be equally applicable to 
research groups in universities as to manufacturers of 
nanomaterials or nano-enabled products. It is intended to be as 
applicable to a global multinational company as to an SME. 
 
Accreditation will be based on documenting existing good 
practice and helping build on this, rather than imposing e.g. 
heavy additional reporting requirements. 
 
Companies who gain the accreditation will be subjected to an 
annual audit. 
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EPA Nanoscale 
Materials Stewardship 
Program (NMSP) 
(http://www.epa.gov/op
pt/nano/stewardship.ht
m) 
USA (but 
potentially 
wider) 
The main purpose of the NMSP is to 
encourage the submission of 
information from industry and 
academia on the properties and 
potential hazards of new 
nanomaterials. Submissions 
regarding materials that are either 
new or existing chemical substances 
(as determined by the TSCA 
Chemical Substances Inventory) are 
invited. 
Submissions are invited under either the Basic or In Depth 
programmes. 
 
For inclusion in the Basic programme, participants may submit 
data on material characterization, hazard, use, potential 
exposures, and risk management practices relevant to specific 
nanomaterials. Participants who have already developed risk 
management plans may include this in their submission. 
Confidentiality and intellectual property protection measures 
are included in the scheme. 
 
At present, the nature of information required under the In 
Depth programme remains to be decided upon. The scheme will 
operate by inviting Basic programme participants to sponsor the 
development of additional data for characterising particular 
nanomaterials. Sponsors will be allowed to work with both 
other sponsors and other stakeholders in developing data 
development plans. 
 
The In Depth programme will be designed to link  up with work 
undertaken by the OECD’s Working Party for Manufactured 
Nanomaterials. 
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UK Voluntary 
Reporting Scheme for 
Engineered Nanoscale 
Materials 
(http://www.defra.gov.
uk/environment/nanote
ch/policy/index.htm) 
UK Designed to canvass industry and 
academia for information on 
nanomaterials currently being 
developed, in order to assess any 
potential risks as a first step towards 
formulating any necessary 
regulation. 
The scheme focuses on deliberately engineered nanomaterials 
that are “free” within any environmental media at any point 
during the material’s life cycle (UK Government 2008b, 4). It is 
viewed explicitly as a starting point for data gathering, 
recognizing that “the data considered as desirable in order to 
determine the hazard, exposure and risk of engineered 
nanoscale materials is likely to change as our understanding of 
what is appropriate develops”. Existing tests, for example, may 
not prove adequate for assessing nanomaterials (ibid. 5). As 
with the US scheme, the DEFRA scheme is designed to feed 
into the efforts of the OECD Working Group, with submissions 
being recorded by the Group. Business confidentiality still 
applies to this data, however, with only the name of the 
nanomaterials and its CAS number being recorded (ibid. 6). 
ResponsibleNanoCode 
(http://www.responsibl
enanocode.org/) 
UK Developed by the Royal Society, 
Insight Investment, and the 
Nanotechnology Knowledge 
Transfer Network (NanoKTN), the 
aim of the code is to translate CSR 
criteria into a voluntary, principles-
based Code.   
The Code is intended to be appropriate for organisations of all 
sizes, and aims “to stimulate organisations to consider all 
aspects of their involvement with nanotechnologies, inc luding 
the broader social and ethical issues” (Responsible NanoCode 
2008). Its key principles cover central CSR criteria, including 
accountability, the need for stakeholder involvement and 
engagement in risk management, occupational health and safety 
(for a company’s own workers, but also including 
considerations of relevant issues for workers involved at other 
stages of a product’s lifecycle), health and environmental 
impacts of a company’s activities, understanding of wider 
social and economic impacts of its NST activities. Companies 
are also encouraged to formulate specific policies for marketing 
nanomaterials and for providing customers and other 
stakeholders with information about products containing them, 
as well as encouraging other businesses to adopt the code. 
 
In 2009 an independent group of stakeholders will be engaged 
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in benchmarking a set of selected companies to see how closely 
they are adopting the code. 
Verband der 
Chemischen Industrie 
(VCI), Responsible 
Production and Use of 
Nanomaterials 
Germany Formulated as a way of translating 
the principles of Responsible Care 
(see above), and particularly the 
ICCA’s Product Stewardship 
framework (see above) into a form 
specific to the challenges facing the 
NST industry. It brings together a 
series of VCI publications which 
address the core RC principles. 
Guidelines are provided to assist companies in understanding 
what data submission requirements exist with respect to 
nanomaterials under the EU’s REACh regulations. Although 
REACh uses tiered production volumes of more than 1t per 
year as a trigger for test requirements, specific obligations 
under REACh and other legislation (such as Chemical Agents 
Directive 98/24/EEC) still apply to nanomaterials in respect of 
risk assessment, classification and labelling, and occupational 
health and safety, as well as the, continue to apply. “This means 
that manufacturers or importers must classify substances, or 
even specific products, according to the hazardous properties of 
the substances or products, label them if necessary, and provide 
specific safety information.” (VCI 2008, 9). Further, 
recommendations are provided for how information sharing 
requirements of REACh can be met by distributing material 
safety data sheets throughout a company’s supply chain. 
 
In addition, specific guidelines are included on establishing 
practices under the principles of Responsible Care (see above) 
voluntary precautionary approaches to occupational health and 
safety for nanomaterials, based on hazard assessment and 
including a consideration of substitution options, technical and 
organisational protection measures and personal protection. 
Finally, examples of stakeholder engagement exercises and 
roadmaps for the future development of risk management are 
included. 
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Annex 3: Analysis of On-line Corporate Reports, Codes and Policies 
 
Introduction 
The object of this exercise was to provide an overview of current online publication of 
CSR-related literature from a sample of 78 companies within different categories 
(university micro/micro, small, medium enterprises (SMEs), large and multinational) 
who have current research and commercial interests in nanotechnology. A major 
source of cases was the Nanotechnology Industry Association’s Corporate Members’ 
List.  
 
Questions which the analysis aims to answer are: 
a) How far companies of different types report on material CSR considerations 
which have been identified as likely to be of import to the development of 
CSR frameworks, codes of conduct and/or best practice around nanoscale 
science and technology. 
b) Whether information on nanotechnologies (risks and opportunities) are 
publicly available through company statements,  
c) Whether companies have sections or entire policies dedicated to 
nanotechnology within codes of conduct, CSR policy statements or annual 
reporting,  
d) Whether current policies on product stewardship, responsible innovation and 
risk analysis i) extend the scope of risk management across the lifecycles of 
products (including R&D, manufacture, distribution and disposal), through the 
value cha in and/or cover orphan/legacy products, and ii) explicitly include 
provisions to deal proactively both with uncertainties about the potential 
consequences of the introduction of a given product (deriving from limits on 
current knowledge) and the risks associated with its introduction. 
e) How currently available standalone risk management frameworks for 
nanoscale science and technology (hereafter NST) might build on and extend 
existing CSR initiatives revealed by our survey. 
 
With this in mind, the survey comprises two approaches. First, a quantitative content 
analysis has been undertaken in order to establish profiles for different industry 
sectors which indicate how different material criteria are reported on, and how far 
NST is currently a subject of reporting across these criteria. Secondly, a qualitative 
analysis of policy statements and reporting from across the sample was undertaken. 
The aim of the qualitative survey was to provide answers to questions d) and e) above, 
via two strands of analysis. Firstly, we examined current policies and practices which 
could be helpful for developing frameworks for responsible innovation. Secondly, we 
considered how far some persistent problems faced by voluntary CSR initiatives 
could be addressed by, on the one hand, the policies and practice we identified and, on 
the other, three examples of stand-alone NST risk management initiatives (i.e. 
AssuredNano, CENARIOS and the NanoRisk Framework), which are designed to 
help companies in implementing responsible risk management in the development of 
nanotechnologies. 
 
 
 
  
57 
Methodology 
Content Analysis 
Online statements surrounding corporate social responsibility from 78 companies, all 
of whom advertise their interest in nanotechnology either through membership of 
industry associations or through broader research programmes, formed the basis of 
this study. Because of the jurisdictional remit of the DEFRA project, all these 
companies are ones either based within, or with substantial research and development 
capacity based within, the UK. As the focus of the project concerns a broad-based 
concept of what constitutes corporate social responsibility, these documents were not 
limited to annual reports, but also included policy statements and published codes of 
conduct. The reasoning behind this was that to assess the degree to which existing 
approaches within the industry to CSR incorporate a degree of responsiveness to 
emerging material issues, it is necessary to understand the broad range of normative 
commitments to which companies lay cla im in forming their own approaches to CSR, 
and to assess the degree to which these approaches incorporate more than one form of 
commitment. These different types of commitment represent different levels of 
specificity of commitment, from general guiding va lues, through specific policy 
guidelines, to quantitative performance targets designed to aid continuous 
improvement. The coding was undertaken by two coders, using a coding sheet of 
which a copy is provided below at the end of this Annex. 
 
Document Categories 
Codes of conduct  typically contain minimum standards of behaviour to which 
employees are expected to conform (including bodies of law with which the company 
has to comply), and typically also provide examples of how to apply these standards 
in real- life situations. These standards are also typically represented as reflecting 
values which should guide all company activities. Some codes of conduct which are 
publicly available are less detailed and comprehensive, and simply state in general 
terms a set of guiding values.  
 
Policy statements generally articulate concrete measures which are intended to 
structure business activities in ways that reflect guiding values, which may be stated 
externally, for example in a code of conduct. They range in scope from general 
commitments within particular areas of concern (e.g. “to reduce environmental 
impacts”) to quantitative targets (e.g. “to reduce emissions of volatile organic 
compounds by 10% by 2010”). 
 
Annual CSR reports (which may be specifically devoted to concepts like CSR or 
“sustainable development”, or which may form a subsection of the company’s annual 
shareholders’ report) detail how a company is actually performing in relation to the 
commitments it has made elsewhere (in codes of conduct, policy statements, or both). 
A higher degree of specificity is required in such documents, with stress being placed 
on measurable indicators of success, which are stipulated as requirements within 
industry-wide codes of conduct like the ICCA’s Responsible Care initiative (ICCA 
2007, 13-14). Annual reporting is itself also included as a requirement by many 
independent CSR frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative (Global 
Reporting International 2006). 
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Categories of Companies 
Companies were categorised as either micros (making use of university-originated IP, 
with <10 staff), SMEs (<250 employees), large (over 250 employees but based in one 
country) or multinational (with substantial production, research or distribution 
operations in more than two countries). They were further categorised according to 
their positioning in relation to NST: does a given company make nanomaterials, 
nanoparticles or nanostructures, which are incorporated into products by others? Does 
it provide instrumentation for researchers or manufacturers? Does it make products 
which incorporate its own nanomaterials, or products which incorporate 
nanomaterials from another supplier? Does it act as a distributor for nanomaterials? 
Many companies of course fall under more than one category in respect of their 
business. 
 
Categories of Statements 
The unit of analysis for the study was explicitly taken to be individual sentences 
within documents, as sentences typically form the unit of analysis for studies of CSR 
statements even when this is not explicitly stated (Tilt 2001, 196). Declarative 
statements containing information either about general commitments, specific policies 
or quantifiable goals and measures of progress were counted across 6 individual 
thematic categories (see Table 7 and Table 8 below)  The classification of these 
statements was further broken down to indicate whether they applied specifically and 
explicitly to NST-related activities or were more general in scope, and whether they 
applied mainly to the company on whose behalf the statement was made, or whether 
the information provided concerned the supply chain with which the company does 
business. Statements which referred to quantifiable measures of progress were 
ignored if they were merely historical (i.e. if they referred only to a point in the past 
and were not involved in making a comparison with present activities or future 
targets). 
 
Table 7: Material CSR Concerns 
 
Environmental Impacts Including statements around specific environmental impacts 
of current activities, but also definitions and programmes of 
sustainable development  
Health and Safety  What measures are undertaken to safeguard the safety of 
workers and the safety of consumers? 
Access Is IP shared with developing countries? To what extent are 
upstream commitments made to sharing other benefits and 
promoting development (NB this excludes corporate 
philanthropy, defined as sharing of profits) 
Social acceptance and 
understanding  
To what extent are a range of internal and external stakeholders 
included consulted and/or informed about the company’s 
activities and future plans? 
Legal compliance and 
liability 
What declarations are made about compliance with legal 
statutes, regulatory regimes (including statements about 
judgements of liability made against the company) 
Risk management Is information provided about general approaches to risk 
management and responsible innovation within the company 
(such as LCA, product stewardship, precautionary approaches)? 
This is in addition to specific statements about safeguarding 
consumers and employees, or the environment – it concerns 
whether systems of risk analysis are explicitly discussed. 
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Table 8: Examples of Declarative CSR Statements 
 
Examples of general declarative CSR 
statements 
“We support efforts to improve access 
to medicines around the world, in both 
developing and developed countries.” 
(Access) 
“We are committed to reducing our 
impact on climate change.” 
(Environmental Impacts) 
Examples of specific declarative CSR 
statements 
“To help us better understand patient needs 
we have set up advisory boards in the US and 
Europe with representatives from a wide 
range of patient groups.” (Social Acceptance 
and Understanding) 
Examples of quantified declarative CSR 
statements 
“We set new targets to reduce our climate 
change impact (CO2 equivalent emissions) 
and energy use in operations, and transport 
from 2006 levels by 20 per cent per unit of 
sales (based on a constant exchange rate) by 
2010 and by 45 per cent by 2015.” 
(Environmental Impacts) 
 
 
Taken together, frequency statistics for these three categories of statement have been 
used to provide “profiles” for different categories of company across the various 
material CSR concerns. We report on these profiles for several key CSR criteria in 
below).  
 
Only statements which related directly to the material concerns outlined above were 
recorded. These material concerns were taken to reflect the different dimensions 
which would have to be included in order to build a comprehensive and integrated 
approach to “responsible innovation”. 1 No account was taken of philanthropic 
initiatives, or community initiatives which did not relate specifically to stakeholder 
engagement or access considerations as outlined above.  
 
In addition, a qualitative analysis was undertaken to identify examples where 
companies have begun to develop (either individually or in concert with others) 
systems of stakeholder, risk and responsible innovation management which may 
potentially be useful both in responding to potential NST hazards, should any emerge, 
and in shaping the future direction of NST development in ways which reflect 
material CSR concerns about access, social acceptance, environmental protection and 
product stewardship through a product’s lifecycle. This analysis also considered, by 
way of comparison with examples from the main sample, the NanoRisk Framework 
developed by DuPont and Environmental Defense, and the CENARIOS “nano-risk 
assessment tool” developed by Innovationgesellschaft GmbH in Switzerland, and 
AssuredNano’s certification standard of the same name (at the time of writing, full 
documentation was not yet commercially or publicly available). For the purposes of 
                                                 
1 On this concept, originating in academic research on innovation, see for example Guston (2006) and 
Cordes (2004). 
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this study, DuPont’s CSR contribut ion was considered as an extreme outlier, given the 
unique nature of the NRF, and was not included within the main survey. Our 
qualitative analysis considers four emerging problems which CSR policies will have 
to address, drawing on surveys of initiatives like the chemical industry’s Responsible 
Care Charter, and provides a qualitative overview of how far existing CSR 
approaches might assist in providing solutions. 
 
Results 
Sectoral Profile of Sample 
 
Table 9: Sectoral Profile of Sample by Company Type (n=71 ) 
 
  Company Type 
Sector (by SIC 2003 code)  Micro SME Large MNC Other2 Total 
11-Extraction of oil 0 0 0 1 0 1 
14-Mining 0 0 0 1 0 1 
22-Printing 0 0 0 1 0 1 
24-Chemical Manufacturing 2 0 2 10 0 14 
27-Precious metals production 0 0 1 0 0 1 
28-Manufacturing3 2 14 2 3 0 2 
51-Wholesale of chemicals, 
metals etc. 0 2 1 3 0 6 
52-Dispensing chemists  0 0 0 1 0 1 
73-Research and development 6 10 3 0 0 19 
74-Other (including testing and 
analysis  1 4 3 2 1 11 
85-Medical practice 0 1 0 0 0 1 
93-Services (other) 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 11 27 11 21 1 71 
 
 
The sample population, broken down by sector (SIC 2003 codes were used, with companies engaged in 
manufacturing products which could contain nanomaterials grouped together) is represented in Table 9 
above and Figure 7 below. SMEs and micro companies were concentrated largely in the 
manufacturing, R&D and testing/analysis sectors (in that order). Multinational companies were 
represented across a number of different sectors, with the largest concentration being in chemical 
manufacturing. It should be notes that large pharmaceutical companies are typically classified within 
the chemical manufacturing or wholesale of chemicals sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Used for companies where data on turnover and/or number of employees were not available. 
3 “Manufacturing” includes the following SIC code subcategories, all of which involve operations 
during which nanomaterials or nanostructures may be incorporated into final products:  manufacture of 
metal products, of special purpose machinery/engines, of electronic components, of precision 
instruments, of auto accessories and other manufacturing. 
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Figure 7: Sectoral Profile of Sample by Company Type (n=71) 
 
 
Level of Reporting 
The first point to note with respect to the online statements we examined was that 
very few statements which could be placed in any of our three categories of document 
were made by either micro companies or SMEs. 86% of micros and 73% of SMEs 
failed to provide either a code of conduct, policy statement or annual report that 
addressed one or more of the areas of CSR ma terial concern identified previously. By 
contrast, all large and multinational companies surveyed provided one or more of 
these documents.  
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Table 10: CSR Statements Available Online by Company Type (n=78) 
 
Type Yes % No % 
Micro 2 14 12 86 
SME 8 27 22 73 
Large 11 100 0 0 
MNC 22 100 0 0 
Other 0 0 1 100 
Total 43  35  
 
 
 Figure 8 : CSR Statements Available Online by Company Type (n=78) 
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In terms of which types of documents each type of company provided, no micros or 
SMEs provided more than one each (see Table 11). Only 18% and 9% respectively of 
large companies provided two or three types of document, whereas 50% and 25% of 
multinationals respectively provided two or three.  
 
Table 11: Types of Document Provided by Company Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type One 
document 
type 
provided 
% Two 
document 
types 
% Three 
document 
types 
% 
Micro 2 100 0 0 0 0 
SME 8 100 0 0 0 0 
Large 8 73 2 18 1 9 
MNC 5 25 10 50 5 25 
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Table 12: Numbers of Documents Published by Document Type (n=68) 
 
Document Type Frequency Percent 
Code of Conduct 15 22.1 
Policy statement(s) 29 42.6 
Latest Annual Report 24 35.3 
Total 68 100 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Numbers of Documents Published by Document Type (n=68) 
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Table 13: Types of Document Submitted by Company Type (n=68) 
 
  Type of Document 
 Company 
Type 
Code of 
Conduct 
Policy 
statement(s) 
Latest 
Annual 
Report 
Total 
Micro 0 2 0 2 
SME 0 8 0 8 
Large 3 7 5 15 
MNC 12 12 19 43 
Total 15 29 24 68 
 
 
This profile of submissions fits previous evidence as to the well-attested difficulties 
faced by smaller companies in engaging in voluntary CSR measures, particularly with 
respect to reporting annual performance indicators. Gunningham (1995, 65-7) notes 
that the conflict between short-term profitability and the longer-term benefits (both 
business and societal) of voluntary environmental initiatives tends to be a difficult one 
for smaller enterprises to address. Higher profit margins and economies of scale make 
it easier for larger companies to bear the costs of introducing environmental measures. 
This is emphatically the case when we consider how far companies are able to 
systematically implement CSR, an indication of which is the number of companies 
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who are able to publish examples of all three types of documents listed in the 
Methodology section above. There appear to be major barriers to this systematic 
approach to reporting for smaller companies.  
 
 
Figure 10: Types of Document Submitted by Company Type (n=68) 
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The sectoral profile (by SIC 2003 division) of the reporting sample shows that the 
lowest level of reporting was among companies engaged primarily in R&D, including 
research on nanomaterials and nanostructures. This sector sees a heavy representation 
of micro companies (see Table 14 and Figure 11 below). 
 
 
Table 14: Provision of CSR Documents by Industry Sector (n=71 ) 
 
  CSR Documents Online? 
Sector  Yes No Total 
11-Extraction of oil 1 0 1 
14-Mining 1 0 1 
22-Printing 1 0 1 
24-Chemical Manufacturing 13 1 14 
27-Precious metals production 1 0 1 
28-Manufacturing4 8 5 13 
51-Wholesale of chemicals, 
metals etc. 
5 1 6 
52-Dispensing chemists  1 0 1 
                                                 
4 “Manufacturing” includes the following SIC code subcategories, all of which involve operations 
during which nanomaterials or nanostructures may be incorporated into final products:  manufacture of 
metal products, of special purpose machinery/engines, of electronic components, of precision 
instruments, of auto accessories and other manufacturing.. 
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73-Research and development 4 15 19 
74-Other (including testing and 
analysis  
5 6 11 
85-Medical practice 0 1 1 
93-Services (other) 1 1 2 
Total 41 30 71 
 
 
Figure 11: Provision of CSR Documents by Industry Sector (n=71) 
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There were very few documents that made explicit reference to a company’s NST 
activities, only 12% (8 out of 68 submissions) overall. The majority of these 
references were only in passing, and did not mention substantive policies. Some 
companies, however, made explicit reference to balancing potential hazards against 
benefits. One multinational, for example, commented on the current state of 
knowledge about dermal penetration as a way of arguing for a balancing of 
uncertainties against known benefits of products. Another multinational made 
reference to concerns about NST which had emerged in the course of a stakeholder 
engagement event. There was, overall, no explicit and detailed discussion in any of 
the documents we examined of NST-related activities across any of the material CSR 
criteria on which our survey focused. This should be set against other recent research 
on CSR and NST. For example, a recent survey of 40 companies in Germany and 
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Austria manufacturing nanomaterials and/or products containing nanomaterials 
originating with others indicated a near complete lack of any voluntary risk 
management framework for nanomaterials (Helland, Scheringer et al. 2008), with 30 
of the 40 reporting that they did not actively investigate the possibility of human or 
environmental exposure of the materials they produced or used (ibid., 642). Similarly, 
a brief survey of 11 large companies from the chemical and consumer goods sectors 
conducted as an adjunct to the EU-funded Nanologue project found that only 3 had 
specific NST-related corporate social responsibility policies, and that both stakeholder 
dialogue and transparency were broadly lacking (Turk 2007). 
 
External Frameworks and Independent Auditing 
A systematic approach to CSR is also correlated with the use of external frameworks 
to guide and inform the nature of reporting and the selection of performance 
indicators for inclusion. below indicates this correlation, with documents published by 
multinational companies, especially annual reports, commonly referring to CSR 
frameworks (of which the Global Reporting Initiative is the most frequently cited) 
that include a variety of performance indicators and public reporting standards. It is 
also notable that the ISO 14000 standard, which provides accreditation for 
implementing a comprehensive environmental management system, is not widely 
achieved by SMEs in the survey (2 of 8, or 25%), although the ISO 9001 quality 
management system standard is more widely awarded to SMEs than to larger and 
multinational organisations. Those larger companies which have achieved ISO 14001 
accreditation are typically being progressively accredited for it on a site-by-site basis. 
 
 
Table 15: Use of External Standards in Reporting by Company Type (includes all documents, 
n=68) 
 
 Name of External Standard 
 Company 
Type 
AA 
1000 
FTSE4 
GOOD 
Global 
Sullivan 
Principles 
Global 
Reporting  
Initiative 
ILO 
Conv. 
ISO 
14001 
ISO 
9001 
Responsible 
Care 
UN Global 
Compact 
UNCTAD 
Micro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SME 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 
Large 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 2 0 0 
MNC 3 5 2 10 5 13 3 8 5 2 
Total 3 6 2 11 5 16 12 10 5 2 
 
 
These figures count all cases where companies have used external standards to 
structure or inform their reporting, have stated their commitment to specific CSR 
principles, or have cited their achievement of specific accreditation standards (e.g. 
ISO9001). References could therefore have occurred within documents of any of the 
three types we have identified for the purposes of this survey.  
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Figure 12: Use of External Standards in Reporting by Company Type (includes all documents, 
n=68) 
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Although some large and many multinational companies refer to and use independent 
CSR frameworks to provide criteria for the selection of performance indicators and to 
guide their reporting of CSR performance, another question that has to be asked in 
order to understand the practice of CSR across the sector concerns how far these 
companies actually seek third-party auditing of their reporting, as is required under 
frameworks like GRI and AA1000 for full compliance and accreditation to be 
possible. 7 companies out of the 43 with online CSR policies have externally audited 
reporting systems in their annual reports. 1 of these is a large company which uses the 
GRI framework with some external auditing. 5 of these are multinationals which use 
the GRI indicators with some external auditing, and 1 is a multinational which uses 
the UNCTAD eco-efficiency indicators with external auditing, to which it also refers 
in its general policy statements. It should be noted, however, that none of these are 
fully externally audited, and all feature some degree of self-assessment under the GRI 
framework. Compliance is therefore nowhere of the highest order set out by the GRI, 
with C grade (“beginning to implement CSR systems”) being a typical assessment. 
 
Many of the companies in the survey are involved in chemical production or 
processing, and so it is not surprising to find many of the multinational actors in our 
survey making reference to the International Council of Chemical Association’s 
Responsible Care code and management systems standard. 2 out of 8 (25%) large 
companies and 8 out of 21 (38%) of multinationals refer to this.  
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However, some criticisms of existing voluntary initiatives like Responsible Care in 
the chemical industry, have often focused on the extent to which external auditing, 
recommended in the programme itself, is actually sought by participating companies. 
A recurrent concern with voluntary reporting initiatives that are not externally audited 
is that the degree of confidence stakeholders can have in interpreting what reported-on 
indicators mean is necessarily low (King and Lenox 2000) – an issue that will no 
doubt be important in future assessments of NST-specific CSR initiatives. 
Gunningham (1995, 70-2) notes that the implementation of Responsible Care has 
historically been dogged by low levels of external auditing. Following a review of the 
scheme which finished in 2002, augmented its codes with the Responsible Care 
Management System (RCMS) (Yosie 2003, 403-4). A key feature of Responsible 
Care is the implementation of policies which are designed to facilitate continuous 
improvement in key indicators, but even in 2007, five years after the review, 
companies are largely left to decide for themselves whether the process of verification 
meant to be built into the standards is conducted internally or by external auditors 
(ICCA 2007, 89).   
 
Both the RCMS and its independent third-party certification requirements are 
designed to be compatible with the ISO 14001 process, an accreditation that measures 
the rigor of a company’s environmental management system (Yosie 2003, 404). This 
form of accreditation was also sought by a high number of multinationals and some 
larger companies. The non-environmental management specific ISO 9001 quality 
management standard was the primary form of external accreditation sought by 
smaller companies. 
 
Material CSR Issue Profiles 
To give a picture of the level of reporting for the different material issues defined in 
Table 7 above for each of the general, specific and quantified dimensions of reporting 
defined in Table 8, we calculated the mean number of each kind of statement for each 
company type. This produced a “profile” of each of these types, based on the 
frequencies of each category of statement. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement 
Given the inevitable uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the risks which 
emerging technologies like NST may pose, commentators have noted that traditional 
risk assessment is not enough in establishing the safety and/or social legitimacy of a 
technology. The need for early and frequent dialogue with stakeholders has been 
stressed in an influentia l attempt to draft a risk management framework for NST 
published by the International Risk Governance Council (Renn and Roco 2006), in 
which “concern assessment”, a process by which societal concerns about the impact 
of technologies on institutions and values can be registered and addressed, is 
recommended as a means of ensuring that technologies are developed in a socially 
legitimate way. An affirmative stance towards early and regular dialogue is seen by 
some writers on CSR as advantageous for businesses (Munshia 2007). This is because 
it can complement effective processes of risk assessment and product stewardship by 
providing information about how the social reception of a technology or product will 
affect its marketability. However, there is little evidence in our survey of proactive 
and regular processes of stakeholder engagement being generally entered into by 
companies involved in NST activities, although some exceptions are evident. These 
are typically multinational pharmaceutical companies (see the section on Qualitative 
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Analysis below for more details) who engage regularly with patient groups on 
understanding side effects of drug treatments. There are no specific instances of 
reporting which concern regular and ongoing upstream engagement activities linked 
specifically to emerging technologies. 
 
As with the implementation of external reporting and management standards and 
independent auditing, it is evident that there is a significant divide between smaller 
and larger companies on stakeholder engagement. This is particularly the case in 
relation to making and reporting on specific measures, as is apparent from Table 16 
and Figure 13 below. However, there is much less of a divide when it comes to 
producing indicators and measuring performance on engagement activities. This may 
indicate (as is borne out by our qualitative analysis in the relevant section below) that 
the systematic implementation of engagement systems, including regular contact, 
mechanisms for feedback and assessment processes, is generally lacking, with one or 
two exceptions. It is also interesting in this regard that so few companies made 
explicit reference to the AA1000 independent accountability standards (see Table 15 
and Figure 12 above). 
 
 
Table 16: Stakeholder Engagement Profile by Company Type (n=68) 
 
Company 
Type  
 Scope of Public 
Engagement Statement 
Statement 
Frequency 
(Mean) 
General 0.00 
Specific 0.00 
Micro 
Quantified 0.00 
General 0.13 
Specific 0.00 
SME 
Quantified 0.00 
General 0.93 
Specific 1.40 
Large 
Quantified 0.20 
General 2.02 
Specific 4.56 
MNC 
Quantified 0.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
Figure 13: Stakeholder Engagement Profile by Company Type (n=68) 
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Access 
Again, a significant gap was evident between the frequency of policy statements by 
multinational companies on access and the frequency of such statements produced by 
other types of organisation. This may be attributed to the fact that multinational 
pharmaceutical companies often promote detailed policies, largely developed against 
a backdrop of pressure from stakeholders, on the pricing of drug treatments in the 
developing world and generic medicines. At the same time, however, there was some 
evidence of policies being developed by larger companies on intellectual property-
sharing agreements (see the section on Qualitative Analysis below for discussion). 
 
 
Table 17: Access/IP Profile by Company Type  (n=68) 
 
Company 
Type  
Scope of Access/IP 
Statement  
Mean 
General .00 
Specific .00 
Micro 
Quantified .00 
General .00 
Specific .00 
SME 
Quantified .00 
General .13 
Specific .20 
Large 
Quantified .00 
General .91 
Specific 3.05 
MNC 
Quantified .37 
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Figure 14: Access/IP Profile by Company Type  (n=68) 
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Risk Management 
In the CSR literature, businesses with proactive CSR are commonly held to engage in 
managerial practices like environmental assessment and stakeholder management 
(Wood 1991) that tend to anticipate and reduce potential sources of business risk, 
such as potential governmental regulation, labour unrest, or environmental damage 
(Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001). The low uptake of such an ant icipatory approach to 
risk management (“beyond compliance”) among smaller companies has been noted by 
researchers (e.g. Gunningham, Thornton et al. 2005). This is reflected in our findings, 
which show that there is no specific reporting by smaller companies in our survey on 
risk management (including programmes concerned with product stewardship), 
Further, the evidence we collected shows large differences between the number of 
statements made by multinational organisations and the number made by even large 
companies on specific risk management measures. There are, however, relatively few 
quantitative statements provided even by multinationals, which suggests that the 
setting of and reporting on performance targets regarding risk management is an area 
of CSR which is comparatively undeveloped. 
 
 
Table 18: Risk Management Profile by Company Type (n=68) 
 
Company Type Scope of 
Risk Management Statement 
Mean 
Frequenc
y 
General   0.00 
Specific   0.00 
Micro 
Quantified   0.00 
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General   0.14 
Specific   0.57 
SME 
Quantified   0.00 
General   2.09 
Specific   1.36 
Large 
Quantified   0.64 
General   1.31 
Specific   7.14 
MNC 
Quantified   0.59 
 
 
Figure 15: Risk Management Profile by Company Type (n=68) 
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Table 19: Risk Management Profile by Company Type (Annual Report Only, n=23) 
 
Company Type Scope of 
Risk Management Statement 
Mean 
Frequency 
General   No Submission 
Specific   No Submission 
Micro 
Quantified   No Submission 
General   No Submission 
Specific   No Submission 
SME 
Quantified   No Submission 
General   2.60 
Specific   2.20 
Large 
Quantified   0.20 
MNC General   1.68 
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Specific   7.37 
Quantified   0.53 
 
 
Figure 16: Risk Management Profile by Company Type (Annual Report Only, n=23) 
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Table 20: Risk Management Profile by Company Type (Policy Statements Only, n=28) 
 
Company Type Scope of 
Risk Management Statement 
Statement 
Frequency 
(Mean) 
General   0.00 
Specific   0.00 
Micro 
Quantified   0.00 
General   0.13 
Specific   0.50 
SME 
Quantified   0.00 
General   1.86 
Specific   0.43 
Large 
Quantified   0.43 
General   2.17 
Specific   10.08 
MNC 
Quantified   0.75 
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Figure 17: Risk Management Profile by Company Type (Policy Statements only, n=28) 
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Qualitative Analysis 
 
Emerging issues 
Although, as noted above, very few documents made any reference at all to NST 
activities, many companies described policies, which despite not being NST-specific, 
were related to risk management and product stewardship across a product’s lifetime 
and which also stress the promotion of responsibility throughout the value chain of 
which a company is part. These might offer potential stepping-stones for any CSR 
strategy that could be responsive to the negative and positive potentials of NST. They 
perhaps reflect the continuing influence on the CSR policies of the companies in our 
sample (especially given the number of multinationals from the chemical sector 
represented in it) of cross- industry initiatives like Responsible Care (see Figure 12 
above). These policies tended to present effective risk management as being part of a 
commitment to implement more general quality management systems, such as those 
covered by international standards like ISO 14000 and ISO 9001. However, despite 
this evidence of gradual familiarisation with general principles of product 
stewardship, it is evident that there are significant problems future efforts must face, 
which, taken together, make visible gaps in otherwise promising initiatives. Among 
these are problems which are familiar from the history of Responsible Care. We 
present here a short summary of these issues, before surveying some notable features 
of the current CSR environment taken from our data study which future efforts might 
benefit from considering, and how they relate to these key issues. To assist in 
outlining the current CSR landscape, we also consider some features of the three 
major stand-alone NST-specific risk management systems which are currently, or 
about to become, available to companies (NanoRisk Framework, CENARIOS, 
AssuredNano), and whether they might assist in  developing current CSR approaches 
to address the problems we identify. 
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1. The lack of a clear link between policies on other material CSR criteria like 
access and public acceptance and understanding  
There is little evidence of attempts to explicitly link these systems, processes 
and approaches with measures on access and on stakeholder engagement, 
under e.g. an umbrella concept of “responsible innovation”, This reflects 
recent findings on the low incidence of CSR policies which centre on shaping 
innovation (Hockerts and Morsing 2008). It is interesting that the IRGC 
identified in 2006 two linked dimensions of responsibility in technological 
innovation. These concerned both the assessment and mitigation of risks, 
understood as the potential for harmful causal impacts on human health and 
the environment, and the assessment and mitigation of societal concerns over 
wider social effects, persistent uncertainties and the extent of ignorance about 
the potential of nanomaterials with novel properties for causing unforeseen 
harm (Renn and Roco 2006). Among the societal concerns which are regularly 
reported on concerning NST are the potential for the way intellectual property 
regimes have developed in the industry (Lemley 2005; Vaidhyanathan 2006) 
to choke off access for developing countries (Correa 2005; ETC Group 2005). 
These concerns connect up with the material CSR criteria we have used in the 
content analysis of social acceptance and understanding and access. There is 
little evidence of policies on access and policies on stakeholder engagement 
being linked up with the planning and implementation of systems of risk 
management to provide a comprehensive approach to responsible innovation. 
There are no doubt significant practical difficulties which have to be faced by 
attempts to build such links. For example, the implementation of Responsible 
Care has, in various national jurisdictions, run into problems due to the 
Responsible Care Global Charter’s requirement on information sharing and 
stakeholder engagement. Once instance is the idea of a “community right to 
know” covering the activities of a company in a given locality, which 
companies have failed to comply with, and even subverted, in Canada and 
Australia (Gunningham 1995, 77-8). 
 
2. The degree to which participation among smaller companies may be reduced 
due to the increased cost of  implementing structured risk management 
systems  
Proponents of voluntary regulation typically face a collective action problem, 
given that what might be rational for the industry (and society) as a whole 
appears to be irrational from the perspective of some smaller actors. There is 
relatively little incentive for these actors to bear the extra costs associated with 
proactive and structured risk management systems. The voluntary Responsible 
Care approach again presents an example of how this problem is already 
familiar in the context of established CSR policies, and in doing so, suggests 
that different motivations are behind the differing attitudes of smaller and 
larger companies to voluntary regulation. Responsible Care has been adopted 
by larger chemical companies, because it allows them to make improvements 
to their practices above and beyond what is required by regulation, making it 
possible to cut future costs of compliance. Smaller companies, on the other 
hand, often do not sign up to the system, and remain responsive only to 
mandatory regulations. For them, the short-term costs of non-compliance are 
great, but the longer-term benefits of Responsible Care implementation are not 
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perceived as being sufficient to offset these (Gunningham, Thornton et al.  
2005, 302). 
 
3. How far participation and compliance can be ensured throughout the value 
chain 
Many large and multinational companies are in the position of manufacturing 
products which incorporate proprietary materials originating with other 
organisations. Smaller companies are often also in this position, but many of 
them (like some larger chemical companies) are also in the position of 
supplying more basic materials or substances to others. Among smaller 
companies, micro companies surveyed tended to be engaged in manufacturing 
basic nanomaterials, particles or structures (57%) as their primary activity, 
SMEs were almost as likely to focus on manufacture of products incorporating 
more basic materials or structures (37%) as on nanomaterials (40%). If 
voluntary regulation is to be a realistic proposition, then companies who 
manufacture products incorporating materials made by others must have 
assurance that their suppliers are committed to the same standards they are. 
For companies which supply materials to others, the same has to be true of 
their downstream customers. Responsible Care was formulated, in part, to 
address the concern in the chemical industry that one bad actor could sully the 
reputation of the whole industry (Gunningham 1995, 64-5). Many of the larger 
and multinational companies we surveyed reported in their codes of conduct, 
policy statements and/or annual reporting on thee measures they had in place 
to audit suppliers and encourage more widespread adoption of the same values 
and policies that they themselves espoused. For many SMEs, however, the 
issue of cost may, once again, deter them from pursuing information about 
their value chains, and from acting upon it. Not only are there costs associated 
with documenting the compliance of others to a given standard, but the 
capacity to choose alternative suppliers or customers in response to 
information about non-compliance is also much reduced for smaller 
companies. 
 
4. The need to gather information, both on the potentially hazardous novel 
properties of some new products, and on the extent of uncertainty and 
ignorance surrounding the possible outcomes of marketing products which 
feature ingredients or components with these properties. 
It is widely recognised that a pressing goal within NST research is to more 
adequately describe the nature of risks and uncertainties associated with 
applications which utilise materials whose properties, being novel, have not 
previously been observed and documented. For example, the authors of the 
DuPont and Environmental Defence NanoRisk Framework have concentrated 
largely on the need for the research into and manufacture of products 
incorporating nanomaterials which may become “free” at some point in the 
product’s lifecycle to be accompanied by a robust process of documentation of 
properties and their potential effects. With reference to trials of the NRF 
carried out at DuPont on three different nanomaterials, they note that the role 
of the framework could be both to guide systematic risk assessments, and to 
provide “uncertainty assessments” by indicating where important limitations 
on current knowledge should influence decision making about product 
development (EDF - DuPont 2007, 20-1). Both functions would be supported 
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by the production of information (“base sets”) on the properties and 
toxicological profiles (human and environmental) of nanoscale materials 
across the lifecycle of a given product, from design through marketing and use 
to disposal. Although it is not explicitly designed to cover the use of 
nanomaterials in coatings (which would exclude, for example, some 
applications in medical devices), the authors of the NRF suggest that their 
toolkit is flexible enough to be adapted for use in such contexts. They also 
recognise, however, that one of the chief barriers to implementing such a 
system is, as with (2) above, the costs that fully documenting the properties 
and toxicological information for nanomaterials and products incorporating 
them would have on small businesses. This will particularly be true for some 
businesses whose activities take place in whole or in part within the EU, 
thanks to the increase in documentation which will required under the new 
REACh regulations (Ruden 2004, 336). 
 
 
Prospects for addressing these issues 
 
1) Promoting integrated responsible innovation 
It is significant that, among the current candidates for a fully developed and industry-
reviewed risk management standard, neither the NanoRisk Framework nor 
CENARIOS, nor AssuredNano, fully incorporate measures to address the material 
CSR dimensions of access and social acceptance within a risk management 
framework. Each of these standards focuses largely on how to respond to issues of 
risk and, moreover, uncertainty about causal impacts. Their main concern is therefore 
with how to construct standards for product stewardship, with emphasis on the 
responsibility of researchers and manufacturers to give due consideration to the 
potential health and environmental impacts of their activities in the context of a 
responsibility which extends throughout the lifecycle of products.  
 
We have already outlined above the essential elements of the NanoRisk Framework 
approach. For its part, AssuredNano, a private company, has developed, in close 
contact with industry representatives, a risk management system certification 
standard. At the time of writing (January 2009) the standard had reached a review 
stage, before being made commercially available. The central element of the standard 
is intended to be the promotion of responsibility for practical measures of risk 
management throughout the value chain to cover all elements of the product lifecycle 
(Keith Robson, CEO AssuredNano, personal communication, 7 January 2009).  
 
TÜV SÜD’s CENARIOS approach (TÜV SÜD GmbH 2008) sets out general 
requirements for a company’s overall risk management system. This includes an 
adaptation of the typical risk matrix used in risk assessment (classifying risks 
according to seriousness of consequences and according to probability of risk event 
occurrence), which, given the lack of knowledge surrounding the probability of 
particular potential consequences of the introduction of an innovative technology, 
uses the seriousness of these consequences as the primary classificatory variable. 
Monitoring of information sources on product risk as the state of knowledge changes 
is included as a crucial ongoing part of the risk management system, recognising the 
extended temporal aspects of the risk management process. CENARIOS features 
annual auditing to support award of accreditation, and established responsibilities of 
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risk (TÜV SÜD GmbH 2008, 23) and production managers (TÜV SÜD GmbH 2008, 
24) to ensure that processes and systems are continuously improved. 
 
Across our survey there are indications that nanotechnology, together with the 
complex relationships between risk, uncertainty, access and acceptance which 
surround emerging radical technologies more generally, are beginning to be the focus 
of concerted efforts to forge a voluntary regulatory agenda on the part of larger 
companies. There is ample evidence of voluntary collaborations, as well as 
involvement on the part of multinationals in international programmes on standard 
setting, metrology, and toxicological research (e.g. the involvement of various 
companies in NanoCare). Specialist task forces being set up by some companies to 
tackle emerging issues (including nanotechnology) and to consider how 
considerations of business risk will increasingly have to take on board not only 
evolving societal pressures but also new legislative programmes. Efforts to produce 
voluntary standards for the assessment and management of risk range from high- level 
and general statements of guiding values and principles, such as Responsible 
NanoCode to detailed risk assessment protocols such as NanoSafe (Park 2006) and 
NanoSure (Friedrichs 2007). 
 
Going beyond nano-specific initiatives, it is common to find among the CSR 
documents produced by larger (especially chemical) companies evidence both of 
broad commitments to the kind of product stewardship principles which are promoted 
by programmes such as Responsible Care. These commitments are often translated 
into policies such as the use of in-house and externally-validated sustainability and/or 
lifecycle assessment tools as part of general systems of risk management. Ciba, for 
example, provides a comprehensive set of product stewardship principles which are to 
govern cradle-to-grave assessments of products and which are intended to be adopted, 
like a code of conduct, by every employee. The systematic approach it sets out is 
supposed to involve all business units within the organisation, and to include supply 
chain relationships. Pharmaceutical companies provided testimony as to their 
implementation of risk assessment methods based on standardised models of the 
environmental fate of their products, such as the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PHRMA)’s PhATE model, which are designed to build 
evidence and make predictions about the long-term effects of substances on aquatic 
organisms and human beings (Sammartino, Bellanti et al. 2008, 206). Using the 
PhATE model, data on predicted sales of a compound and on the calculated removal 
of substance at various steps (human metabolism, wastewater treatment etc.) are 
inputted. The model then generates outputs in the form of predicted concentrations of 
the substance in question in sewage treatment plant effluents, rivers and drinking 
water under different flow conditions. The development of this model stemmed from 
the recognition that past models had been undermined by discrepancies between 
extrapolations of concentrations and actual data. 
 
Some of these tools show signs of being developed to not only comprehensively 
address lifecycle issues, but social acceptance issues as well. There was one instance 
in our survey of a risk and uncertainty assessment tool employed by a multinational 
chemical company which featured not only a broad temporal scope (including 
lifecycle issues), but also covered potential societal concerns. It bases risk assessment 
of new products on a comprehensive semi-quantitative profile of the environmental 
and social impact (taking into account emerging issues and preparedness together 
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with current and potentially emerging regulatory frameworks) of a product, together 
with standardised exposure tools intended to be responsive to established and 
emerging international standards. 
 
Despite the rarity of signs of a fully integrated approach to responsible innovation, it 
is possible to point to practices elsewhere which provide examples of how the 
voluntary treatment of access and engagement issues might be improved, on the way 
to producing more integrated CSR approaches to responsible innovation. The larger 
pharmaceutical companies in our survey, probably as a result of their sensitivity to 
campaigns over drug copyrights and also because of their relationships with patient 
groups, report on a number of initiatives which are of interest. One multinational’s 
latest annual report discussed ongoing issues over drug pricing and the company’s 
responses to them, developed in concert with stakeholders. The issue of cost as a 
barrier to access for products which are particularly needed in the developing world is 
treated in depth by the multinational pharmaceutical companies in the survey. Other 
elements of access sometimes mentioned (again, by the large pharmaceutical 
companies which are engaged in large scale development of biotechnologies) are the 
sharing of benefits which arise from the exploitation of genetic resources that are 
counted among the natural resources of a given state, as detailed under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).5 Less attention in general, even within the 
pharmaceutical sector as represented by our sample, is paid to developing new ways 
of sharing IP and technologies, although pharmaceutical companies once again 
provided some counter-examples. One annual report mentions technology-sharing 
initiatives undertaken under TRIPS with companies in India, voluntary licensing 
initiatives, collaborative patent pooling, and innovation targeted at diseases that 
particular affect the developing world.  
 
The need to deal with problems of social acceptance for new technologies is also 
being addressed by some companies, although the quality and effectiveness of 
stakeholder engagement activities is difficult to judge, based on the relatively low 
level of provision of information on this material issue. As Figure 13 above indicates, 
there is little quantitative reporting of goals and performance in this area, and very 
few documents make reference to international accountability standards such as 
AA1000 (see Figure 12 above), which require a systematic and iterative approach to 
engagement, focused on goal setting and continuous improvement. Again, as with 
reporting on other criteria, it was evident that multinational companies (see Figure 13) 
were most able to allocate resources to engagement activities, although the most 
emphasis was given to engagement as “information sharing”. However, there were 
some examples from the submissions of multinational pharmaceutical companies of 
ongoing stakeholder engagement over issues like access to medicines in the 
developing world, and on other issues. Two notable examples were provided by two 
multinationals’ annual reports. In one, engagement activities were independently 
audited by Bureau Veritas6 against the AA1000 independent accountability standard, 
while in the other, a self-assessed system of stakeholder engagement was described, 
which had prepared in accordance with the AA1000 guidelines. The latter presented a 
systematic approach to engagement, covering the mapping of stakeholder groups, 
identification of material issues, analysing stakeholder perceptions of these issues and 
                                                 
5 See the CBD website at http://www.cbd.int/abs/intro.shtml (accessed 18/12/08). 
6 See www.bureauveritas.co.uk 
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planning engagement activities at a variety of scales, beginning with activities 
undertaken by management at individual facilities. With respect to early consultation 
about emerging technologies, there was very little evidence of systematic 
engagement. The former, Bureau Veritas-assessed report, noted that the company held 
a stakeholder workshop in the USA in 2007 with representatives of retail customers, 
regulators, environmental interest groups, health interest groups and academia. Here, 
nanotechnology was one of the issues identified as a priority for environment, health 
and safety policy. However, whether this was just a one-off and how exactly input 
could be used to inform policy is not stated in the company’s report. Further, the 
framework for holding such events is not explicitly detailed here, and it is not made 
clear how engagement processes relate to research, development and innovation.  
 
It should also be mentioned that criteria for risk communication, both within the 
company and, in the event of a crisis, outside it, are also part of the CENARIOS 
standard. Communication must take into account forecasting of possible outcomes of 
emerging technological and societal developments, including worst case-scenarios. 
But there is no extensive treatment within the standard’s documentation of any 
systematic approach to public engagement of the kind included within the AA1000 
standard. 
 
2) General implementation costs 
The problem of implementation costs is one which is largely under-addressed, both by 
the three stand-alone risk frameworks we have discussed, and by companies in their 
CSR reporting. Some multinational companies make statements about “assisting” 
smaller companies with whom they do business with the costs of incorporating 
particular values or practices into their activities, or about cost and risk sharing in 
R&D. Within the stand-alone frameworks, there are some acknowledgements of the 
difficulties smaller companies will face. Under AssuredNano, it is proposed that 
existing practices undertaken as part of certification for other standards, such as ISO 
9001, will be considered as elements counting towards accreditation (Keith Robson, 
CEO AssuredNano, personal communication, 7 January 2009). This may well be 
useful in reducing costs to smaller companies, particularly given that, as Table 15 and 
Figure 12 above indicate, accreditation under ISO 9001 is more strongly represented 
among SMEs in our survey than any other external accreditation or reporting 
standard. However, TÜV SÜD and AssuredNano both also acknowledge that their 
systems are resource intensive for smaller companies to implement (ENDS Report 
2008). The NRF recognises the problem of implementation costs, and sets out some 
recommendations to deal with the problem, such as using appropriate outside experts 
such as consultants or university researchers to help implement systems, or creating 
industry consortia to help provide resources (EDF - DuPont 2007, 17-18). 
 
3) Supply chain issues 
It is certainly the case that existing efforts to oversee e.g. environmental standards 
throughout the supply chain are generally much stronger in the larger and 
multinational companies represented in our survey (see Table 21 and Figure 18 below 
for profiles of different companies compiled on the basis of the mean frequency 
values for general, specific and quantified statements companies made about their 
policies on surveying environmental performance within their value chain).  
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Table 21: Environmental Impact in Value Chain Profile by Company Type  (n=68) 
 
  General Specific Quantified 
Micro 0 0 0 
SME 0 0.25 0 
Large 0.47 0.2 0 
MNC 0.86 1.79 0.33 
 
 
Figure 18: Environmental Impact in Value Chain Profile by Company Type  (n=68) 
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This is perhaps inevitable given the multiple relationships multinational companies 
typically have to other organisations within the value chain, and the relative amount 
of power they can exert as a result of their market position. The implementation of 
management systems standards such as ISO 14001 and the use of reporting guidelines 
like the GRI, together with industry initiatives like Responsible Care, provide 
motivation and incentives for companies to take a more proactive stance towards 
suppliers’ and customers’ stances on the material CSR issues which form the 
backbone of our content analysis. Again, reference to these standards and initiatives 
is, as is shown in Figure 12 above, present only in larger and multinational 
companies’ reporting, except for two references by SMEs to their implementation of 
ISO 14001. All the stand-alone nano-frameworks make reference to the need for 
suppliers of materials to provide information to customers on the properties of their 
products (EDF - DuPont 2007, 25; TÜV SÜD GmbH 2008). Again, the cost of 
undertaking assurance measures in the supply chain will be a problem for smaller 
companies, which the EDF-DuPont framework recommends should be addressed 
through cost-sharing arrangements amongst companies (EDF - DuPont 2007, 18) 
 
4) Additional information costs 
Smaller companies will also be faced with the costs of more extensive testing and 
more documentation. As larger companies, in many cases, already require certain 
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standards from suppliers (see Figure 18 and Table 21 above), there is evidence in our 
survey for a general awareness among these more powerful actors that smaller 
companies upstream in the value chain face additional costs arising from material 
CSR issues and may require assistance in meeting them. The stand-alone frameworks 
make, for their part, few suggestions as to how this requirement can be dealt with. 
Under AssuredNano, it is hoped that an emphasis on recognising existing good 
practice and improving it where necessary can be used as a certifying criterion where 
possible, in order to keep the need for supplying new information to a minimum. The 
NRF, with its strong emphasis on testing and information provision, recognises that 
there are various factors which can affect information costs: for example, costs of 
implementing the Framework would increase as a product gets nearer to release, or 
when short-term toxicity tests are required. A number of suggestions are offered by 
the authors on how to mitigate costs, such as assuming that a material is toxic and 
requires worker-protection protocols (rather than fully documenting exposure 
pathways), managing the assessment process so that information costs are spread over 
time (as there may be a long period from early research to full commercialisation), 
seeking external funding support from regulatory bodies, and for companies to 
cooperate with each other to share information through the value chain . 
  
Conclusion 
Several major points emerging from the two halves of the study should be stressed.  
Firstly, there is the very low level of reporting from micro companies or SMEs with 
NST activities, with 86% of micros and 73% of SMEs failing to provide either a code 
of conduct, policy statement or annual report that addressed one or more of the areas 
of CSR materiality identified in the section on Methodology above. This is consistent 
with existing research on the problems facing the implementation of voluntary 
regulatory measures among smaller companies in general. 
 
Use of third-party auditing for voluntary measures that are based on reporting 
performance is widely recognised as essential to build trust and credibility. However, 
there is room for concern at the extent to which the use of external reporting 
standards, even among multinationals, incorporates a robust audit component. From 
the data collected, it is evident that the use of external auditing for CSR performance, 
together with other CSR measures such as the implementation of rigorous, accredited 
environmental management systems, are not popular with smaller companies active in 
the NST sector. 
 
Concern with CSR criteria such as access and stakeholder engagement is reserved for 
larger NST companies in our survey. Again, this is consonant with existing research 
into the scope of CSR activity in companies. Reporting and evidence of activity 
among even larger and multinational companies is patchy, however. Evidence of 
systematic engagement activities is particularly hard to find, with one or two 
exceptions. 
 
The four problems we discuss in the previous section are ones which are not 
necessarily unique to NST, but they have features which the current directions taken 
by regulatory thinking on NST, as well as the current stand-alone risk management 
frameworks, risk exacerbating. The need to implement new risk assessment and 
management systems, fully document activities, and properly engage stakeholders to 
deal with emerging issues of societal concern, as well as to perhaps go beyond the 
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provisions for product stewardship present within Responsible Care and the NRF to 
cover longer-term issues such as orphan products, all present the NST industry with 
cost problems that will require sustained collaborative efforts to address, so that 
smaller companies are able to reconcile the need to make a profit with the longer term 
benefits to be had from strategic CSR implementation. Existing evidence of problems 
with how initiatives such as Responsible Care are implemented should be used as a 
resource for learning about how these problems can be addressed.  
 
If the twin dimensions of risk and societal concern are to be addressed in order to 
create both safe development in the near- and long-term, and social acceptance going 
forward, the need to develop CSR policies towards a pro-active and integrated model 
of responsible innovation is imperative. 
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Online CSR Survey Coding Sheet 
  
Annex 4: Interview Questions 
1. Public Sector 
 
The Role of Government and Regulatory Agencies 
 
1. What do you consider to be the role of government bodies in promoting the 
responsible development, use, and end disposal or recovery of nano-scale 
materials? 
2. In your opinion what components of regulatory frameworks (e.g. mandatory 
regulations, guidance, information, etc) might make the most important 
contribution to ensuring that nano-scale materials are formulated, manufactured, 
supplied, and used safely? 
3. “Current existing legislation faces problems of coverage due to the size/scale of 
nano-scale materials” – do you agree with this statement, and if so, how in your 
opinion might this issue be resolved? 
4. What evidence base is required to enable government agencies/bodies to develop 
appropriate policies for nanotechnology companies? 
5. In particular, what indicators are required in order to measure areas of possible 
exposure? 
6. Should the precautionary principle have a role in policy decisions which are made 
by government and regulatory agencies concerning the regulation of 
nanotechnologies? 
 
Industry and CSR 
 
7. Thinking of the dealings you have had/continue to have with industry, what would 
you say are the chief concerns that companies have in relation to the present and 
future markets for the nano-scale materials/products they are 
developing/manufacturing/using? 
8. Do you have any views on the benefits of and/or problems with corporate social 
responsibility in general (i.e. not just with reference to the production and use of 
nano-scale materials) as a means of encouraging self-regulation? 
9. Are you aware of any particularly good or exemplary models of CSR or self 
regulation being employed within the nanotechnologies industry? 
10. Do you believe that important gaps exist in current industry approaches to self-
regulation? If yes, what do you think these are? Do you think they exist across 
different sectors within the industry, or are specific to certain sectors? 
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11. What drivers do you think might have the most effect on encouraging industry to 
increase its use of CSR/self regulatory approaches? 
12. What is your view on the role of voluntary codes (e.g. Responsible NanoCode) 
and third sector initiatives (e.g. Institute of Nanotechnology)? 
 
2. Private Sector 
General company information/characteristics 
 
1. Please tell me some general information about your company? [Prompt: 
business activities, age of company, no. of employees, no. of business units, 
ownership structure, business plan]. 
 
2. What are your business goals; are they clearly identified and disseminated to 
all those concerned? 
 
3. How would you describe your ‘way of doing business’? [Prompt: principles, 
vision]. 
 
4. To what extent do your personal beliefs/principles affect your way of doing 
business? 
 
 
The Nanotechnology Industry 
 
5. Do you produce, buy, or buy and refine nanoparticulate material? If you 
produce and sell such material, are your major customers 
a. SMEs 
b. Large and/or multinational companies 
 
6. What do you think the key technological advances in your part of the nanotech 
sector will be in 5/10 years’ time? 
 
7. What changes would you like to see made to the current regulatory situation in 
an ideal world?  
 
 
CSR questions  
 
8. How would you define CSR in relation to your company/the nanotech 
industry?  
 
9. Do you feel under any pressure to become engaged in the CSR agenda? If so, 
from which sources does this pressure originate [Prompt: government and/or 
agencies, NGOs, other companies, nanotech industry bodies, general public?] 
 
10. Do you feel that you have enough support to understand and engage in CSR? 
Which sources of support do you use? 
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11. Have you heard of/are you involved with any of the following initiatives? 
 
a. Responsible NanoCode 
b. DuPont/Environmental Defence NanoRisk Framework 
c. Responsible Care  
d. DEFRA Voluntary Reporting Scheme 
e. AssuredNano 
 
12. Do you think that voluntary CSR measures can be used as an effective form of 
governance for the nanotech industry?  
 
13. What are the general challenges facing your company/the nanotech industry? 
[Prompt: gaining financing, identifying market niches, launching innovation 
strategies, risk identification and management, keeping up with legislation 
etc]. 
 
14. What are the specific challenges your company faces in trying to become more 
socially and environmentally responsible? [Prompt: Identifying possible 
activities, promoting activities already carried out, finding resources, receiving 
support and information].  
 
 
Specific questions related to CSR type activities 
 
1. Are you aware that the activities you carry out can be categorised as socially 
responsible? 
 
2. Do you undertake any of the following CSR-related activities?  
 
a. Use a code of ethics and/or have a set of CSR policies (on 
environmental management, H&S, stakeholder engagement, etc.) 
· If so, does the company stipulate that it requires certain 
similar standards/policies from its suppliers/customers? 
b. Reporting- CSR, sustainability, H&S 
· If so, does this conform to external standards? Is it externally 
audited? 
c. Stakeholder engagement in consultative mode  
· If so, with what stakeholders?  
d. Building links with local communities e.g. sponsorship of local sports 
teams, support of long-term unemployed, work experience, organising 
school visits. 
 
3. Do you communicate about CSR internally and externally? 
 
4. What would you say are the benefits to your company of engaging in CSR?  
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Risk Management 
 
5. Has your company identified sources of risk within the nanotechnology 
activities in which it is involved? 
 
6. Are there any major areas where scientific uncertainty may affect how your 
business develops in the future unless more research is forthcoming [Prompt: 
metrology, knowledge of properties of nanomaterials, toxicological data] 
 
7. Does your company conduct specific risk assessments where nanomaterials 
are involved?  
 
8. How far do you think life-cycle approaches to risk management are feasible in 
your part of the sector? (to include LCA, product stewardship, establishing 
frameworks for orphan products) 
 
9. What factors have been decisive in inclining your company to conduct/not 
conduct RAs? 
 
10. (if RAs have been performed) Have measures been taken based on these risk 
assessments? 
 
11. Do you take specific precautionary measures where nanomaterials are 
produced? [prompt: treating materials as hazardous until proven otherwise, 
restricting exposure in absence of data] 
 
Stakeholders  
 
12. What does the term stakeholder denote to you; how would you identify your 
stakeholders and prioritise the importance of different stakeholders? 
 
13. Who would you say are your most important stakeholders? 
 
14. Would you say the contacts you have with stakeholders was 
 
a. Occasional (e.g.. occasional meetings prompted by a specific issue) 
b. Frequent (e.g. regular meetings to share information and concerns) 
c. Systematic (e.g. regular meetings to review product development and 
give feedback) 
 
15. Can you give any examples of notably good or bad relationships you may 
have experienced with a particular stakeholder? 
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Annex 5: Overview of Interview Participants 
1. Public Sector/Government Agencies 
Identifier Organisation/Agency 
1 Professor Simon Collinson, Cranfield University 
2 Dr Brian Greenwood, Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) 
3 Gill Smith, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
4 Keith Robson, NanoKTN 
5 Christine Northage, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
6 Kieron Stanley, Environment Agency (EA) 
7 Hilary Sutcliffe, Responsible Nanocode 
 
2. Private Sector 
Company 
Identifier 
Category Role Sector SIC 
(2003) 
Code 
A SME Instrumentation Process technology 2956 
B MNC Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs 
Pharma/Consumer Health 5146 
C MNC Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs 
Pharma/Consumer Health 2452 
D SME Nanomaterials 
manufacturer 
Coatings and Composites 7310 
E SME Nanomaterials 
manufacturer 
Speciality Chemicals 2466 
F SME Characterisation 
services 
Food 9305 
G SME Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs 
Speciality Chemicals 5151 
H MNC Nanomaterials 
manufacturer 
Speciality Chemicals 7430 
I MNC Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs 
Food 2466 
J MNC Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs 
Coatings and Composites 2911 
K SME Nanomaterials 
manufacturer 
Speciality Chemicals 7340 
L Micro Nanomaterials 
manufacturer 
Speciality Chemicals 2466 
M SME Nanomaterials 
manufacturer 
Speciality Chemicals 7310 
N Micro Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs 
Medical and Diagnostics 7310 
O SME Nanoproducts w. 
supplied NMs  
Medical and Diagnostics 3310 
 
  
Annex 6: Analysis of Interview Data 
 
1. Introduction  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 7 representatives of government departments, agencies and government/industry supported 
nanotechnology CSR initiatives, together with 15 companies with substantial involvement in the development of nanotechnologies. Ten 
companies involved were SMEs or micros, and five were multinationals. The multinationals interviewed represented a cross-section of different 
key sectors in the UK nanotechnologies industry, with NST involvement in most cases (except for the food packaging and cosmetics companies 
interviewed) being restricted to R&D: 
 
· food packaging  
· speciality chemicals (with customers in e.g. the semiconductor industry) 
· cosmetics and consumer health  
· pharmaceuticals and consumer health 
· coatings and composite materials  
 
The profile of our sample of smaller companies arguably reflects key sectors among the growing number of small players in the industry.  
· Providers of specialty chemicals to larger industrial customers, mainly for purposes of industrial R&D (five companies).  
· R&D activities in the field of medical diagnostics (two companies).  
· Research services to food companies of varying sizes (one company). 
· Coatings and composite materials (one company) 
· Manufacture of instrumentation for process technology (one company). 
 
Where data relating to “most”, “many” or “some” companies are referred to below, it is this sample of 15 companies that is being referenced. 
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2. Public Sector/Government Agencies 
 
 
Analytical Focus 
 
 
 
 
1. Government role in 
promoting 
responsibility in 
nanotechnologies 
industry. 
 
 
Summary 
· Government’s role is not just about creating legislation, and nor is it about standing back and promoting CSR; 
· It should follow a variety of routes to promote responsibility and set a “climate for commercialisation”, to 
take the industry on beyond its current concentration on research and development; 
· Setting research goals is vital to help create standards and data; 
· The provision of spaces for debate is vital both for reasons of inclusion and to promote good decision 
making; and 
· Government can also act to raise the profile of codes of conduct or accreditation standards 
 
One respondent (Public 7) suggested that government should not be involved too closely with simply promoting 
voluntary regulation, as it can raise suspicions among industry and the public that they are not performing their 
legislative role properly. Some contrasting views on this issue, particularly in relation to the appropriateness of a 
“light touch” approach to regulation were evident (e.g. Public 2, 7) 
 
Another defined the role of government as primarily being about “setting a climate for commercialisation”, which 
should involve sponsoring themes or pockets of research to address toxicological and occupational hygiene 
considerations (Public 2, 4). Part of this effort should be to create a broad range of reference materials, allowing 
toxicological and occupational hygiene requirements to be determined, and moving towards standardisation 
(Public 3).  
 
Government also has a role in promoting the free flow of information, as in debate between scientists, and 
between scientists and the public (Public 4), and by “inclusively” involving other stakeholders like CSOs and 
third sector organisations (Public 6). Such a debate is necessary to promote a “reasonable, sensible” debate, in 
place of immediate, mandatory, nanospecific legislation, which would – without a debate – most likely be too 
much of a catch-all, and could severely damage the industry (Public 4).   
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Finally, the Government could use its position to raise the profile of a given code of conduct or accreditation 
standard by stating that it will not buy anything from a company which has not been benchmarked under it (Public 
4). 
 
2. Contribution of 
different regulatory 
approaches. 
 
 
Summary 
· Given persistent gaps in knowledge, sensible application of precautionary approaches continues to be vital; 
and 
· This will largely involve, in the workplace, the extension of existing protocols from the chemical industry. 
 
In addition to minding potential regulatory gaps, the promotion of sensible precaution is widely seen as vital 
(Public 2, 4, 6). For the HSE, precautionary guidance in the form of concrete examples of compliance is vital to 
ensuring occupational health measures are taken “these are the lines along which we expect people to work” 
(Public 5).  
 
Precaution in nanotechnology workplaces is about applying precautionary protocols already in use in the chemical 
industry stringently, and providing advice. At the moment, the agency sees occupational health issues in the 
nanotechnologies industry as adequately covered by existing regulations, including REACh. (Public 3). It should 
be noted that the 2006 regulatory gaps report for the then DTI by BRASS suggested that there may be some issues 
affecting REACh coverage, due to (a) tonnage triggers for data requirements (b) questions which remain over the 
suitability of conventional chemical safety assessment methodologies for nanoscale materials, and (c) assumptions 
about the substantial equivalence of bulk and nanoscale versions of a substance, particularly given that no 
nanomaterials have yet been placed on the list of “substances of very high concern” (Frater, Stokes et al. 2006, 
59-60). 
 
3. Extent of evidential 
gaps and application of 
precaution 
 
 
Summary 
· Minimisation of risk through minimisation of exposure has formed the keynote of advice offered by agencies 
to business and academia; 
· Consultation with industry has been used to fine-tune advice; 
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· Gaps include data on human exposure hazards and materials characterisation, but also affect methods of 
exposure modelling, toxicological methods more widely, and testing protocols. 
· These issues also affect ecotoxicology, with the added complications of traceability, complex interactions and 
potential latency effects. 
  
With respect to occupational health, an example is precautionary advice on CNTs in the form of a Guidance Note 
which has been written by the HSE and sent out to industry and academia This has been prepared as a response to 
potential “early warnings” from academic research, and recommends a precautionary, exposure minimising 
approach until individual companies can amass enough data to do individual risk assessments (Public 3) and thus 
prove that no toxicity exists (Public 5). The advice has been the subject of consultation within HSE and within 
government (e.g. DEFRA, EA) to make sure that its recommendations don’t impact adversely on the environment, 
and was circulated to industry for “fine-tuning” input which made the advice “more practical” (Public 5).   
 
Exposure studies at this stage often involve artificial situations which cannot serve as an adequate basis for 
extrapolating to real world exposure situations (Public 4). Toxicology methods and testing instruments are seen as 
needing validation, with new ones potentially needing to be developed. 
 
Existing "methods of test" may or may not be suitable for nanoscale devices and nanoscale dimensions. 
Measurement techniques and instruments need to be developed and/or standardized. New calibration 
procedures and certified reference materials are needed for validation of test instruments at the nanoscale. 
(Follow-up email from Christine Northage, HSE) 
 
Concerns over ecotoxicology exist, with how far particles can be traced in water or air a particular issue, together 
with potential complications further down the line caused by mechanisms such as bioaccumulation – experiences 
with endocrine-disrupting chemicals, PCBs etc. have sensitized regulators to issues of possible long-term latency 
(Public 6). Currently, international protocols for ecotoxicity testing are lacking, as they are for human toxicity 
(Public 3). 
 
4. Drivers within the 
industry that might 
encourage the uptake 
 
Summary 
· Reputation and publicity are two key drivers due to effect on company’s position in the market; 
· These might be activated by being benchmarked for a code of conduct or accreditation standard; 
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of CSR 
 
· A strong profile is needed for any code or accreditation to succeed, which requires involvement of 
organisations outside business too. 
· Need for expert advice and information could be used as an additional incentive to be benchmarked.  
 
From the HSE’s point of view, a development of existing practice (whereby registering with the agency entitles 
companies to expert advice on compliance) would be seen as a strong incentive (Public 3). 
 
Incentives for adopting codes of conduct would be favourable publicity, but this requires that one code be seen as 
“the only game in town”, the “’thing’ that companies do”, which in turn requires that the code develop a strong 
profile as a result of pressure applied by NGOs, government, industry peers and so on (Public 7). Responsible 
behaviour beyond compliance has to be driven by tangible market advantage (Public 3). 
 
5. Companies’ 
concerns regarding 
present and future 
markets for their 
products 
 
 
Summary 
· The industry remains at an early stage of development, and vulnerable to over-regulation;  
· Extension of REACh specifically to NMs and NSPs could be the likeliest route to over-regulation; and 
· Companies still want unambiguous guidance and useful information. 
 
Many nanomaterials and other products remain at an early stage of development, and thus vulnerable to over-
regulation (Public 3). At this stage, not many companies are probably using large quantities of CNTs, for 
example, except for R&D (Public 5). But companies still want clear and unambiguous advice and guidance, which 
is not the same “as being told what to do” as in a command-and-control model of legislation (Public 3). 
 
Requirements of REACh are onerous, so nanotechnology companies faces severe economic problems if the full 
testing regime is required for nanoproducts on the basis of particle size or some other nano-specific criterion 
(Public 4). Such a move would remove any prospect of a global level playing field and disadvantage the EU. 
 
6. Views on role of 
codes of conduct 
 
 
Summary 
· High level codes of conduct are intended to illustrate how compliance with legislation can best be carried out 
in the nanotechnologies industry, and also to spread responsibility throughout organisations ; 
· Such codes have to operate on the basis of benchmarking, to develop “good intentions” into concrete policies; 
and 
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· Processes of benchmarking are costly, and difficult to implement, but a favourable reception among 
companies is expected. 
 
Codes of conduct or forms of best practice accreditation are seen as giving companies assurance that “they have 
done the best they can” (Public 4). Responsible Nanocode is largely intended to illustrate and embody examples 
of compliance with existing legislation (Public 3). It is not intended to be a body of standards, and to operate on a 
benchmarking of best practice basis rather than on the basis of adoption, given that adoption will tend to catch 
only those who are already up to scratch.  
 
Its uniqueness lies in two features – that it describes required behaviour in a way that can be communicated to 
non-experts, and, because it is based on principles, it also makes CSR a concern for every company department, 
rather than defining behaviour in relation to technical legislation which typically concerns only one department 
(Public 7). Processes of benchmarking are required in order to establish definite processes and procedures to carry 
through the declaration of intent contained in the code (Public 4). Smaller companies are seen as having less 
trouble adopting a code of conduct, as with larger companies more internal bureaucracy has to be negotiated 
(Public 7). 
 
Benchmarking process is proving difficult, as getting funding from industry (to be matched by government) is 
becoming difficult - larger consumer-facing companies are envisaged as the best bet (Public 1). Generally, 
however, industry appears to be well-disposed to the benchmarking approach (Public 1) 
 
7. Examples of CSR in 
industry/gaps in 
practices 
 
 
Summary 
· Tackling the problem of credibility for voluntary approaches is key, and examples from the chemical and 
fishing industries have been considered as models; 
· Multi-stakeholder approaches to formulating best practice may be best, but tend to be slow; 
· In the meantime, other models such as Responsible Care may be useful; and 
· Upstream stakeholder engagement processes have had some notable successes in engaging  large consumer-
facing companies and retailers. 
 
It was noted that some in the industry, particularly those in the specialty chemical sector, see Responsible Care as 
a useful model, but that its usefulness might be questionable, due to the lack of credibility typically accorded to 
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measures undertaken by trade associations on their own (Public 7). Multi-stakeholder approaches (like the Marine 
Stewardship Council, which was an influence on Responsible Nanocode) have been shown to have more 
credibility. For codes of conduct to work, however, transparency about EHS measures and the like is necessary, 
and this is not always easy for companies to achieve (Public 7). Nonetheless, Responsible Care was mentioned by 
another respondent as a useful model to rely on for the time being in providing guidance on how issues like 
product stewardship could be dealt with in a proactive and precautionary way (Public 4). Larger retailers in the 
food sector are increasingly engaged with the Responsible Nanocode process (Public 7). 
 
Encouraging systematic and repeated participation in upstream stakeholder engagement activities by some larger 
consumer-facing companies were considered to have been a notable success of recent Government-sponsored 
engagement efforts (Public 6), although some findings were seen as equivocal (e.g. Gavelin, Wilson et al. 2007).  
 
 
3. Private Sector 
 
 
Analytical Focus 
 
 
1. Role of foresight/ 
anticipatory risk 
management 
 
Summary 
· Smaller companies typically understand the capacity of SMEs in general for foresight as constrained by cost 
concerns; yet with respect to their own activities, they often show a marked concern with foresight; 
· Companies often attribute this capacity to values and attitudes held by directors or senior management ; 
· Anticipation of risk is, in isolated cases, seen as an important driver for innovation. 
· It is more widely seen as a means of being sensitized to regulatory change. 
 
A core element of CSR, whether activities are oriented towards minimising risk or towards creating positive social 
value, is proactive or anticipatory action. Foresight, understood as the systematic use of critical thinking 
concerning long-term developments, can be understood as necessary to inform and guide such action. All 
companies surveyed talked about foresight mainly in terms of anticipating new product developments, market 
needs, and internal industry pressures.  
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However, there is also some discussion of foresight as a means of anticipating business risk (cf. Wood 1991; 
Orlitzky & Benjamin 2001) – whether it be from shifts in the regulatory environment, scientific uncertainties, or 
uncertainties about potential risks or perceptions of risk. In this respect, it is interesting that several of the smaller 
companies noted that other smaller companies in the industry (not just their sector) tended to see the long-term 
costs of CSR as a difficult hurdle for companies in their position to get over, with these reported attitudes tending 
to agree with findings from research on attitudes among SME and micro companies to CSR (Gunningham 1995, 
65-7) 
 
And I tell you one of the real challenges for CSR is specifically for small companies where to be honest a 
long term - a long timeframe is six months and I think this is why, whereas for big - for bigger players, the 
big multinationals they are expecting to be around […] Whereas SMEs they don't have the same - they're not 
engaged to the same degree as perhaps larger organisations.  Yet they tend to be at the cutting edge of 
technology. (Company G) 
 
Some remarks from larger companies also bore out this view, with one interviewee noting that making longer-
term risk management (such as LCA) mandatory would mean “that nothing in Europe is ever going to be 
developed by a smaller medium sized company” (Company C). However, this conflict between costs considered 
over different timescales was not necessarily always evident when discussion turned to a company’s own view of 
longer-term uncertainties and their potential effect on its activities. This concern with anticipation often, small 
companies report, based on strategic direction coming from the board, who often comprise scientists and directors 
with backgrounds in larger companies). Here, it was evident in several cases that extensive anticipatory scanning 
of potential uncertainties was undertaken. Action was taken to direct investment in ways which would help in 
keeping future opportunities open, rather than threatening the company with less freedom of movement (cf. 
Husted 2005). In many cases, (e.g. B, D, G) this was associated with technical distinctions between the different 
kinds of uncertainties associated with different potential products and technologies (see also Analytical Focus 5, 
below) 
 
Foresight was seen, in several smaller companies, as a capacity which derives from the values and experience of 
directors and senior management more widely. A comment from Company A concerning their work on novel 
materials was perhaps typical: “the board members of the company took the view and said, look right assume its 
deadly and manage it and make sure that, you know we're not harming our customers.”  
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More unusually, this orientation towards risk minimisation was accompanied in the same interview with an 
interpretation of business risk as a possible source of further technological innovation: “let's manage the safety 
side and for us it’s making us - it will make us come up with some new technologies to deal with that.” (Company 
A). 
 
In general, companies saw foresight as a crucial component of both anticipating regulatory change and of helping 
to shape it. One smaller company expressed this attitude to regulation by describing it as a kind of “social 
contract” between business and wider society: “regulation is society's willingness to accept risk.” (Company G). 
 
 
2. Nature and extent 
of pre-market 
research/isolation 
of employee risk 
factors  
 
 
Summary 
· Precautionary attitudes, focused on minimisation and monitoring of exposure are claimed across the industry; 
· Drivers for these attitudes vary, from ingrained values which reflect operators’ backgrounds, to e.g. systems 
of “risk banding” established across a global company’s operations ; 
· Companies claim to avoid assumption that NMs are “substantially equivalent” to bulk versions; 
· Examples exist of specific and extensive pre-market human and environmental toxicology being developed 
by companies; 
· Some companies suggest existing toxicology protocols are unsuitable, and better ones would encourage more 
pre-market research; and 
· Consumer-facing companies have in place extensive systems of safety testing to meet regulatory 
requirements, but are either not developing NST-based products at present, or question whether – given 
regulatory definitions – their products are actually NST-based 
 
Various forms of what could be described as precautionary approaches to pre-market testing were described. 
These varied across sectors: nanomaterials manufacturers spoke of the connection between technical issues, such 
as improving production processes to the point where reliable production of NSPs or structures with sufficiently 
similar characteristics became possible (Company E), or upscaling production (Companies A, M), and risk 
assessment. Without a standardised product of sufficiently reliable and consistent quality to take to market, there 
would be no point in investing in full toxicology either (Company E). Nonetheless, companies (e.g. E, G, N) 
stressed that they had not made any assumptions about “substantial equivalence” between their NMs and existing 
bulk ones, and adapted toxicological approaches accordingly. Company G described how tests on their product 
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had looked at a number of environmental hazard scenarios (including the effect of their products on the toxicity of 
other airborne particulates) and had produced risk profiles based on particle size, none of which gave them cause 
for concern. Where toxicological protocols run by external bodies are relied on, however, some smaller 
companies (E, K) reported that these did not fit well with the nature of their NM-manufacturing processes (where 
different production runs might have different toxicological profiles due to variations in product):  
 
I can make 10 materials out of one production run by changing the parameters. What I need is someone to 
tell me, okay, of all of these that one might be 10% less effective but it's 90% less toxic (Company K). 
 
In fact, they tended to lack flexibility and to be excessively slow to turn around results. Development of a new 
generation of appropriate toxicological testing protocols was seen by these companies as key to encouraging 
better pre-market testing. 
 
Precautionary and risk minimisation approaches in the workplace were common among nanomaterials 
manufacturers, from micro to multinational – companies A, E, K, M stressed the extent of “sensible” (Company 
K) measures, generally including isolation in suitable fume hoods or other forms of exposure prevention such as 
encapsulation in matrices (Company M) or growth or manufacture of NSPs in liquid media (Companies H, I, L).  
 
K emphasised how far they minimised exposure by emphasising the difference in orders of magnitude of average 
numbers of airborne NSPs in different environments: 
 
“[…] outside in the big, wide world the average in London it can be 0 to 100,000 - to a million in Oxford 
Street on a hot Monday morning. Then when your aircraft is out on the runway at calm down and the wind 
blows in the wrong direction it can peak at half a million. Then at my facility which is the largest 
manufacturer of nano particles in the UK, dry nano particles it's 8000. So we take it very seriously.” 
(Company K) 
 
The need to get things “in perspective” to understand exposure risks was a common theme among manufacturers 
of nanomaterials. The enforcement of a precautionary approach was often in smaller companies attributed to 
ingrained ways of working, inherited from larger companies or University departments from which they had been 
spun off: “So you know, we live it.  We don't need to be told it, we live it” (Company K). Other small and large 
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companies (e.g. Companies H, M) described the mandatory use of material safety data sheets for the new 
materials and annual health screenings for employees to check exposure levels. 
 
For larger companies, such as pharmaceutical multinationals, discussion of the nature of precaution covered 
detailed systems of hazard definition, including the delineation of uncertainties and consequent minimisation 
measures based on risk banding: “we take more of a conservative attitude to start with so that we can back off as 
things would get new data.” (Company B). One NM manufacturer, an arm of a chemicals multinational, described 
how their parent company had assessed their activities under their own risk banding system as low risk, based on 
the nature of the materials they made (Company H). Further, the consumer-facing activities of pharmaceutical and 
cosmetics companies give them a specific require specific attitudes to compliance that mandate higher levels of 
precaution. New pharmaceuticals may take ten years to develop, incorporating e.g. the passage from pre-clinical 
to clinical trials, and  requiring a higher level of data from suppliers of ingredients - to include, in the future, NMs, 
once NM-based products are developed (Company B).  
 
Company C, a cosmetics manufacturer, was careful to point out that the materials they use are not, strictly 
speaking, nanoparticles, but pigments and emulsions scaled on the micron level, some of which were first 
introduced to the market over 25 years ago. Researchers at the company continued to update the sizeable body of 
studies already done on these materia ls. Acute and extended exposure data for a variety of different scenarios 
(from dermal exposure to ingestion was available. 
 
 
3. Sources of 
influence on 
company 
practices from 
within the 
industry 
 
 
Summary 
· Collaboration between smaller and larger companies on product development is vital – in many cases 
collaborations reach beyond the EU; 
· This leads to CSR influence from larger companies via the supply chain; 
· The need to commercialise products that add real value is and will continue to be a significant issue for larger 
companies and so for the smaller companies that supply them; 
· These pressures may add to negative perceptions of costs of “beyond compliance” measures; and 
· Navigating markets and finding customers can impose significant financial and time costs for smaller 
companies. 
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With respect to nanomaterials manufacture much UK production (especially with CNTs) is currently for industrial 
R&D purposes. Smaller companies engaged in NM manufacture seek strong collaborative relationships with large 
of MNC customers, typically in the USA or in East and Southeast Asia. A common theme was that the hype over 
the properties of NMs often obscures the real difficulties with using them in actual products. One common 
problem concerns the conditions under which the manufacturing processes employed by customers operate. A 
great deal of close technical collaboration is typically required to ensure that supplied NMs do not lose their 
properties during these processes.  This means that exchanges of staff and expertise between companies is 
common, and that this can include some communication of values and practices from larger companies who often 
have more established approaches to CSR, along with pressure to conform to particular standards, some of which 
is aimed at encouraging accreditation under e.g. ISO14000. The experience of e.g. Company M, operating in 
Japan, is typical:  
 
We basically have a range of material that doesn't use any cadmium and that really is a big deciding factor 
for Japanese companies to work with us because they just don't like any heavy metal in their products. 
 
We spoke to some larger companies who are in the position of being customers for smaller NM manufacturers. 
These typically see nanotechnologies as generally being still potential contributions to their product portfolio, 
whether operating in pharmaceuticals (Company B) or advanced materials (Company J). For companies in this 
position, a common experience is being approached by “start up companies [with] perhaps single products that 
they are promoting” (B), but “the technology itself competes against all other kind of things that we look at” and 
is just “one possible  route” (J) to desired improvements, and so considerations like the market value of a product 
and whether a given technology adds value are of primary concern, not promoting  a technology because of some 
kind of inherent promise. 
 
Smaller companies (E, F, K) were keen also in some cases to stress this point: that the promise of the technology 
has to be realised in relation to real products to make developing it worthwhile, which as Company F suggested, 
may be an obstacle to developing nanotechnologies in the food ingredients sector. The need to commercialize 
rapidly technologies to supply to customers which will “actually improve their efficiency, cut costs, or add extra 
value”, particularly given that nanotech companies outside the EU are seen as “much more advanced in looking at 
commercialisation issues” (Company N). So far, the UK and EU appear to be lagging behind in this regard, from 
the point of view of some SMEs. The drive to commercialisation may reinforce negative views of the costs 
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associated with CSR, particularly among smaller companies (Companies C, G, H, K, N). 
 
In addition, smaller companies often face significant research costs in finding potential customers, as the range of 
applications for their products is often very large (Company L). 
 
4. External sources 
of pressure which 
influence 
practices (e.g. 
media, 
NGOs/CSOs, 
public 
perceptions) 
 
 
Summary 
· Clear differences in attitudes to external pressures were evident among companies based on supply chain 
position; 
· Many companies see business risks from negative public perceptions, and relate these to inadequate 
communication by industry, government and media, with some also citing CSO activities; 
· Outside larger (particularly consumer-facing) companies, there is little evidence (with one or two exceptions) 
that these pressures are driving changes in practice; and 
· Rapid commercialisation of beneficial products is seen as a key route to positive public perceptions. 
 
Among small and large companies, there were some evident differences in attitudes to external pressures based on 
their position in the supply chain. B2B companies differed in their sense of external pressures. Only a couple saw 
very little business risk coming from public perception of their own area of activity. This was either because of 
the B2B nature of their business (Company L), or was linked to a perceived low awareness of NST among the 
public at large (Company D).  
 
Others expressed varying degrees of concern about the possibility of localised negative publicity harming all 
companies involved in NST through a cascading spread of negative perceptions. The impact particularly of even 
one-off negative stories in either the popular or scientific media was seen as particularly significant by some, with 
particularly sensitive reactions being seen as possible where food applications were concerned (Company F). One 
interviewee recalled a recent incident in the US Congress, involving CNTs: 
 
this guy was scaring the bejesus out of a bunch of senators and congressmen saying this was the next devil 
incarnate in a material and the guy had no real clue or basis for those claims but yet that's what got in the 
paper (Company M) 
 
Companies across all categories and sectors saw the threat of such pressures as deriving mainly from widespread 
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“hype” concerning both the negative and positive potential of NST (Companies C, M). A common obstacle which 
companies saw NST businesses as having to struggle with was the tendency within the media to treat Some saw a 
negative influence here from CSOs, extending to the “misrepresenting and mis-citing” of scientists (Company C), 
driven by the need of civil society organisations to attract funding and prestige to big issue oppositional 
campaigns (Companies G, K), and perhaps by their freedom from processes like peer-review (Company C). 
Others suggested that CSOs had not, to date, taken a blanket position against NST, having recognised that “could 
actually have some serious impacts on things like […] global warming” (Company E).  
 
How far such pressures and business risks have driven changes in companies’ practices is questionable, at least 
with respect to smaller companies (see Analytical Focus 7, Stakeholder Engagement). Some small companies 
(e.g. Companies A, M) expressed a desire to use the absence of regulation as an opportunity to develop models of 
best practice in communication, and had sent representatives (Company A) on a recent course (March 2009) 
organised by the RAE, NIA and Nano-Bio-Raise (“Public Communication & Applied Ethics of 
Nanotechnology”), with a view to developing a published engagement strategy. But other small companies (e.g. 
E, K) were negative about the benefits of individual companies trying to communicate about their practices in 
relation to CSR, on the basis that there was little appetite amongst the public for “listening” (Company E: “you 
must engage publicly, so when you do, no one listens”) or that there would inevitably be repetition from 
companies of the same messages, and people would stop listening (Company K). For one company (E), this 
attitude was justified in relation to the interviewees’ experience in the “GM food industry”. Nonetheless, several 
companies saw the prospect of negative public reactions as a good reason for joining industry groups like the 
NIA. 
  
Interestingly, commercialisation was in this area once again a major factor which influenced company attitudes 
and practices. Six companies suggested that the most effective route to public acceptance would be via the 
development of products which were perceived to be delivering major benefits. Two companies mentioned the 
example of mobile phones as one where significant uncertainties about risk existed and continued to persist, but 
where the perception of clear consumer benefits creates acceptance: “most people decide that the benefit to them 
outweighs that perception.” (E); “people discounted that risk because they wanted a mobile phone” (G). By 
contrast, technologies like GM had failed commercially because people couldn’t see such benefits: “people 
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couldn't really see the difference between the tomato paste they had in the fridge today versus the one they could 
buy which was GM modified” (G).7 Several interviewees foresaw a process of “natural selection” (E) in which 
various applications of NST would fail to take off, while others would make a huge difference to people’s lives 
and would be accepted. There seemed to be a view amongst these smaller companies (A, D, E, G, M, N) that the 
market would effectively differentiate between different uses of NST, solving the problems of perception created 
by hype and sensationalistic reporting. 
 
Nonetheless, companies whose products are more “consumer facing” were more concerned to examine the 
nuances of public opinion and how it might change or be influenced over time. One large pharmaceutical 
company we spoke to (Company C), having become involved in recent years in “upstream” and “systematic” 
stakeholder  engagement activities, noted that engaging in deliberative assessments of public opinion had for them 
been a powerful driver in changing business practices in the developing world. Initiatives developed as a result 
(on access to products, IP and technology sharing) would be most likely also cover future products which 
incorporate nanotechnologies. 
 
5. Technical 
questions about 
manufacture, use 
and disposal  
which influence 
product 
development 
 
 
Summary 
· In looking at potential paths of product development, companies tend to distinguish between (i) products with 
established benefits which are expected to lead to acceptance; (ii) products surrounded with known 
uncertainties which can be dealt with by established precautionary protocols and (iii) products where 
scientific uncertainties make them unacceptable business risks; and 
· Other key technical questions which determine future investments concern the precise extent to which value 
may be added to products by nanotechnological innovation. 
 
Many companies, small and large (B, C, F, H, K, L, M, N) were careful to distinguish between three categories of 
technical knowledge about products: (i) products whose benefits could be assessed with enough confidence to 
allow customers and consumers to make assessments based on known risks versus bene fits; (ii) products where 
known uncertainties existed and where precautionary action (based on largely familiar protocols) in manufacture, 
handling and use downstream in the supply chain would be appropriate (although this may not include recycling 
                                                 
7 There is some evidence however from research on functional foods which utilise GM to suggest that, with some technological applications, there may be inherent resistance 
among consumers to them based on the nature of the technology (e.g. Cox, Koster et al. 2004). Whether and how this might also be the case among NST applications 
(particularly those relating to food ingredients) is unclear. 
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or disposal – see Analytical Focus 6 below), and (iii) products  or materials whose risk profiles after use in 
downstream products could not be determined with enough certainty to make them an acceptable business risk 
(see also Analytical Focus 1 above). 
 
Pharmaceutical and medical companies (small and large) pointed out that the particularly strict issues which 
applied to them meant that the supply of accurate information from suppliers of NMs was critical, and where this 
was not available or inadequate, they had to engage in often costly characterisation studies of their own (B, N). 
These same issues applied to a lesser extent to other large companies who bought in nanomaterials, such as one 
MNC operating in the food sector (Company I). Elsewhere in the food sector, different views were apparent. 
Company F saw a serious general lack of data and modelling expertise in understanding both exposure pathways 
and fates of nanomaterials within the human body, which could be expected to have a serious impact on the 
development of products. 
 
More than questions about scientific uncertainty, however, many of the technical issues which concerned 
companies were about the extent to which nanotechnological innovations could add values to products (the 
company’s own, or a customer’s), and what trials, tests and/or stakeholder engagement processes of would be 
necessary to determine this (Companies B, D, E, F, J, K, N, O). 
 
6. Temporal extent 
of risk assessment 
and research and 
actions resulting 
from these 
assessments 
(including LCA, 
product 
stewardship, 
orphan products) 
 
 
Summary 
· Various gaps affect the feasibility of LCA, particularly in relation to data and modelling; 
· Resources and expertise are a problem for smaller companies; 
· Collaboration and specific funding may assist in making LCA more commercially viable; 
· Approaches to product stewardship are being widely considered, with development of existing legislation on 
traceability seen as less onerous for smaller companies; and 
· Liability for orphan products has not been widely considered, but where it has, the problem is seen as related 
to IP ownership passed up or down the supply chain. 
 
The majority of companies interviewed, large and small (13 out of 15), saw life-cycle approaches as potentially 
very important for anticipating risks to human health and the environment associated with emerging technologies. 
However, views as to what such approaches might involve, what impact they would have on companies from 
different sectors and of different sizes, and whether they should form part of a future regulatory regime differed 
  
106 
enormously.  
 
Producers of basic NMs, for example, are generally not at the stage where products containing their materials are 
being commercialised, and so have not begun to undertake or commission the kinds of exposure studies that 
would be needed.  
 
Some smaller companies see LCA as not presenting major difficulties for them, due either to the nature of the 
products for which their materials are being developed (some may already have an established lifecycle profile, 
making assessment easier) or special expertise within the company or in one of its subsidiaries or partners 
(Companies C, G). 
 
Generally, however, there were still seen to be significant problems deriving either from gaps in lifecycle data 
(Companies A, G), a lack of modelling capability for complex interactions between NMs and the environment or 
human body (F, K), and/or the relatively early stage of development of a material manufacturing process or a 
product (A),  Larger consumer-facing companies (B, C) had more capacity, as well as (C) access to relevant data, 
but here the problem was seen as being that “nobody has been able to put all of the pieces together” (C)  
 
Addressing these gaps, it is generally agreed, requires a lot of resources, too much for small companies to 
undertake such activities on their own in many cases. A lack of access to relevant expertise is also a problem. To 
enable wider uptake of LCA, collaborations between small companies and larger ones with appropriate expertise 
were recommended, with the Government assisting, either through providing assistance with coordinating 
research efforts and collaborative arrangements, or, as one company, already extensively engaged in LCA for its 
products suggested, actually “put[ting] some seed money in to allow companies to start to do some work” 
(Company G). 
 
Anticipation of lifecycle and product stewardship issues is, as noted above (see Analytical Focus 1, Foresight), 
often a key element of strategic decision making on product development.  The question of how best to tackle 
product stewardship for current products produced a range of different responses. One multinational saw the only 
way to deal with this issue as legislation to bring together companies involved in different stages of a product’s 
life-cycle (Company I). But for smaller companies, such legislation was thought to present significant cost 
problems, with a full take-back model being particularly damaging. Traceability (rather than full take-back by 
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originators) was seen as the best model for product stewardship, and one for which some parts of the industry are 
already prepared (Company E). 
 
Discussions of orphan products and successor liability were marked by little evidence that companies had 
considered this issue in depth. Some smaller companies dealing with innovations in electronic components or 
spun out from universities interpreted this issue in relation to IP arrangements (Companies D, N). In the event of 
the company’s dissolution, D saw IP and liabilities returning to the university. N saw them as being on by larger 
customers who had incorporated N’s proprietary technology in their mobile devices, textiles etc.  
 
 
 
7. Extent and nature 
of stakeholder 
engagement 
practices 
 
 
Summary 
· Stakeholders, for most companies (10 out of 15, 66%), are defined first and foremost as peer companies, 
business customers and employees; 
· In general, wider engagement tended to be understood in terms of education – not in terms of enabling people 
to understand the science, but to appreciate the benefits of particular products; 
· B2B companies, small and large, view stakeholder engagement as difficult, costly, and being best undertaken 
through intermediaries (media, government, industry bodies). Cosmetics companies are more engaged, 
though in downstream mode. 
· Companies involved in the medical/pharmaceutical sectors tend to be most interested in upstream and 
consultative modes of engagement, often as a result of previous negative publicity. 
  
For most companies interviewed (10 out of 15, 66%), stakeholder dialogue means an activity that primarily 
involves peers, customers, employees and to a lesser extent, regulatory agencies and government. One of the 
primary aims of engaging with peers and customers is of course to develop the company’s products, by attracting 
investment and collaboration, and by understanding in more depth the nature of the markets in which it operates, 
including the CSR expectations of downstream customers. In some cases, this has led to changes in a business 
model, or even to product innovation – a good example being Company M, who remarked on their development 
of manufacturing processes that do not rely on heavy metals, motivated by the requirements of the Japanese 
market.  
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Beyond this level, smaller companies often find the prospect of engaging with the public, media, CSOs and other 
organisations daunting, particularly in an “upstream” mode, although most believe that such processes may have 
positive business value. We will explore why they tend to believe this, once we have examined why a minority of 
companies have a negative view of stakeholder engagement. After covering the attitudes of smaller companies, 
we offer some comments on the activities of larger companies. 
 
One interviewee professed a “cynical” attitude to engagement activities, both upstream and downstream, noting 
that  
 
At the end of the day it comes to, to you know, people putting their hands in their pockets and pulling out and 
[…] buying the product (Company E) 
 
This stemmed, according to the interviewee, from experiences in the GM food sector. Whether people saw concrete 
benefits from individual products would make the difference between e.g. public suspicion and acceptance (see also 
Analytical Focus 4, above), and while it was important to have industry organisations like the NIA or CIA (for 
chemical companies) putting data in the public realm and communicating about risk, it was not thought that “it'll 
make an enormous difference”. Engagement exercises, the interviewee noted, tended to happen when something goes 
wrong, when a company has “hit a brick wall. They don't have a licence to operate.” 
 
For another company (K), the value of engagement was undercut if too many people got involved in it on an 
individual basis, as repetition would quickly render individual efforts increasingly redundant. A company involved in 
the food industry (F) suggested that companies in that sector find themselves in a double bind over early engagement: 
 
The problem is that they can't talk about it.  If they are doing it they can't talk about it for commercial 
sensitivity really.  They don't want to talk about it to give their competitors an advantage […]It is very 
difficult for them to say anything.  If they don't say anything then people will think they are doing it anyway, 
and if they say well, we are not going to involve ourselves in this nanotechnology thing then I don't believe 
that – with all these benefits of course they are looking at it.  So they are on a lose-lose in many ways. 
 
For these companies, wider engagement was either something which had little value on its own account, marked a 
failure to secure a “license to operate” by managing risk effectively within the company, or was something which 
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brought up collective action problems stemming from the logic of the market. 
 
The positive views of other small companies reflected assumptions that wider engagement could be an effective way 
to demonstrate to people that companies were managing risk effectively, and indeed that the risks of nanotechnologies 
had to be placed in an appropriate perspective. Public engagement in particular was seen primarily as a form of 
information management, required because of current inbuilt distortions within public perception, generated primarily 
not by public irrationality but by media sensationalism and NGO over-concern with technology as a source of risk.  
 
Looking at the present climate, a number of interviewees remarked on the tendency to represent nanotechnology as an 
over-unified field, which leads to assumptions that e.g. science at the nanoscale as such brings within it certain risks 
which affect all its applications (Companies A, F, K, M). One company (A) argued that it made excellent business 
sense, therefore, to undertake to break what sometimes seemed like a mutually reinforcing bond between a lack of 
public awareness  and industry silence, before scare stories damaged the whole industry. 
 
This company felt that both industry bodies like the NIA and individual companies should take responsibility for 
engaging the public, but also that, in common with other smaller companies who had a more positive view of 
engagement, this should be primarily via the media, and via the cultivation of contacts with what were seen as a 
growing number of journalists with a good record on science and technology stories. Models of upstream public 
engagement which solicit more consultative input from a wide circle of stakeholders (Gavelin, Wilson et al. 2007) 
were not mentioned by smaller companies as central to the meaning of engagement.  
 
Company E, although taking a more negative view of engagement activities in general, noted that certain 
intermediaries between companies and the media (such as the Science Media Centre) had proven highly effective at 
assisting journalists in presenting a discriminating and accurate depiction of science and technology issues. Skill in 
communicating with the media was a capacity which some (e.g. Company A) acknowledged they found problematic. 
Success here was seen as depending on being able to discuss issues in terms which spoke to the everyday frame of 
reference of the listener in order to successfully get across the likely benefits of a product – as opposed to the 
potential benefits of nanotechnology as such (Company G: “at the end of the day […] people don't buy technology on 
the whole, they buy products”). This indicates an assumption that it is individual products that are the subject of 
acceptance and rejection, rather than whole technologies, unless these technologies are created as an object of specific 
concern through the advocacy action of CSOs, etc. 
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When it comes to intermediaries, government and industry associations such as the NIA and CIA were seen as having 
important, though different roles to play. What links these roles, however, is the way in which they are seen as 
providing a legitimizing function for the communications activities which individual companies may carry out via the 
media. The NIA are seen as a coordinating function, through which a consensus industry view of current signature 
products, realistic future promise, and the current state of knowledge on risks may be produced and promoted. 
(Companies D, K, L).  The government’s role with respect to engagement activities was variously interpreted as the 
provider of opportunities for upstream, multi-stakeholder engagement (Companies F, G) and as coordinating efforts at 
filtering information, by e.g. setting up review committees who would put forward a balanced view of current 
research, preventing one-sided “inflammatory” publications and presentations by researchers from getting too much 
attention (Company A). 
 
Smaller companies we interviewed tended to operate in a business-to-business environment, and this – as well as the 
question of cost – may well influence views about the difficulties inherent for small companies in activities of this 
kind (Companies K, M). For larger companies, it is interesting that there was also an evident relation between 
primarily business-to-business activities and a lack of proactive involvement in wider stakeholder engagement, 
beyond engaging with the trade and, more occasionally, public media (Companies H, I). Larger consumer-facing 
companies (B, C) – and also smaller companies involved in medical technologies (N, O) – have more of an active 
engagement profile, with the most proactive being those involved in the pharmaceutical and medical fields (B, N, O). 
These companies tend to have regular and ongoing contacts with patient groups and panels of health professionals and 
representative of public healthcare authorities upstream during the process of product development: small or large, 
companies speak of ongoing contacts with “patients and the GPs, we already do that and we engage them all the time” 
(Company N);  “engaging with them, getting their opinion of you know the kind of things we're […] possibly 
interested in developing” (Company B). In addition, Company B mentioned other points of contact, including panels 
on EHS issues (including CSO involvement) and sustainability. Some of this activity was felt to be a result of past 
pressures from patients’ groups and CSOs, and past “perceived imperfections”. 
 
By comparison, the cosmetics company we interviewed tends to engage wider audiences more downstream, taking up 
opportunities offered to them by other organisations to present information on their activities, and their understanding 
of the benefits and risks associated with their products: they noted that “very often events that are organised by 
industry groups are seen as being some sort of front to […] brainwash people” (Company C). Again, as with smaller 
companies, the intermediary role of government, industry associations and other organisations like consumer groups 
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is seen as vital in order to establish the legitimacy of downstream engagement. 
 
 
8. Extent to which 
monitoring 
procedures for 
products 
containing 
nanomaterials 
differ from those 
not containing 
nanomaterials 
 
 
Summary 
· In the workplace, NMs are treated largely in accordance with existing risk management protocols developed in 
response to existing regulation; 
· A generally precautionary approach is evident, which in some cases leads to NMs being treated according to 
additional protocols and with extra toxicology and risk assessment being done; and 
· Products incorporating nanomaterials are made to meet the same standards as apply to other comparable 
products. 
 
Precautionary measures adopted by companies A, B E, I, K, ranging from SME to global in size, work on the 
assumption that hazard types and levels will be similar to existing sometimes very hazardous chemicals and 
biological agents (including powerful acids, poisons, mutagenic and teratogenic substances), even though their 
initial data suggests in many cases that nanomaterials they’re working with may not be anything like as 
hazardous. Procedures of regular, systematic and ongoing hazard assessment were also described by companies 
working on novel materials and other products, which one company (E) described as regularly checking with 
toxicologists whether the “big red button” should be pressed to stop development.  
 
A minority of SMEs noted that they typically monitor exposure levels for staff more stringently where NMs are 
concerned than with other materials (e.g. Company A). In general, however, NMs were not seen as representing 
novel forms of hazard that would require unusual or especially innovative measures within the workplace 
(Company D). However, some smaller companies also reported having run a series of toxicological tests to 
establish risk profiles for their materials in order to compare them with bulk version of the same chemical, which 
had led to peer-reviewed publications in toxicology journals (Company G). 
 
Beyond the workplace, products are generally assessed according to existing regulations covering specific 
products, in the absence of nano-specific regulation. One larger company (I) noted that the manufacture of 
products containing nanomaterials (such as films for use in food packaging) was geared to meet the same 
standards as other products they made.  
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The use of nano-pigments and emulsions in consumer products like sunscreens, one large cosmetics company (C) 
suggested, did not present any novel problems at all, given nearly 30 years of research into the potential exposure 
effects of such uses. 
 
 
9. Influence of 
modes of 
governance on 
attitudes to CSR 
 
 
Summary 
· Regulatory uncertainty is generally unhelpful, and will not generally of itself drive self- regulation; 
· Better engagement between regulators and industry might be necessary to educate companies on what 
regulations apply to them; 
· Some proposed mandatory regulatory approaches were seen as economically destructive, and a reaction to 
anticipated public fear; 
· REACh is seen as sufficient to capture NMs as it stands, and is welcomed by some as a positive regulatory 
model, though costs are high; 
· Mandatory regulations to deal with uncertainties surrounding NST (e.g. lifecycle risks) are seen as 
economically destructive rather than a positive driver for CSR uptake; and 
· Codes of conduct, for guidance and for accreditation, are seen as a useful step forward, on the other hand. 
 
6 out of 14 companies interviewed emphasised that the current regulatory environment in the UK and EU was, as 
they saw it, characterised by significant uncertainties. Of these, two multinationals (C, I) and one micro (L) saw 
this situation as negative, while two SMEs (A, G) saw it as a mix of positive and negative, and one SME saw the 
situation as a positive opportunity for the industry to develop its own models of best practice (Company M).  
 
Nonetheless, to resolve this uncertainty (by consolidating at the very least authoritative forms of guidance for self-
regulation) is seen as an urgent need. As one company pointed out,  
 
the absence of clear regulations, especially at an early stage of a technology, raises concerns around the 
controlled environment to levels that don't actually reflect necessarily the risk (Company G) 
 
However, this was seen as not a task which should be carried out, in the first place, by resort to hard law. One 
obstacle to further mandatory regulations might be, as two companies (M, N) suggested, a persistent lack of 
sufficient knowledge among companies of the regulatory environment in which they operate now.  
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Companies small and large were generally keen to stress that they strive to comply with all relevant regulations of 
which they are aware, but that further regulations designed to capture some of the risks and uncertainties that have 
been associated with nanotechnology (such as lifecycle risks) might have serious negative consequences. For 
example, the costs implied by imposing full liability for disposal on manufacturers of NMs used in other products 
would mean such measures would be unworkable (Company E), and similar measures designed to make full life-
cycle analysis of materials mandatory would be equally ruinous for the nanotechnology industry in the EU 
(Company C). 
  
In this regard, companies’ evaluations of REACh are interesting. One small NM manufacturer, who had been 
involved both with the DEFRA VRS and its counterpart in the USA run by the EPA, noted that the EPA version 
featured a phased approach to declaration and risk assessment that corresponded to the different technical 
problems associated with low-volume manufacturing for R&D on the one hand and high-volume manufacturing 
for commercialisation on the other: 
 
“We've got a consent order against manufacturing for export, from the E.P.A. in the States and within that 
they give us guidelines, that if we hit a certain value or quantity we then have to do full toxicological 
assessment […] Now to me that's sensible regulation.[…] It allows development and allows us to get to the 
point where it, it justify the costs of doing this, and until you get to the point, you have to use a precautionary 
approach.”(Company E) 
 
For E, it was felt that REACh is moving in the same direction, and would therefore encourage good practice in the 
industry, even though its costs are high. Others (e.g. Company H) affirmed that the general approach of REACh 
was useful to the industry, but that further mandatory regulation requiring additional data and reporting efforts 
would impose onerous costs. 
 
Further, companies see serious difficulties with targeting regulations appropriately. For example, various surveys 
of public opinion have suggested that labelling of nanoproducts is often called for by consumers (e.g. Which? 
2008). This form of governance was very unpopular with consumer-facing companies. Cosmetics companies (C) 
and companies engaged in exploring how NST could be applied to food ingredients and packaging (F) noted that 
proposed EU measures on labelling could be very counterproductive and should not be used as a “one-shot” form 
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of regulation for the industry.  Company C noted that, in conjunction with a general lack of public awareness 
about NST, labels would be interpreted primarily as warnings, especially on sunscreens, despite the company 
being assured that no evidence exists of health risks through dermal exposure.  
 
Company F made a similar point, noting also that a labelling regime based on “nanotechnology” risked positing 
too much of an identity between different applications based on factors such as particle size. C addressed this 
point too, arguing that the current EU definition of nanotechnology, as applied to cosmetics, meant that “any 
cosmetic product that contains an ingredient that has one or more dimensions of the order of 100 nanometres or 
less” would be covered by labelling. This was, C argued, a “hopeless” definition, and potentially one that could 
lead to WTO-driven conflicts on the international stage.  
 
In the current industry environment, some companies characterised the most useful forms of regulation as CSR 
“guidance”, perhaps provided through codes of conduct developed by multi-stakeholder groups including CSOs 
(Company F). Another, related form of governance which was strongly supported (by smaller NM manufacturers 
in particular) was accreditation for implementing codes of conduct (E, G), which could drive the adoption of CSR 
by having clear commercial benefits in terms of providing a “license to operate”.  The uptake by several 
companies of ISO9001 and ISO14000 indicate that accreditation as a form of governance is something which 
companies already take seriously, particularly where they collaborate with large companies from overseas (see 
Analytical Focus 3 above). However, Company E noted that accreditation standards, when connected to codes of 
practice, need to have “bite” – something, it was suggested, that some other attempts at such standards (such as 
those stemming from Responsible Care) have not possessed, and which industry bodies such as the NIA may help 
to promote. 
  
Annex 7: Scenarios Exercise – Overview of Scenarios8 
 
Scenario 1: Low consensus, high cost  
 
Summary 
 
· Public institutions have been slow to plan for the possibility of health or 
environmental risks related to nanotechnology and self-regulation on the part 
of industry has been hesitant.  
· This regulatory environment, together with a global recession at the end of the 
first decade of the 21st century, has been widely linked with a slower than 
expected spread of nanotechnologies.  
· Some occupational health concerns have emerged, and as a result public 
worries about nanotechnologies escalated.  
· Although nanoscale science is still being widely applied in commercial 
applications, the term nanotechnologies is used less, and the prefix nano has 
all-but disappeared. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 These scenarios were developed on the basis of ones employed in the engagement activities 
undertaken by the EU-funded Nanologue project (see www.nanologue.net). 
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Timeline  
 
2009 A public opinion poll of European citizens showed that, among the 
minority that had heard of nanotechnology, most had positive associations 
with the term, though didn’t necessarily trust either public institutions or 
private businesses to govern the application of the science effectively. 
Relatively slow R&D in key areas meant that nanotechnology products 
were still peripheral in the marketplace. Much heralded applications in 
healthcare and pharmaceuticals were still to emerge, with some companies 
projecting up to 10 years for these to reach market. 
2010 A major venture capital firm announced that it had embargoed all 
investment in nanotechnology-related products, citing a failure of the 
technology to deliver in the market as expected. This decision was ridiculed 
by most in mainstream science. An editorial in ‘Nature’ magazine said the 
decision was “not only foolish, but dangerous.” 
A number of different accreditation schemes for nanotech production 
companies have been launched in the last year, based on a mixture of CSR-
type approaches: ranging from high- level codes of conduct to detailed 
lifecycle risk management policies with auditing. Takeup has to date been 
slow: companies appear to be waiting to see which one becomes the 
“industry standard”.  
2010 Attempts to set up a global approach to regulating nanotechnology have 
begun, following a series of international meetings. The Framework on 
Nanoscale Technologies aims to be in place by 2012. 
Breakthrough advances in high volume manufacture of carbon nanotubes 
thought by industry insiders highly likely to make commercialisation of a 
growing number of applications an option, due to greater predictability of 
product and lower costs. 
2011 The UK Government criticises the slow development of the Framework, 
and moves to publicly back one of the available accreditation standards. 
Adoption of the guidelines it provides is voluntary. Takeup remains slow 
among SMEs – some complain about compliance costs. 
Advances in processor computing speeds based on extensive use of 
nanotubes and other nano-based advances in semiconductor technology are 
the business story of the year. 
2012 ICT continues to be a major area of application, with monitoring and anti-
counterfeiting technologies showing particularly strong growth. 
2013 It is reported that some construction workers involved with cutting concrete 
have begun developing difficult to treat respiratory complaints. They are 
discovered to have unusual complications. 
A UK newspaper publishes story about the constructions workers’ 
illnesses, suggesting a connection between their condition and the recent 
emergence of nanotube-reinforced concretes in the industry. The story 
surveys the growing use of nanotubes across a number of sectors. It also 
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compares the workers’ condition to “World Trade Center syndrome” 
(whose cause remains unknown), and recalls the studies published from 
2006 onward concerning the potential toxicity of the materials. 
2014 A coherent EU regulatory framework for nanoscience and technology was 
finalised, based loosely on the UK guidelines. 
2015 A consortium of European businesses published a report criticising the EU 
framework and committed to developing its own, stricter guidelines. 
2018 Nanodiagnostics continue to develop, and with them, concerns over privacy 
Applications are now no longer marketed explicitly as “nano”. The 
widespread nature of certain uses of nanoscale science is rarely brought up 
in debate. 
 
 
In depth 
Risk management and regulation 
Despite early attempts, it has proven impossible to establish a level playing field 
globally for regulating the development of new technologies. Instead, we have a 
piecemeal approach. In Europe, we have a legal framework, finalised in 2014 and 
based on voluntary guidelines established by a joint private-public working group in 
the UK.  
 
The USA has a different set of laws, as do the other main producers of nanoproducts. 
Recently, concerns have been raised that the framework isn’t tight enough. It is 
difficult to see how one company’s code of conduct aligns with another and to hold 
companies to account for their voluntary initiatives. 
 
Public debate  
Today, the dominant public discourse draws on a few high profile “scandals”. Many 
in science and industry feel that this is holding back progress. The media has adopted 
a sensationalist and adversarial approach, and is perceived by science as ill- informed 
and as continually returning to a series of iconic failures. The substantial number of 
lower- impact successes has largely been ignored and level-headed debate informed by 
scientific method is hard to come by. Likewise, in attempting to draw attention to 
risks, the NGO sector has missed the opportunity of separating out socially or 
environmentally beneficial applications of the technology from more worrisome ones.  
 
Access and inequality 
Due in part to the slow speed of commercialisation, and because the anticipated 
economies of scale have not taken place, nanotechnology-enabled products tend to be 
more expensive. It is thought this is likely to change in the near future, however, as 
the geographical centre of production continues to shift eastward, and countries 
formerly thought of as developing begin to determine the sort of products that are 
released onto global markets. The untapped markets in these countries present 
innovative companies with a major opportunity.  
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Once this opportunity is exploited, nanotechnology-enabled products will probably 
become available to a larger audience. At present there are few organisations 
clamouring for private or public sector action to open up access to nanotechnology. If 
anything, despite the benefits that nanotechnologies could deliver, prominent NGOs 
are arguing that it is the poor who have less freedom to avoid potentially dangerous 
nanoparticles. 
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Scenario 2: High Consensus, Slow Growth 
 
Summary 
 
· Regulation of new technologies has been standardised internationally and 
strong accountability systems are in place.  
· Public sector incentives, supported by multi-stakeholder participation forums, 
have directed research towards products that explicitly benefit society.  
· Local stakeholder forums debate issues that arise from the use of technology 
(such as privacy) and make decisions for their local area.  
· The strong regulatory regime, especially around issues of toxicity, has meant 
that health and safety risks are spotted early on and are well-managed.  
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Timeline 
 
2009 Several new developments in the EU mark a potential shift in the regulatory 
environment. Following new recommendations on labelling for cosmetics 
containing nanomaterials and calls from MEPs for an extension of the “no 
data, no market” principle, a review of the EU nanotechnologies action plan 
for 2005-2009 has taken place.  
As a result, a new platform was developed for dialogue between scientists, 
product developers, NGOs, consumer groups and others on the social and 
environmental aspects of nanotechnology. Early progress was made with 
some quick wins including: 
· Funding allocated for The European Centre for Environment, Health, 
Safety and Toxicology (ECEHST) 
· Moves to include training on the ethical, legal and social aspects of 
nanotechnology into all relevant higher education courses 
· Development of a protocol for the assessment of risk and 
implementation of moratoriums, if necessary 
· A requirement for all funding applications to be accompanied with a 
completed ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) assessment 
· Education programmes and funding to support development of skills 
and mitigate anticipated skills shortage in Europe 
Companies complain that there is no longer a level playing field, either 
within countries or internationally, as larger companies can absorb additional 
costs. 
2010 An OECD process for developing standards on nanoparticles is underway. 
The ECEHST was opened. The centre identified potentially harmful 
particles, provided guidance for regulation (e.g. where moratoriums were 
necessary) and advised on safety issues for workers and users. The 
development of life-cycle analysis for nanomaterials was a particular focus. 
2011 It is evident that growth in nanotechnology has slowed considerably. Many 
smaller companies have left the sector, with economic difficulties due to the 
global recession being exacerbated by increased regulatory costs. 
The food sector is particularly affected by the extension of modified labelling 
requirements to the emerging sector of nanofoods.  
The use of nanotech in electronics continues to grow, with a slow but 
significant increase in its diagnostic applications. 
2012 The first publication of standards for nanoparticles was announced in China. 
The OECD standards on nanoparticles were launched quickly in response, 
informed by data from the ECEHST. This is proclaimed by some as 
heralding a major step forward in providing a level international regulatory 
field, but others argue that the damage to nanotech has already been done. 
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International discussions begin on overhauling intellectual property/patenting 
systems, with a view to ensuring access to important enabling technologies. 
2013 The first moratoriums were announced and a number of products were 
recalled, based on research from the ECEHST. 
Little progress has been made on issues of intellectual property. 
2014 Privacy came to the forefront of the debate over. Nanosensors tracked what 
people bought, where they went and even what they said. The media and 
civil rights groups began to talk about this as an infringement on civil liberty 
and increasingly the public took notice. 
2015 Stakeholder debates took place across Europe to discuss what was off limits 
with respect to the use of nanotech to collect and transmit information. Clear 
signposts were required where the technology was in use, and products that 
used this type of surveillance technology were labelled accordingly. 
2016 By now, it was clear that the word “nanotechnology” was no longer a 
marketing tool. Nonetheless, nanoscale science was in abundant use, without 
attention being drawn to its employment. 
2017  Larger companies are examining the possibility of developing technology-
sharing programmes with developing countries, drawing on long-established 
models from the pharmaceuticals industry. 
2019 BBC documentary ‘Whatever happened to nanotechnology?’ is broadcast. 
The programme revisits 2009, the fears of the time and looks at 
developments of the past ten years. The programme takes viewers back to 
some of the more radical predictions that were made, as well as some of the 
more serious forecasts about risk, such as those concerning the possibility of 
human and ecological toxicity. 
 
 
In depth 
 
Risk Management and Regulation 
A strict regulatory environment has evolved. International regulatory standards, 
promoted by the OECD, have been in place since 2012. Environmental and social 
impact assessments are now required for every new application that uses 
nanotechnology. Life cycle analysis is standard, analysing the impacts of each product 
from production, through use, to disposal.  
Based on findings from the ECEHST, set up in 2010, there have been a number of 
moratoriums put in place on certain applications of nanotechnology.  
 
There is a central website resource from the ECEHST updated with all the 
information on the vast number of safety standards related to nanoparticles. This is 
mainly used by scientists and product developers but is free to access. EU and 
government funded multi-disciplinary teams that include representatives from NGOs, 
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companies, regional governments and delegates from local stakeholder forums, advise 
on regulation and the direction of research funding. 
 
Public debate 
Early mapping of key stakeholders enabled the European Commission to engage 
those with an interest in, those who might be affected by, or those who had a strong 
influence over, the development of nanotechnology – including scientists, product 
developers and other representatives from industry, NGOs, consumer groups, the 
media and academia. Effective dialogue at EU, national and regional levels has been 
key in directing nanotechnology towards more societal needs and building consensus. 
Educated through a series of high profile media workshops early on, the media has 
played a vital role in providing informed and balanced information on 
nanotechnology and galvanising effective public debate.  
 
Although nanotechnology itself does not have a high enough profile to warrant 
specific debate, issues related to the impact of nanotechnology, such as privacy, do. 
NGOs have also become much more targeted in their campaigning around specific 
issues – to great effect.  
 
Access and Inequality 
An unintended consequence of the careful approach in taking new technologies to 
market has been to add a premium to nanotechnology-related products. Consultation 
and dialogue cost money, and it is eventually the consumer that pays the price for this. 
Although this hasn’t affected the success of products in the market, it has contributed 
to an emerging “nanodivide” in Europe and the developing world. Therefore, rather 
belatedly, significant effort is going into developing new mechanisms to broaden 
access, although this poses many difficulties. For example, some NGOs are entering 
into partnership with companies to deliver crucial products to “bottom of the 
pyramid” markets, often bringing in third-party companies based in the developing 
world. The continuing suggestion of public sector subsidy for the most important 
products, such as water purifiers and air filters, is hotly debated. In 2012, international 
patent law came under sustained scrutiny in an attempt to prevent individual 
companies from wielding excessive market power and raising barriers to entry for 
new or smaller players, but little progress was made. Today, some are placing great 
hopes in efforts by large companies to open up access based on some established IP 
and technology sharing models from other sectors. 
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Scenari o 3: High Disruption, High Growth 
 
Summary 
 
· Scientific progress has been faster than expected and nanotechnology-related 
products are making a real impact on society and the economy.  
· Dramatic improvements have taken place in the efficiency of solar 
photovoltaic (PV) cells.  
· Long-term investments in fossil fuel resources are progressively losing value 
and new market entrants are growing quickly.  
· The speed of change has left regulation behind. Nonetheless, public debates 
seem to indicate that people feel the benefits so far outweigh the risks. 
·  
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Timeline 
 
2009 UK nanotech companies take the lead in backing a new code of conduct-
based model of voluntary regulation, overseen by a trade association. Some 
commentators note the resemblances between this approach and Responsible 
Care in the chemical industry. 
Many smaller companies are concerned at the potential costs of 
demonstrating they are compliant with the code. 
2010 After a short recession, business confidence is buoyed up by the emergence 
of small, efficient fuel cells, which are beginning to replace batteries in 
smaller electronic devices such as mobile phones and laptops. Progress in 
this area drove research in other areas of fuel cell research and led to 
advances in larger fuel cell technology for transport use. 
2011 There were dramatic improvements in PV – experimental solar cells were 
operating at 30 per cent efficiency. Prices began to drop. 
2012 Rapid developments occurred with the first commercially available printable 
PV. 
Governments across Europe struggled to keep up with the rapid pace of 
technological change. There was a lack of defined regulation. However, 
products were seen to have widely applicable benefits, so there were few 
objections. 
European governments offered large subsidies to home-owners who invest in 
microgeneration. 
2013 NGOs criticized the industry’s system of voluntary regulation, arguing that it 
lacks adequate oversight. They pointed to the emerging long-term problems 
of resource over-use and waste management. 
There was an increasing shortage in engineers and researchers resulting in an 
increase in salaries. 
There was a dramatic increase in the use of fuel cells in cars, at least ten 
years earlier than had been expected. Storage problems were solved by use of 
new composite materials and some houses were fitted with fuel cells as 
power sources. 
2014 Many of the old energy giants lobbied hard against the decentralisation of 
energy production. 
Greenpeace produced a report on resource use, which highlighted the limits 
of platinum availability and concerns about the lack of recycling of 
nanomaterials. 
2015 A Nobel prize was awarded to the team responsible for developing cheap, 
efficient spray-on solar cells. 
Robotics started to kick off due to small, cheap and highly efficient batteries. 
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2016 Concerns over resource use and pollution continued to increase. The 
recycling issue had still not been resolved. 
The first major nanotechnology-related incident at a manufacturing plant 
highlighted the risks involved and forced a rethink from governments on 
regulation. 
There was a worrying skills shortage in Europe. 
2017 The rapid spread of spray-on solar cells led to a worldwide rise in renewable 
energy production. For the first time there were signs that major reductions 
in CO2 emissions might be achievable. The importance and timing of these 
developments cannot be overstated as atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
had reached 400ppm. 
The religious right in the US scaled up its opposition to nanotechnology with 
a publication called ‘The End of God’s Children’, which questioned the 
religious implications of the advancing science of human modification. 
2019 In 2019 the disruptive nature of the developments has become apparent as 
centralised energy production begins to fall dramatically.  
There is increasing unrest in countries that have no access to the technology 
and representatives are calling on governments and corporations to ensure 
wider distribution. 
 
 
In depth 
 
Risk Management and Regulation 
The regulatory environment has struggled to keep up with the pace of technological 
change. Health and safety at the workplace and concerns over life-cycle impacts have 
recently made regulation a higher priority. Because of the increasing complexity of 
nano-enabled devices, and the fact that they are often embedded in other materials (as 
with solar clothing), recycling them effectively is extremely difficult. As the 
technology has a high profile in society and a huge market value there is resistance 
from business interests to any additional red tape. Regardless of this pressure, 
governments are finally starting to react to the rapid development of technology and 
new legislation has been introduced in the last two years concentrating on health and 
safety and long-term producer responsibility, including disposal. 
 
Public Debate 
In the years leading up to 2019, most public opinion polls showed an overwhelmingly 
positive response to nanotechnology. Nanotechnologies are seen by most to be 
delivering an obvious societal benefit. However, debate has intensified about the 
trade-off between rapid progress and the potential down-sides. Spray-on solar has 
raised awareness of the potential issues around how waste is dealt with when the 
product has reached the end of its useful life. There is increasing pressure for 
biodegradable alternatives to be developed. There is also increasing unease in 
religious circles about the path that the advances in technology are taking us, 
particularly with respect to advances in the science of human modification. 
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Access and Inequality 
There are still a number of developing countries that have not been able to take 
advantage of the rapid development of technology due to lack of infrastructure and 
investment. There is growing demand for energy technology to be made more 
universally ava ilable. 
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Annex 8: Analysis of Scenarios Exercise 
 
Summary 
· In general, effective anticipatory action on the part of industry and regulators requires 
that both stakeholders engage better with each other in more formal and systematic 
ways. 
· Effective communication with regulators and with the public is one of industry’s chief 
obligations, which may require institutional innovations within the industry. 
· The role of voluntary standards or forms of accreditation was seen as important, but as 
not providing anything like a panacea. Government needs to provided guidance on what 
such standards should cover. 
· Foresight is not just about anticipating negatives, but also about anticipating benefits, 
and enabling these to be spread as widely as possible without engendering negative 
socio-economic impacts  
· Upstream and consultative modes of wider engagement are very problematic, but in the 
face of insuperable uncertainties about latent effects, the question of how far such 
initiatives are possible and necessary will probably not go away. 
 
Introduction 
The scenarios exercise was run as part of a roundtable event for representatives from 
companies who had participated in the interviews in Phase 3, academia, and regulatory 
agencies. Three scenarios were provided, to serve as the basis of discussion of what were 
considered to be less and more desirable future outcomes for the development of 
nanotechnologies within society over the next decade. Each scenario was constructed around 
“outlier” or wild card events which were of low probability, but which could have a high 
impact.  Each consisted of a summary, a ten-year timeline of developments from 2009, and a 
more in-depth look at issues surrounding risk management and regulation, public debates about 
the technology, and economic impacts (see Annex 7 for full description of each). The 
development of these scenarios, using a set developed by the EU-funded Nanologue project as 
a template, was designed to reflect initial findings from Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the research. 
 
Methodology 
Participants were divided into two groups, including a chair and scribe, and asked to consider 
how voluntary regulation may play a role, in each scenario, in bringing about negative and 
positive impacts.  
 
Specifically, they were asked to consider the following questions: 
 
1. What could business and regulators have done to prevent or avoid negative outcomes? 
2. What might be the barriers here in 2009 to dealing successfully with the issues that arise 
within your scenario?  
 
In thinking about these questions, they were asked to consider in each case drivers which might 
be important within the three areas that are addressed “in depth” in each scenario: public 
debate, risk management and regulation, and technology access. 
 
They were requested to formulate 3-4 measures which should be undertaken (a) by regulators 
and (b) by business in order to address the barriers they had identified as existing in the present. 
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Participants 
 
Identifier Organisation 
Group 1 (Scenarios 
1 & 2) 
 
A Academic 
B HSE 
C MNC – Food 
D SME – Medical and Diagnostics 
 
Group 2 (Scenarios 
1 & 3) 
 
E NanoKTN 
F SME – Food 
G SME - Instrumentation 
H Academic 
 
Discussion 
Overall, Scenario 1 was interpreted as the scenario that industry fears most, in which regulatory 
gaps and/or poor practices lead to a situation which threatens to blight the nanotechnologies 
industry.  Tackling such a situation was seen to require several different measures.  
 
First, clear and early communication about risk and benefit was seen as vital, both within and 
outside the industry, in order to counteract potential negative consequences of media reporting. 
Trade organisations were seen as playing a key role here, with the goal being to help a wider 
circle of stakeholders understand the technologies, why they are being developed, and what 
benefits they might bring: “if they understand it more they may be prepared to adopt it.” 
Companies and trade organisations must avoid “talking down” and also have to make the 
message “credible and believable” (Participant F). But legitimacy and trust would be 
undermined by having the government take a lead on communication efforts, as they would be 
seen to have compromised their position as regulators in doing so (E). One suggestion for how 
trade bodies could organise was that, instead of umbrella organisations striving to represent the 
whole of the nanotechnologies industry, sectoral bodies could be constituted, helping define 
clear positions on risks and benefits for specific applications, and helping “quarantine” issues 
as they arose.  
 
Secondly, a lack of data and toxicological knowledge was seen as a contributing factor in the 
emergence of the CNT-related health scare. Participants suggested that more action should be 
taken at EU level to coordinate toxicology efforts, and that, at the national level, more targeted 
regulation based on exposure, risk and potential harm should be looked at in order to better 
capture the differences between potential applications of nanotechnology in different sectors. 
There was also some discussion of how well technology graduates are being trained to examine 
their activities in light of ethical and duty-of-care considerations. It was also possible, 
participants noted, that the latency of an exposure problem might make it impossible to predict 
its emergence, no matter how much toxicological research was done. Nevertheless, regulation 
had to be proportionate and react to risk and uncertainties as they were discovered. 
 
Although Scenario 1 was felt to be highly negative, Scenario 2 was felt to represent another 
source of danger – over-regulation. Indeed, this scenario was interpreted as demonstrating 
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some of the difficulties inherent in attempting to put in place the kind of measures that were 
seen as necessary to avoid Scenario 1.  
 
Early and heavy regulation in this scenario (particularly around the need to engage with the 
public in upstream mode) was interpreted as having added to economic difficulties caused by 
the recession (in the present.  Compliance with regulation was seen as having imposed heavy 
costs on smaller players, with the result that many small companies had been driven out of the 
industry. The main response participants saw as appropriate to this scenario was much more 
engagement between regulators and industry to decide early on what level of regulation would 
be necessary in order to ensure acceptance of technologies, along with safety. 
 
Perhaps the key interaction here was seen as between public consultation and a lack of 
profitability across the industry. The possibility of public opinions actually vetoing specific 
applications was seen as potentially having a direct impact on the survival of a broad range of 
nanotechnologies. 
 
The role of accreditation standards in driving responsible activity was also discussed in relation 
to both Scenarios 1 and 2, with some concern evident over how best these could be developed 
without engendering a collective action problem. Unless companies were given a clear view of 
which of several standards would be the best overall option, then they would be likely top wait 
to see which one survived a process of VHS versus Betamax-style natural selection (Participant 
E). One way forward might be for the Government to specify what kinds of criteria a code of 
conduct or accreditation standard might need to meet, and then allowing different standards to 
be developed. 
 
Scenario 3 was much seen in a much more ambivalent light. The benefits of the rapid 
technological advances detailed in the scenario were seen as leading directly to public 
acceptance, but that a demonstrable lack of foresight from industry and from regulators was 
evident, given the problems which emerged around the recycling, reuse and disposal of 
sophisticated and complex nano-devices and materials.  
 
A need for early investment in large-scale recycling and disposal infrastructure suited to 
potential future uses of nanotechnologies was seen as a key need, in order to avoid the creation 
in future of an excess of material.  Investment in such infrastructure could come from both 
government and industry, but this would be a global problem, as increasing access to complex 
consumer products in developing countries would probably not be matched by a corresponding 
increase in availability of “lifecycle technologies” or end-of- life infrastructure. A combined 
effort of increasing technology access in these areas to compensate, together with (as most 
signature products here are consumer products) a concerted programme of public education 
about the best ways to recycle products would be necessary. This scenario was seen as being 
one which most obviously required a great deal of complex coordination of efforts at a global 
level. 
 
Conclusions 
It was evident that participants from both public bodies and private companies saw in the three 
scenarios evidence that led them to call for better engagement between regulators and industry, 
both to avoid situations like the exposure problems detailed in Scenario 1, the issues of 
overregulation which participants saw as central to Scenario 2, and the lack of foresight 
apparent in Scenario  3. The need to differentiate between different uses of nanotechnology, 
both in terms of assessments of risk and of benefit, recalls various observations recorded during 
Phase 3 of the research (see pp. 104 and 114 above). The need to build in such considerations 
to processes of communication was seen as particularly important, both in terms of the forms of 
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information being promulgated, and in terms of the institutional innovations which might be 
necessary to communicate effectively (such as sectoral industry bodies representing food, 
speciality chemicals, and so on). 
 
As some participants noted, however, the possibility of latent and unpredictable problems 
(perhaps both in terms of health and environmental risks, and socio-economic issues, as in the 
technology access problems within Scenario 3) remains something which is extremely difficult 
to address, if not impossible. It is interesting here that the processes of wider engagement and 
consultation described in Scenario 2 were viewed negatively. As one company we interviewed 
suggested, regulation could be thought of as representative of “society's willingness to accept 
risk” (see p. 98 above). If these kinds uncertainty are unavoidable, then questions of how 
regulation extends to encompass them (which some have suggested may extend to formal 
processes).
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